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Executive summary 
What is the HANCI? 
This report presents the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index (HANCI) 2013. It seeks to: 
1. Rank governments on their political commitment to tackling hunger and 
undernutrition; 
2. Measure what governments achieve and where they fail in addressing hunger 
and undernutrition – providing greater transparency and public accountability; 
3. Praise governments where due, and highlight areas for improvement; 
4. Support civil society to reinforce and stimulate additional commitment towards 
accelerating the reduction of hunger and undernutrition; 
5. Assess whether improving commitment levels leads to a reduction in hunger 
and undernutrition. 
The report builds on the HANCI 2012, first launched in April 2013, and incorporates new data 
collated until December 2013. It also presents new primary research findings on political 
commitment in Bangladesh, India, Nepal, Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia. 
Why measure political commitment to reduce hunger and 
undernutrition? 
Globally, levels of hunger and undernutrition remain unacceptably high 
Hunger and undernutrition are among the most persistent global development challenges. At 
the global level, insufficient progress has been made towards achieving Millennium 
Development Goal (MDG) 1. Global numbers of undernourished people remain very high 
despite some improvements over the last year. A total of 842 million people in 2011–13, or 
around one in eight people in the world, were estimated to be suffering from chronic hunger, 
regularly not getting enough food to conduct an active life (FAO 2013). This figure is 26 
million lower than reported for 2010–12 (FAO 2012). Many countries in Africa still report high 
or very high child stunting prevalence rates, of 30 per cent or more. The worst-affected 
countries are concentrated in Eastern Africa and the Sahel. A few countries in South Asia 
also report stunting rates of up to 50 per cent (FAO 2013). Undernutrition contributed to 45 
per cent or 3.1 million deaths of children under five in 2011 (Black, Alderman et al. 2013). 
Progress towards reducing hunger and undernutrition has been highly 
variable 
Marked differences persist between the regional prevalence of undernutrition and the rates at 
which progress towards addressing this is achieved. Sub-Saharan Africa remains the region 
with the highest prevalence of undernourishment, with modest progress; over the last two 
decades the prevalence of undernourishment declined from 32.7 per cent to 24.8 per cent. 
Highly populous South Asia shows slow progress (FAO 2013). 
Many developing countries have benefited from substantial economic growth during the last 
two decades. For growth to have maximum impact, the poor must benefit from the growth 
process, enabling them to use additional income for improving the quantity and quality of 
their diets and access to health and sanitation services. However, governments need to use 
additional resources for public goods and services to benefit the poor and hungry. Thus, 
‘economic growth is necessary but not sufficient to rapidly accelerate reduction of hunger 
and malnutrition unless it is equitable’ (FAO 2012). 
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A high level of political commitment is essential to prioritise the fight 
against hunger and malnutrition 
There are many reasons for insufficient progress in reducing hunger and undernutrition. One 
of these is a ‘lack of political will’ or political prioritisation (FAO 2012: 22). Political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition would be shown by purposeful and decisive 
public action, through public policies and programmes, public spending and legislation that is 
designed to tackle these twin problems, drawing on newly gained wealth. 
The research methodology 
The HANCI compares 45 developing countries for their performance on 22 indicators of 
political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. It looks at three areas of 
government action: 
1. Legal frameworks 
2. Policies and programmes 
3. Public expenditures 
Figure 0.1 shows the structure of the HANCI. 
Figure 0.1 Structure of the HANCI 
 
 
The HANCI separately measures commitment to reduce hunger and commitment to reduce 
undernutrition, because hunger and undernutrition are not the same thing. Hunger is the 
result of an empty stomach and is caused by people having insufficient income or social and 
economic entitlements to access food. Hunger makes people more susceptible to disease 
and thus leads to increased illness and death. Hunger strongly undermines development. To 
‘cope’ with hunger, families can be forced to sell vital assets, such as farming tools, often 
perpetuating their vulnerability to hunger. Hunger can mean that children (particularly girls) 
are taken out of school so they can work; it causes communities to migrate away from their 
homes and, at worst, leads to permanent destitution, prostitution and child trafficking. Hunger 
also contributes to the onset of armed conflict (Foresight Project 2011: 3). 
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Undernutrition is related to, though subtly different from, hunger. Undernutrition is not only a 
consequence of hunger, but can also exist in the absence of hunger, and can be caused by 
non-food factors. Undernutrition results from both a critical lack of nutrients in people’s diets 
and a weakened immune system. In a vicious cycle, poor nutritional intake can make people 
more susceptible to infectious diseases while exposure to disease can lower people’s 
appetite and nutrient absorption. Undernutrition in the first 1,000 days of a child’s life (from 
conception until the age of two) has lifelong and largely irreversible impacts because it 
impairs a child’s physical and mental development. Undernutrition increases the risk of 
chronic diseases and premature death in adulthood, and negatively affects people’s lifelong 
ability to learn, be economically productive, earn income and sustain their livelihoods, and 
thus perpetuates poverty. In short, undernutrition undermines all aspects of development. 
Hunger and nutrition are not the same thing, yet can coexist, and require diverse instruments 
for remedial action, including a range of food security and nutrition-enhancing interventions in 
agriculture, health, hygiene, water supply and education, particularly targeting women. For 
instance, in countries where child stunting rates are considerably higher than the prevalence 
of undernourishment, as indicated by inadequacy of dietary energy supply, nutrition-
enhancing interventions are crucial to improve the nutritional aspects of food security (FAO 
2013). By separately analysing nutrition commitment and hunger reduction commitment 
HANCI identifies how governments prioritise action on hunger and/or undernutrition. 
The Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index draws on secondary data (owned by 
governments) and complements this with primary data on expert and community 
perspectives on political commitment in Bangladesh, India, Nepal in South Asia and Malawi, 
Tanzania and Zambia in Southern and Eastern Africa. 
We situate levels of political commitment within specific country contexts, such as their levels 
of wealth and economic growth, government effectiveness and, not least, their hunger and 
undernutrition statuses. 
Key findings 
In HANCI 2013, Guatemala, followed by Peru, tops the list of 45 countries in terms of 
relative political commitment to address hunger and undernutrition. Malawi is ranked number 
three. 
Guinea Bissau, Sudan and Myanmar languish at the bottom of the rankings. 
Guatemala retains the number one position on the HANCI, despite declining 
commitment scores. Guatemala continues to be positioned number one on the Hunger 
Reduction Commitment Index (HRCI) sub-index; however, it recorded declining commitment 
scores for both sub-indices, and it hence no longer tops the Nutrition Commitment Index 
(NCI) sub-index as it did in the HANCI 2012. Indeed, Guatemala is among the three 
countries seeing sharpest declines in nutrition commitment, and this is of particular concern 
given its deep and persistent nutrition challenges, notably one of the world’s highest child 
stunting rates (48 per cent). Moreover, Guatemala is assessed to annually lose over US$300 
million in GDP to vitamin and mineral deficiencies (World Bank 2010). 
What explains these declining scores? Compared to 2012, Guatemala saw lower health 
spending, lower civil birth registration rates and lower vitamin A supplementation coverage 
rates. Moreover, the last time a national nutrition survey was conducted is now more than 
three years ago. On the upside, the Government of Guatemala increased its spending on 
agriculture, and marginally improved the population’s access to water and sanitation and 
pregnant women’s access to skilled birth attendance. 
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Competition for HANCI’s top spot is heating up. In the HANCI 2012 Guatemala’s scores 
were substantially higher than the other top five countries. This gap has since declined. As 
compared to last year’s index, Guatemala saw weaker absolute performance on more 
indicators (five) than for which it saw improvements (four). In contrast, Guatemala’s nearest 
‘rivals’ showed net improvements across indicators. Thus, Malawi showed net improvements 
on three HANCI indicators. Madagascar and Peru showed net improvements over one and 
four indicators respectively. If the current pace of change is retained, HANCI 2014 will have a 
new leading country. 
Polarisation in the lower regions of the index is a cause for concern for some 
countries, and cause for cautious optimism for others. 
Some low-ranked countries are demonstrating a clear improvement of commitment 
(relative to others). Most notably, Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Liberia and Myanmar all 
show improvements on at least three more indicators than they deteriorated on. These 
countries showed minor improvements for several indicators (e.g. water and sanitation 
coverage) but some significant changes on other indicators. Thus, Angola improved its 
coverage of vitamin A supplementation by 27 per cent points, improved safety nets, and 
initiated a statistically representative nutrition survey that could better inform policymakers. In 
Liberia, notable improvements were made in terms of women’s economic rights, and public 
spending on health rose by 7 per cent points. Burundi saw notable improvements on a wide 
range of hunger and nutrition commitment indicators. The government increased agricultural 
spending by 5.9 per cent points; it enhanced people’s security of tenure over agricultural 
land; it enhanced the coverage rates for vitamin A supplementation; it enhanced access to 
drinking water and sanitation; it initiated a national nutrition policy/strategy; and safety nets 
were strengthened. This is good news. As the country has an ‘extremely alarming’ hunger 
status and found itself at the bottom of the Global Hunger Index 2013 (IFPRI, Concern 
Welthungerhilfe and IDS 2013) there is a desperate need for committed action. 
Worryingly, several countries that are already at the bottom of the HANCI ranking, 
including Guinea Bissau, the Yemen and Sudan are demonstrating a decline in relative 
commitment. The efforts of Guinea Bissau and the Yemen on hunger and nutrition are 
stagnating. Sudan, while making minor increases in public spending on health and 
agriculture, showed reducing access to water and sanitation, weakening women’s economic 
rights, and no recent nutrition surveys were undertaken. In others, positive change is too 
small to make a difference. For instance, in Myanmar, positive yet ultimately too small 
improvements on numerous indicators (net: five) did not result in significant improvements in 
relative commitment scores. In other words, positive change here is not only starting from a 
low threshold but is also too slow to allow the country to catch up with commitment levels 
demonstrated by other high burden countries. As a consequence, these countries are 
increasingly getting left behind, and also because other countries at the lower end of the 
rankings are demonstrating improved political commitment. 
Understanding political commitment in context 
The HANCI is calculated using political commitment indicators only. Yet, commitment must 
be understood within context, taking account of variables such as hunger and undernutrition, 
wealth and governance effectiveness. This process of ‘decoupling and recoupling’ 
commitment levels from outcomes and context variables enhances HANCI’s diagnostic 
relevance for policymakers and civil society. As in HANCI 2012 this entailed organising 
countries into four groupings expressing commitment levels (high; moderate; low; very low) 
relative to the other countries in the rankings. As findings for HANCI 2013 were strikingly 
similar, this section only presents a brief narrative of findings. The keen reader is referred to 
Annex C for detailed graphs and tables: 
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● Significantly, within areas of high and growing hunger and undernutrition 
prevalence, some countries are clearly showing much greater political 
commitment to addressing these problems than others. In sub-Saharan Africa, 
for instance, some of the smaller economic powers such as Malawi and 
Madagascar continue leading the charge against hunger and undernutrition, 
while Nepal is leading in South Asia. 
● Among those countries with high stunting levels and with ‘serious’ or 
‘alarming’ status on the Global Hunger Index, there is high variation in 
commitment; some are showing high commitment and others very low 
commitment compared to one another. Worryingly, in those countries that 
have seen stunting increase over the last two decades, current levels of 
political commitment are low to very low. Many countries in this position are 
currently or have recently been afflicted by conflict (Sierra Leone, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan), though not all (Benin, Niger). 
● Economic growth has not necessarily led to a commitment from governments 
to tackle hunger and undernutrition. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are 
global hotspots of hunger and undernutrition. Here, not only is hunger and 
undernutrition prevalence high, this is also where hunger is increasing most 
rapidly (FAO 2012). Many countries within these regions have achieved 
sustained economic growth over the last decade, making it possible for 
governments to more effectively address hunger and undernutrition. Yet, 
progress on reducing hunger and undernutrition is either too slow (e.g. South 
Asia) or stagnating (sub-Saharan Africa). 
● The countries showing relatively highest commitment are found in diverse 
wealth groups. Malawi, Madagascar and Nepal all show that low wealth is not 
necessarily an impediment for taking highly committed action on hunger and 
undernutrition. 
● Perhaps unsurprisingly, countries in the highest wealth group (>$3,500 per 
year per capita) are more likely to undertake committed action than those who 
are less well off. Encouragingly, greater commitment is now being recorded 
among those middle-income countries that were lagging, such as Angola and 
India. Yet, greater committed action on nutrition remains much needed, 
particularly in India as the country with the highest number of stunted children 
in the world. 
● The relative commitment to hunger reduction does not predict the relative 
commitment to nutrition (Figure 0.2). 
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Figure 0.2 Country performance: hunger commitment vs nutrition 
commitment 
 
 
Expert perception surveys in South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Nepal) and Southern and 
Eastern Africa (Malawi, Tanzania, Zambia) affirm the usefulness of distinguishing between 
hunger and nutrition commitment. Within these countries, experts assess their governments 
as showing consistently higher levels of commitment to reduce hunger than to reduce 
undernutrition, across spending as well as public policy and governance indicators. For a 
substantial number of questions that experts scored their governments on, we find mean 
scores to be different for hunger reduction and undernutrition reduction at high levels of 
statistical significance. 
Expert perception surveys further note the moderate to weak quality of implementation of 
various government schemes addressing hunger and undernutrition. These observations 
were also commonly made by communities consulted in India, Nepal and Tanzania. 
Greater government commitment to hunger reduction may be partly explained by the political 
economies underlying government action. In this respect, the expert surveys show that 
general publics, the media and civil society organisations as well as senior political party 
leadership are generally less supportive of government action on nutrition than on hunger. 
One major challenge therefore is not just to change government commitment but also to 
enhance commitment towards nutrition within these countries at large. 
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1 Introduction 
Hunger and undernutrition are among the most persistent global development challenges. At 
the global level, insufficient progress has been made towards achieving Millennium 
Development Goal 1. Global numbers of undernourished people remain very high despite 
some improvements over the last year. A total of 842 million people in 2011–13, or around 
one in eight people in the world, were estimated to be suffering from chronic hunger, 
regularly not getting enough food to conduct an active life (FAO 2013). This figure is 26 
million lower than reported for 2010–12 (FAO 2012). Many countries in Africa still report high 
or very high child stunting prevalence rates of 30 per cent or more. The worst-affected 
countries are concentrated in Eastern Africa and the Sahel. A few countries in South Asia 
also report stunting rates of up to 50 per cent (FAO 2013). Undernutrition contributes to 45 
per cent or 3.1 million deaths of children under five in 2011 (Black, Alderman et al. 2013). 
There are many reasons1 for insufficient progress in reducing hunger and undernutrition. One 
of these is a ‘lack of political will’ or political prioritisation (FAO 2012: 22). Political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition would be shown by purposeful and decisive 
public action, through legislation, public policies and programmes and public spending that 
are designed to tackle these twin problems. 
The HANCI’s objective is to develop a credible measure of the commitment to reduce hunger 
and undernutrition to help focus support and pressure for change, because the measurement 
of hunger and nutrition outcomes alone is not a sufficiently strong accountability mechanism. 
The theory of change behind the HANCI aims is that: (a) by credibly measuring commitment 
it will strengthen our ability to hold governments to account for their efforts in reducing 
undernutrition and hunger; (b) if civil society is better able to hold governments to account, it 
can apply pressure and ensure that hunger and undernutrition are put high on development 
agendas; (c) governments can hold themselves to account in their efforts to keep hunger and 
undernutrition high on the agenda: the index can help them to track and prioritise their efforts 
because the index is constructed on the basis of performance in different areas (legal, policy 
and spending); and (d) commitment can be linked to outcomes, to allow all to assess the 
‘value added’ of different commitments and effort. 
The HANCI is unique in three respects. First, its methodological insistence on decoupling the 
measurement of political commitment from outcomes (levels of hunger and undernutrition) 
distinguishes it from other food security metrics and scorecards, such as the Global Hunger 
Index (IFPRI et al. 2013), the Global Food Security Index (EIU 2013), SUN country analyses 
(SUN 2013b) and the World Health Organization’s Global Landscape Analyses (WHO 2013). 
Second, the HANCI presents composite as well as separate analyses of the political 
commitment to hunger reduction (using ten distinct indicators) and undernutrition reduction 
(12 indicators). Third, while the HANCI is calculated using secondary (government-owned) 
data, primary research is employed to deepen analysis of political commitment for selected 
countries in order to further support in-country advocacy by partner organisations. 
This report builds on findings from the Hunger And Nutrition Commitment Index 2012 
(HANCI) first presented in June 2013 (te Lintelo, Haddad, Lakshman and Gatellier 2013). It 
                                               
1 The Global Strategic Framework for Food Security and Nutrition (cited in FAO 2012) identifies the following causes of hunger 
and malnutrition: ‘lack of good governance to ensure transparency, accountability and rule of law, which underpin access to 
food and higher living standards; lack of high-level political commitment and prioritization of the fight against hunger and 
malnutrition, including failure to fully implement past pledges and commitments and lack of accountability; lack of coherence in 
policymaking within countries, but also globally and regionally; lack of prioritisation of policies, plans, programmes and funding 
to tackle hunger, malnutrition and food insecurity, focusing in particular on the most vulnerable and food insecure populations; 
war, conflict, lack of security, political instability and weak institutions; and weak international governance of food security and 
nutrition’. 
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presents an updated picture of the extent of government commitment to reducing hunger and 
undernutrition in 45 high burden developing countries, drawing on the latest available 
secondary data. 
Table 1.1 provides an overview of key features of HANCI 2012 and HANCI 2013. 
Table 1.1 Overview of HANCI for developing countries 2012, 2013 
Features HANCI 2012 HANCI 2013 
Focus Hunger commitment + Nutrition commitment 
Themes Legal Frameworks 
Policies and programmes 
Public expenditures 
Secondary data for index construction 
 Countries 45 
Indicators 22 
Aggregation of indicators Normalised values, at theme level 
Ranking scheme Bordia 
Primary data 
 Countries Bangladesh 
Malawi 
Zambia 
Bangladesh 
India (2012 data) 
Nepal 
Malawi 
Tanzania 
Zambia 
Experts interviewed 137 546 
Community focus groups 16 17 
 
While the HANCI 2013 continues to employ 22 commitment indicators, one minor difference 
with HANCI 2012 is that it merges two indicators (existence of a nutrition policy/strategy/plan 
with the existence of time-bound nutrition targets) into one composite indicator, for analytical 
reasons. 
This report further presents new rounds of primary research findings for Bangladesh, Malawi 
and Zambia, as well as research findings for three new countries: Nepal, India and Tanzania. 
Key partners involved in conducting the research and – critically – in using this in domestic 
policy advocacy are listed in Table 1.2. Finally, research is ongoing into partnership 
processes and policy impact pathways of HANCI; its findings will be reported on in the 
HANCI 2014 report. 
Table 1.2 HANCI partnerships 
Country Partners 
Bangladesh ActionAid Bangladesh + consultant 
India Oxfam India, Public Health Foundation of India
2 
Nepal Save the Children Nepal + consultant 
Malawi Civil Society Agricultural Network (CISANET) + consultant 
Tanzania Partnership for Action on Nutrition in Tanzania (PANITA) + consultant 
Zambia Civil Society Network on Poverty Reduction (CSPR), RuralNet Associates 
 
                                               
2 The research in India that is reported on here was funded by Oxfam India and conducted jointly by Oxfam India with the Public 
Health Foundation of India and IDS. 
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The remainder of the report is structured as follows. Chapter 2 recaps basic aspects of the 
HANCI methodology. Chapter 3 presents the HANCI country rankings, based on secondary 
data analysis. Chapter 4 discusses the empirical functioning of the index and the findings 
from a sensitivity analysis. Chapter 5 presents findings from primary research for five case 
study countries in South Asia (Bangladesh, India and Nepal) and in Southern and Eastern 
Africa (Malawi, Tanzania and Zambia). It is followed by a brief set of conclusions in 
Chapter 6. 
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2 Methodology 
The HANCI is calculated using political commitment indicators, whose operationalisation 
references key dimensions of food availability, access, stability and utilisation, and actively 
seeks to address food, care-related and other non-food aspects of nutrition. 
This chapter provides a quick summary overview of the methodology. Full details of 
conceptualisation, justifications for indicator and country selection, methodological choices 
regarding normalisation, weighting and ranking of the index (based on secondary data), and 
the methodology underpinning the primary research with experts and communities are all set 
out in te Lintelo et al. (2013). 
2.1 Secondary data on political commitment 
The HANCI 2013 continues reporting on the same 45 countries as in HANCI 2012 (Table 
2.1) and once more sets out how commitment levels relate to critical context variables such 
as hunger and undernutrition levels, wealth and governance effectiveness. 
Table 2.1 HANCI 2013 countries, in alphabetical order 
Afghanistan China Indonesia Myanmar Sierra Leone 
Angola Congo, DR Kenya Nepal South Africa 
Bangladesh Côte d’Ivoire Lesotho Niger Sudan 
Benin Ethiopia Liberia Nigeria Tanzania 
Brazil Gambia Madagascar Pakistan Togo 
Burkina Faso Ghana Malawi Peru Uganda 
Burundi Guatemala Mali Philippines Vietnam 
Cambodia Guinea Bissau Mauritania Rwanda Yemen 
Cameroon India Mozambique Senegal Zambia 
 
With one exception, the HANCI 2013 employs the same indicators as in HANCI 2012 (Table 
2.2).3 We have clubbed together two existing indicators into one composite indicator for 
nutrition commitment: whether a country (a) has a national nutrition policies/strategy/plan, 
and (b) whether this contains time-bound nutrition targets.4 Accordingly, these key 
commitment features continue to be accounted for; however, the new composite indicator 
facilitates statistical analysis (by showing greater variation in performance between 
countries). Additionally, for the Constitutional Right to Food indicator we adopted the 
categorisation of data offered by Knuth and Vidar (2011) revised from Knuth and Vidar 
(2006), and simplified from five to three answer categories. While this recategorisation is 
more accurate, it drives some swings in scores for countries, as compared to HANCI 2012.5 
The search for new data was completed by end December 2013. The HANCI spreadsheet 
presented on www.hancindex.org provides all key data sources. However, we have not been 
                                               
3 We also note that the relative importance of civil registration for accessing key public services varies across the countries 
included in the index and, for instance, depends on the effective presence of alternative mechanisms attributing legal identity to 
children.  
4 Consequently, nutrition commitment indicators for the policy and programmes theme are weighted 1/54th rather than 1/60th.  
5 For instance, Bangladesh was allocated highest scores for having an explicit mention of the Right to Food in the Constitution 
in HANCI 2012, whereas HANCI 2013 gives low commitment scores for this, as this right is not justiciable, being incorporated in 
the Directive Principles of Policy section of the Constitution.  
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able to provide updated data for all HANCI indicators.6 Complete data sources can be made 
available upon request to the authors. 
Table 2.2 HANCI indicators by theme and by type of intervention 
 Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
Direct 
interventions 
ICMBS in domestic law* 
Constitutional right to food‡ 
Vitamin A coverage* 
Complementary feeding* 
Nutrition budget* 
Indirect 
interventions 
Women’s access to 
agricultural land‡ 
Access to improved drinking water* 
Access to sanitation* 
Skilled birth attendance* 
Public expenditures 
on agriculture† 
Enabling 
environment 
Constitutional right to social 
security‡ 
Women’s economic rights‡ 
Civil registration of live births‡ 
Status of safety nets ‡ 
Security of access to land† 
Access to agricultural extension 
services† 
Nutrition in national development 
policies/strategies* 
National nutrition plan or strategy* 
Multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder 
coordination mechanism* 
Time-bound nutrition targets* 
National nutrition survey‡ 
Public expenditures 
on health† 
Note: ICMBS, International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes. 
*Nutrition indicators, †Hunger reduction indicators, ‡Hunger and nutrition indicators. 
 
As Table 2.3 shows, these HANCI indicators span multiple sectors and dimensions of food 
and nutrition security.7 
Table 2.3 Political commitment indicators by sector and dimension of 
food and nutrition security 
 Food and 
agriculture 
Women’s 
empowerment 
Social protection Health and nutrition 
environment 
Availability of 
food and key 
nutrients 
Public expenditures 
on agriculture† 
Women’s access 
to agricultural 
land‡ 
 Nutrition budget* 
Access to 
food and key 
nutrients 
Security of access 
to land† 
Access to 
agricultural 
extension services† 
Women’s 
economic rights‡ 
Constitutional right to 
social security‡ 
Constitutional right to 
food‡ 
Status of safety nets‡ 
Civil registration of live 
births‡ 
Vitamin A coverage* 
Complementary feeding* 
Skilled birth attendance* 
Utilisation of 
food and key 
nutrients 
   Public expenditures on 
health† 
Access to water* 
Access to sanitation* 
ICMBS in domestic law* 
*Nutrition indicators, †Hunger reduction indicators, ‡Hunger and nutrition indicators. 
 
 
                                               
6 No new data was obtained for the following indicators: access to agricultural research and extension services; the extent to 
which nutrition features in national development policies/strategies; women’s access to agricultural land; and the extent to which 
ICMBS is enshrined in domestic law. 
7 Several indicators are not shown in the table because they are cross-cutting (‘national nutrition policy or strategy with numeric 
time-bound nutrition targets’; ‘nutrition in national development policies/strategies’; ‘multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder 
coordination mechanism’; and ‘regular national nutrition survey’). 
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Finally, it should be noted that HANCI indicators share a common limitation: they weakly 
express the quality of government efforts. Arguably, real commitment should be reflected in 
thorough implementation of policies and laws, and in spending that reflects value for money. 
Typically, such data do not exist to allow for comparisons between countries. This is a 
problem across this whole class of commitment and governance indicators. At best, 
secondary data such as provided by the World Governance Indicators tell us something 
about the general quality of public administration in a country; accordingly, in Chapter 3 we 
show how countries’ commitment compares to governance effectiveness. Moreover, the 
primary data explore the quality of implementation. 
The HANCI 2013 retains the key design principles of HANCI 2012. It applies a subjective, 
theory-driven weighting scheme that allocates equal weights to: 
1. Each of the two sub-indices, such that the hunger reduction commitment and 
nutrition commitment sub-indices each contribute 50 per cent to overall 
HANCI scores; 
2. Each of the three policy, legal and expenditure themes (within the sub-indices 
and consequently in the overall HANCI). Figure 2.1 shows the HANCI 2013. 
Although we do present the weighting scheme preferences expressed by experts and 
communities in the countries where primary research was undertaken, these fluctuate 
substantially by country and are hence not applied to the international rankings. 
We assume full substitutability of sub-indices and themes. Given that the HANCI uses 
uneven numbers of indicators for its themes, and for its two sub-indices, any weighting 
scheme applied at sub-index and thematic level implicitly affects the weightings attributed to 
the individual indicators. While we suggest a trade-off between legal frameworks, policies 
and programmes and public expenditures, we cannot reasonably uphold this position at the 
indicator level. The unequal weighting of indicators means that, for instance, within the 
Nutrition Commitment Index putting the ICMBS into law or having a nutrition budget are 
weighted nine times more than coverage of access to sanitation; clearly this is contestable. 
Nevertheless, we decided to privilege comprehensiveness over equality of weighting for 
indicators. That is, we do not want equal indicator weighting to drive down the number of 
indicators to the lowest common denominator because we want to capture the multi-
dimensional nature of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. 
2.2 Primary data on political commitment 
As in the HANCI 2012, primary research was conducted involving expert perceptions survey 
and community consultations to capture contemporary perspectives on political commitment. 
The survey employed a structured questionnaire posing over 30 questions (plus additional 
sub-questions) to a variety of experts across sectors (Table 2.4) on hunger and nutrition in 
Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania and Zambia.8 These questions investigated 
aspects of political commitment (listed in Annex A) on which no routine data is collected, and 
which are therefore complementary to the indicators used calculating the index.9 
                                               
8 All findings presented here are based on surveys conducted in the period July–October 2013, with the exception of India, 
where expert surveys were conducted in 2012.  
9 For practical purposes, tables of findings present the questions in a summary fashion. 
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Figure 2.1 The structure of the HANCI 2013 for developing countries 
 
 
Table 2.4 Summary of respondent types, expert surveys 
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Government 14 8 11 12 20 15 15 8 103 
NGO/civil society 10 10 7 7 18 9 12 14 87 
Academia/research 10 4 6 7 10 6 6 4 53 
Development partners 4 5 5 6 6 9 5 12 52 
Other 2 7 9 3 - - - 2 23 
Total 40 34 38 35 54 39 38 40 318 
 
This report presents an analysis of expert perspectives on governments’ commitment 
organised around themes of public spending and policies and programmes. Based on 
feedback from project partners and policy stakeholders in Bangladesh, Malawi, Tanzania and 
Zambia this year’s report presents scores for individual rather than for aggregated sets of 
questions10 using percentages in tables and narrative labels in the text as set out in Table 
2.5. Questions are organised in tables that set out areas of strength and areas where political 
commitment can be improved. In most cases, separate scores are presented for hunger and 
for nutrition commitment. Where such scores differ substantially we calculate a mean score 
to allocate the findings to a table. 
Further tables set out expert perspectives on political leadership and external support for 
government efforts on hunger and nutrition. 
 
                                               
10 Aggregated scores for sets of questions constitute somewhat abstract commitment indicators; these are presented in Annex 
D. 
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Table 2.5 Translating expert survey scores in commitment levels  
Range of scores used in 
questionnaire 
Expressed as percentage out of 
100% 
Commitment level: narrative 
label applied in report 
<1.75 >81% Very strong 
>=1.75 – 2.25 <=81%–69% Strong 
>=2.25 - 2.75 <=69%–56% Fairly strong 
>=2.75 – 3.25 <=56%–44% Moderate 
>=3.25 – 3.75 <=44%–31% Fairly weak 
>=3.75–4.25 <=31%–19% Weak 
 
For Bangladesh, Malawi and Zambia we present a temporal analysis of changing expert 
perspectives, as the survey questionnaire (with minor modifications) was applied in 2012 and 
2013. For Bangladesh and Zambia, where appropriate, we also compare with findings from a 
prototype survey conducted in 2011. 
The expert survey methodology was designed to revisit the same experts over time. This 
proved difficult as attrition was high, for various reasons such as staff turnover, unavailability, 
illness, etc. As a result we could not treat the 2013 sample as a repeat of the 2012 sample. 
This was reflected in the choice of test statics employed below. 
The analysis uses independent sample student t-tests to highlight cases with statistically 
significant temporal changes in scores between 2012 and 2013. We were not able to use 
paired sample t-tests (also known as repeated sample t-test) for this because all of the 
respondents in 2012 could not be interviewed as repeat cases in 2013. The analysis similarly 
employs a paired sample student t-test to assess the statistical significance of differences in 
scores allocated by the experts to hunger versus nutrition commitment in 2013. In a few 
cases the paired sample t-test was accommodated by dropping from the analysis any 
observations that could not be paired due to missing values. We highlight which of the 
reported scores are significantly different at the 90 per cent, 95 per cent and 99 per cent 
confidence level. 
For India, we not only examined mean scores across hunger/nutrition divide within each 
state, we also examined whether the inter-state differences implied by experts’ responses 
were in fact statistically significant. Annex D contains the results of these tests which were 
based on a series of one-way ANOVA (analysis of variance) tests examining whether the 
mean scores for each question were different among states. The annex covers two types of 
tests: (1) one overall ANOVA test where the null hypothesis was that at least one pair out of 
the three pairs of states had statistically different means (this is an F-test); and (2) three pair-
wise post hoc tests (Bihar–Uttar Pradesh (UP), Odisha–Bihar, and UP–Odisha) where the 
null hypothesis was that the mean scores of two states were equal. Annex D tabulates the 
significance level of each of these four tests. The results were separated into hunger and 
nutrition elements when the data permitted it. 
For India, Nepal and Tanzania, we further present findings from community-based research 
that aimed to explore individual and collective accounts and perceptions of existing 
government actions and intentions to reduce hunger and undernutrition. This research 
employed focus group discussions in a limited number of localities (Table 2.6). 
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Table 2.6 Community voices: focus group discussion locations 
Country Locations Focus 
groups 
India Bihar State: Gaya district; Patna city 3 
Odisha State: Mayurbhanj district 3 
Uttar Pradesh State: Balarampur district; Lucknow city 3 
Nepal Chitwan District: Jagatpur Village Development Committee; Bharatpur municipality 2 
Nawalparasi District: Patkhauli; Parasi; Ramgram Municipality 2 
Tanzania Lindi Rural District: Kijiweni village; Chiwerere village 4 
Total 17 
 
Furthermore, a simple exercise was conducted through which community members allocated 
weightings to three dimensions of political commitment: legal frameworks; policies and 
programmes; and public expenditures. The communities were asked to assert what they felt 
should be priority areas for government action. In addition to the research, community 
perspectives were captured in audio-visual materials, using photographs, videos and audio-
recordings, for subsequent transcription, production and dissemination.11 
                                               
11 This was guided by a protocol explaining and agreeing with respondents the voluntary waiver of anonymity and 
confidentiality. 
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3 HANCI findings drawing on secondary data 
An elaborate sensitivity analysis demonstrated the robustness of the index; that is, rankings 
would not significantly alter had we decided to employ alternative design and methodological 
choices (te Lintelo et al. 2013). As the HANCI employs a theory-driven approach to building 
the index, this section explores whether the index hangs together empirically, by ascertaining 
its internal reliability. 
3.1 Internal reliability 
HANCI can be considered reliable if it ranks two countries with the same level of political 
commitment on par with each other. In statistical terms, reliability is a measure of whether 
individual indicators in the HANCI produce results that are consistent with the overall HANCI. 
Arguably, the most commonly used measure of internal reliability is Cronbach’s alpha or the 
standardised version thereof. Table 3.1 tabulates standard and modified Cronbach’s alphas 
based on the heterogeneous correlation matrix for the HANCI and its sub-indices (HRCI and 
NCI). The modified version is more accurate as it uses appropriate correlation types for all 
indicators based on their data types (see te Lintelo et al. 2013 for more details). 
Table 3.1 Cronbach’s alphas for HRCI, NCI and HANCI 
 Number of 
countries 
Indicators Cronbach’s α Modified 
Cronbach’s α 
HANCI 45 21 0.6130 0.6856 
HRCI 45 10 0.5249 0.6623 
NCI 45 11 0.5375 0.6397 
 
The first observation to make from Table 3.1 is that the alphas for HANCI are higher than for 
either of its sub-indices, confirming that hunger reduction commitment and nutrition 
commitment are distinct (albeit related) entities. Because Cronbach alphas should not be 
used as a measure of unidimensionality (Field 2009), HRCI and NCI alphas should be 
expected not to be greater than the overall HANCI alpha, to demonstrate statistical evidence 
for the existence of underlying themes/factors. 
Researchers commonly use 0.7 as a rule of thumb cut-off value when using Cronbach’s 
alpha to determine the internal reliability within a set of indicators. Table 3.1 shows that 
HANCI’s α value is lower and the modified α value is marginally lower than 0.7. We are 
nevertheless confident that this is not something to be worried about. Te Lintelo et al. (2013) 
offer two reasons for not putting too much emphasis on alpha values which are lower than 
0.7. Here we briefly restate them (see te Lintelo et al. 2013 for more details) as: (1) the 
existence of a substantial body of literature that argues against the blind application of 0.7 
cut-off value of Cronbach’s alpha (Cortina 1993; Schmitt 1996). This literature clearly shows 
that factors other than internal reliability could affect the value of alpha; and (2) the 
Cronbach’s alpha value for the HANCI is suppressed because the index combines data from 
countries that have low incidence of hunger with data from countries with high incidence of 
hunger (as measured by the Global Hunger Index, GHI). If instead data from only the high 
GHI countries were used (i.e. by excluding Brazil, China, Peru and South Africa) in 
calculating the Cronbach’s alpha, its value will improve. In the case of HANCI 2013, the 
Cronbach’s alpha value increases to 0.7016 with the exclusion of four low GHI countries. We 
can therefore be confident that the indicators used in the HANCI 2013 are internally reliable. 
Accordingly, we conclude that HANCI works empirically, to affirm our theory-driven choice of 
hunger reduction commitment and nutrition commitment sub-indices. 
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3.2 Interpreting HANCI rankings 
Before setting out the HANCI rankings, readers should be aware of the following features of 
the index: 
● The HANCI aggregates relative (not absolute) political commitment levels. 
HANCI indicators are measured on ordinal, categorical and cardinal scales, 
and the index is therefore not able to meaningfully calculate absolute 
commitment levels aggregated across indicators. 
● Instead, the HANCI employs the Borda scoring technique to calculate scores 
for the HRCI and NCI sub-indices and for the three themes that compose 
these (policies and programmes, spending and legal frameworks). Borda 
scoring respects the diversity of measurement scales and thus allows the 
valid calculation of aggregate scores across indicators. Resultant Borda 
scores are translated in rankings. 
● It is important to remember that the Borda scores do not represent absolute 
commitment levels; they represent relative political commitment levels. For 
this reason also, the HANCI does not identify absolute benchmarks of 
commitment to be achieved. 
● The HANCI compares countries’ performance relative to one another. 
Consequently, a ranking emerges regardless of the (weak or strong) 
performance of countries. 
● Countries that show relatively high commitment levels in the HANCI do not 
necessarily perform strongly on all of the composite indicators. High rankings 
should not be a reason to sit back and relax: often, substantial scope remains 
to enhance performance on selected indicators. 
● Absolute commitment levels can be ascertained for all individual indicators 
(not aggregations) by referring to the raw data (prior to normalisation) shown 
in the spreadsheet in Annex B. Tables in chapters 4 and 5 show for six 
primary research countries (Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania and 
Zambia) where such change occurred in indicator scores over the last year. 
● Countries may improve their absolute performance on indicators, say between 
HANCI 2012 and HANCI 2013, yet fail to improve their rankings, when other 
countries’ performance improvements are at least just as fast. To prevent 
demotivation, we suggest that wherever absolute performance on indicators 
improves, this should be the benchmark (not country rankings). 
● Finally, commitment rankings should not be confused with hunger and 
nutrition outcomes. 
3.3 Key findings for the HANCI 2013 
In HANCI 2013, Guatemala, followed by Peru, tops the list of 45 countries in terms of 
relative political commitment to address hunger and undernutrition. Malawi is ranked number 
three (Table 3.2). 
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Table 3.2 Hunger reduction commitment, nutrition commitment and 
overall Hunger and Nutrition Commitment scores and 
rankings, 2013 
 HRCI  
Score 
NCI  
Score 
HANCI  
Score 
HRCI  
Ranks 
NCI  
Ranks 
HANCI  
Ranks 
Guatemala 108 119 227 1 3 1 
Peru 106 115 221 2 5 2 
Malawi 99 115 214 8 5 3 
Brazil 101 110 211 7 9 4 
Madagascar 106 103 209 2 11 5 
Nepal 79 123 202 19 2 6 
Tanzania 78 118 196 20 4 7 
Gambia 61 134 195 31 1 8 
Burkina Faso 99 95 194 8 17 9 
Ghana 92 101 193 12 13 10 
Philippines 88 103 191 14 11 11 
Indonesia 76 114 190 22 7 12 
Rwanda 105 85 190 6 23 12 
Senegal 93 91 184 11 19 14 
Vietnam 84 98 182 17 15 15 
Bangladesh 65 112 177 27 8 16 
Uganda 67 106 173 26 10 17 
South Africa 106 64 170 2 35 18 
India 95 74 169 10 28 19 
China 106 57 163 2 37 20 
Benin 62 100 162 29 14 21 
Ethiopia 88 73 161 14 29 22 
Niger 72 88 160 23 21 23 
Mali 90 67 157 13 33 24 
Mozambique 58 98 156 34 15 25 
Cambodia 71 84 155 25 24 26 
Kenya 72 76 148 23 26 27 
Pakistan 52 95 147 37 17 28 
Sierra Leone 59 87 146 32 22 29 
Zambia 64 75 139 28 27 30 
Liberia 83 51 134 18 38 31 
Burundi 59 70 129 32 31 32 
Côte d’Ivoire 41 82 123 40 25 33 
Nigeria 51 69 120 39 32 34 
Lesotho 87 26 113 16 44 35 
Togo 78 33 111 20 43 36 
Mauritania 62 48 110 29 39 37 
Cameroon 35 73 108 41 29 38 
Afghanistan 14 90 104 45 20 39 
Yemen 30 65 95 42 34 40 
Congo, DR 52 42 94 37 41 41 
Angola 54 39 93 35 42 42 
Myanmar 27 58 85 43 36 43 
Sudan 54 25 79 35 45 44 
Guinea Bissau 18 45 63 44 40 45 
Note: Calculations based on Additive + Borda method, with equal weights by theme. 
Guinea Bissau, Sudan and Myanmar languish at the bottom of the rankings. 
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Table 3.3 Temporal changes in relative scores and ranks, and absolute 
scores for indicators, by country, 2012–2013 
 Change in Borda 
Score (2013–
2012) 
Change in Ranks 
(2012–2013) 
Indicators 
with no 
change in 
score 
Indicators 
with 
absolute 
score 
declines 
Indicators 
with 
absolute 
score 
increases 
Net 
number 
of 
Indicators 
with 
absolute 
score 
declines 
HANCI HRCI NCI HANCI HRCI NCI  (1) (2) (2)–(1) 
Afghanistan 0 6 -6 -3 0 -5 14 2 6 4 
Angola 13 7 6 1 1 2 13 3 6 3 
Bangladesh -12 -9 -3 -4 -6 -2 13 3 6 3 
Benin 15 8 7 5 4 3 12 4 6 2 
Brazil 1 5 -4 0 3 -2 13 5 4 -1 
Burkina Faso -4 -5 1 1 -3 -1 13 5 4 -1 
Burundi 43 24 19 10 8 7 10 2 10 8 
Cambodia -20 -16 -4 -8 -8 -2 13 4 5 1 
Cameroon -14 -12 -2 -5 -5 -1 13 6 3 -3 
China -5 3 -8 2 5 -4 16 1 5 4 
Congo, DR 18 23 -5 3 4 -1 14 3 5 2 
Côte d’Ivoire -9 -4 -5 -2 -1 -1 13 5 4 -1 
Ethiopia 1 -8 9 3 -4 5 10 5 7 2 
Gambia -6 -10 4 0 -7 1 11 7 4 -3 
Ghana -5 -2 -3 0 0 0 14 6 2 -4 
Guatemala -13 -1 -12 0 0 -2 13 5 4 -1 
Guinea Bissau -11 -6 -5 0 0 -1 15 4 3 -1 
India 31 28 3 10 17 2 12 3 7 4 
Indonesia -14 -14 0 -5 -8 0 13 6 3 -3 
Kenya 34 26 8 7 15 6 14 4 4 0 
Lesotho 9 17 -8 1 9 -1 14 5 3 -2 
Liberia 22 18 4 4 10 2 12 3 7 4 
Madagascar -4 5 -9 -2 6 -2 13 4 5 1 
Malawi -8 -6 -2 -1 -6 0 15 2 5 3 
Mali -20 -14 -6 -8 -8 -4 13 5 4 -1 
Mauritania 9 14 -5 1 6 -2 14 2 6 4 
Mozambique -30 -10 -20 -12 -8 -11 14 4 4 0 
Myanmar -4 1 -5 -2 0 -1 13 2 7 5 
Nepal 27 29 -2 12 15 1 15 1 6 5 
Niger -2 0 -2 1 0 -1 13 5 4 -1 
Nigeria -15 -4 -11 -4 -7 -5 13 5 4 -1 
Pakistan 0 -11 11 -2 -7 8 13 3 6 3 
Peru 11 1 10 2 0 6 12 3 7 4 
Philippines -14 -12 -2 -5 -5 0 14 2 6 4 
Rwanda 11 15 -4 2 8 -2 13 2 7 5 
Senegal 12 4 8 7 5 7 15 3 4 1 
Sierra Leone -1 0 -1 -3 -1 0 15 4 3 -1 
South Africa 3 1 2 5 0 1 13 3 6 3 
Sudan -13 -10 -3 -4 -6 0 15 5 2 -3 
Tanzania -5 -13 8 1 -7 6 12 5 5 0 
Togo -12 0 -12 -4 0 -1 13 7 2 -5 
Uganda 0 -14 14 3 -7 9 12 6 4 -2 
Vietnam 3 -2 5 -1 1 2 13 3 6 3 
Yemen -2 2 -4 -1 0 -3 14 4 4 0 
Zambia -37 -10 -27 -13 -7 -13 13 6 3 -3 
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Table 3.3 shows countries’ performance in HANCI 2012 and 2013. The change in rankings 
give a quick impression of how well a country has done relative to others, and the revised 
Borda scores provide a relative measure of the size of their temporal differences in 
performance.12 Note that a country’s performance on the HANCI over time is affected 
by its own as well as the other countries’ baseline 2012 and 2013 performance on each 
indicator. In order to understand any country’s absolute commitment, we guide readers 
towards absolute scores on individual indicators, see www.hancindex.org/explore-the-
data/view-the-data/. This report will highlight for selected countries the indicators on which 
absolute scores improved or deteriorated between the 2012 and 2013 issues of the HANCI. 
Guatemala retains the number one position on the HANCI, despite declining 
commitment scores. Guatemala continues to be positioned number one on the HRCI sub-
index; however, it recorded declining commitment scores for both sub-indices, and it hence 
no longer tops the NCI sub-index as it did in the HANCI 2012. Indeed, Guatemala is among 
the three countries seeing sharpest declines in nutrition commitment, and this is of particular 
concern given its deep and persistent nutrition challenges, notably one of the world’s highest 
child stunting rates (48 per cent). Moreover, Guatemala is assessed to annually lose over 
US$300 million in GDP to vitamin and mineral deficiencies (World Bank 2010). 
What explains these declining scores? Compared to 2012, Guatemala saw lower health 
spending, lower civil birth registration rates and lower vitamin A supplementation coverage 
rates. Moreover, the last time a national nutrition survey was conducted is now more than 
three years ago. On the upside, the Government of Guatemala increased its spending on 
agriculture and marginally improved the population’s access to water and sanitation and 
pregnant women’s access to skilled birth attendance. 
Competition for HANCI’s top spot is heating up. In the HANCI 2012 Guatemala’s scores 
were substantially higher than the other top five countries. This gap has since declined. As 
compared to last year’s index, Guatemala saw weaker absolute performance on more 
indicators (five) than for which it saw improvements (four). In contrast, Guatemala’s nearest 
‘rivals’ showed net improvements across indicators. Thus, Malawi showed net improvements 
on three HANCI indicators. Madagascar and Peru showed net improvements over one and 
four indicators respectively. If the current pace of change is retained, HANCI 2014 will have a 
new leading country. 
Polarisation in the lower regions of the index is a cause for concern for some 
countries, and cause for cautious optimism for others. 
Some lowly ranked countries are demonstrating a clear improvement of commitment 
(relative to others). Most notably, Afghanistan, Angola, Burundi, Liberia and Myanmar all 
show improvements on at least three more indicators than they deteriorated on. These 
countries showed minor improvements for several indicators (e.g. water and sanitation 
coverage) but some significant changes on other indicators. Thus, Angola improved its 
coverage of vitamin A supplementation by 27 per cent points, improved safety nets and 
initiated a statistically representative nutrition survey that could better inform policymakers. In 
Liberia, notable improvements were made in terms of women’s economic rights, and public 
spending on health rose by seven per cent points. Burundi saw notable improvements on a 
                                               
12 Because a country’s rankings depend not just on its own score (Borda points) but also on those of other countries, some 
apparent anomalies occur. For instance, we find countries that are improving in terms of Borda points but are getting lower 
rankings: several countries such as Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Brazil, Cameroon, Lesotho, Madagascar and Myanmar gained 
the same as or slightly higher HANCI Borda scores than in 2012, yet obtained lower rankings, as they were outpaced by other 
countries. Conversely, some countries such as Burkina Faso, China, Ghana and our top- and bottom-ranked countries – 
Guatemala and Guinea Bissau, and Uganda – obtained the same or lower HANCI scores yet found themselves ranked similarly 
or slightly higher than in the previous year, as others showed faster deterioration of commitment. Countries with biggest overall 
declines in Borda points such as Mozambique and Zambia showed weakened outcomes on only one indicator more than for 
which they saw improvements. 
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wide range of hunger and nutrition commitment indicators. The government increased 
agricultural spending by 5.9 per cent points; it enhanced people’s security of tenure over 
agricultural land; it enhanced the coverage rates for vitamin A supplementation; it enhanced 
access to drinking water and sanitation; it initiated a national nutrition policy/strategy; and 
safety nets were strengthened. This is good news. As the country has an ‘extremely 
alarming’ hunger status and found itself at the bottom of the Global Hunger Index 2013 
(IFPRI et al. 2013) there is a desperate need for committed action. 
Worryingly, several countries that are already at the bottom of the HANCI ranking, 
including Guinea Bissau, the Yemen and Sudan are demonstrating a decline in relative 
commitment. The efforts of Guinea Bissau and the Yemen on hunger and nutrition are 
stagnating. Sudan, while making minor increases in public spending on health and 
agriculture, showed reducing access to water and sanitation, weakening women’s economic 
rights, and no recent nutrition surveys were undertaken. In others, positive change is too 
small to make a difference. For instance, in Myanmar, positive yet ultimately too small 
improvements on numerous indicators (net: five) did not result in significant improvements in 
relative commitment scores. In other words, positive change here is not only starting from a 
low threshold, but is also too slow to allow the country to catch up with commitment levels 
demonstrated by other high burden countries. As a consequence, these countries are 
increasingly getting left behind, also because other countries at the lower end of the rankings 
are demonstrating improved political commitment. 
3.4 Understanding political commitment in context 
The HANCI is calculated using political commitment indicators only. Yet, commitment must 
be understood within context, taking account of variables such as hunger and undernutrition, 
wealth and governance effectiveness. This process of ‘decoupling and recoupling’ 
commitment levels from outcomes and context variables enhances HANCI’s diagnostic 
relevance for policymakers and civil society. As in HANCI 2012 this entailed organising 
countries into four groupings expressing commitment levels (high; moderate; low; very low) 
relative to the other countries in the rankings. As findings for HANCI 2013 were strikingly 
similar, this section only presents a brief narrative of findings. The keen reader is referred to 
Annex C for detailed graphs and tables: 
● Significantly, within areas of high and growing hunger and undernutrition 
prevalence, some countries are clearly showing much greater political 
commitment to addressing these problems than others. In sub-Saharan Africa 
for instance, some of the smaller economic powers such as Malawi and 
Madagascar continue leading the charge against hunger and undernutrition, 
while Nepal is leading in South Asia. 
● Among those countries with high stunting levels and with ‘serious’ or 
‘alarming’ status on the Global Hunger Index, there is high variation in 
commitment; some are showing high commitment and others very low 
commitment compared to one another. Worryingly, in those countries that 
have seen stunting increase over the last two decades, current levels of 
political commitment are low to very low. Many countries in this position are 
currently or have recently been afflicted by conflict (Sierra Leone, Côte 
d’Ivoire, Pakistan, Yemen, Afghanistan), though not all (Benin, Niger). 
● Economic growth has not necessarily led to a commitment from governments 
to tackle hunger and undernutrition. Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia are 
global hotspots of hunger and undernutrition. Here, not only is hunger and 
undernutrition prevalence high, this is also where hunger is increasing most 
rapidly (FAO 2012). Many countries within these regions have achieved 
sustained economic growth over the last decade, making it possible for 
governments to more effectively address hunger and undernutrition. Yet, 
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progress on reducing hunger and undernutrition is either too slow (e.g. South 
Asia) or stagnating (sub-Saharan Africa). 
● The countries showing relatively highest commitment are found in diverse 
wealth groups. Malawi, Madagascar and Nepal all show that low wealth is not 
necessarily an impediment for taking highly committed action on hunger and 
undernutrition. 
● Perhaps unsurprisingly, countries in the highest wealth group (>$3,500 per 
year per capita) are more likely to undertake committed action than those who 
are less well off. Encouragingly, greater commitment is now being recorded 
among those middle-income countries that were lagging, such as Angola and 
India. Yet, greater committed action on nutrition remains much needed, 
particularly in India as the country with the highest number of stunted children 
in the world. 
● The relative commitment to hunger reduction does not predict the relative 
commitment to nutrition (Figure 3.1). 
Figure 3.1 Country performance: hunger commitment vs nutrition 
commitment 
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4 HANCI findings: primary data for South 
Asia 
Chapter 4 presents analyses of political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition for 
countries in a key region suffering from high burdens of hunger and undernutrition: South 
Asia. The case countries are Bangladesh, India, Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania and Zambia. 
The primary data is devised to complement rather than corroborate the index. We present 
new data on important aspects of political commitment on which no secondary data is 
routinely collected in order to support in-country advocacy on hunger and undernutrition 
(rather than cross-country comparisons). The country analyses provide a brief discussion of 
context, before presenting the findings from the primary research conducted with experts and 
communities. 
Chapter 4 also provides some reflections on how HANCI evidence has been used to inform 
and influence public policy in some of the primary research countries. 
4.1 South Asia 
South Asia, home to 1.6 billion people (2012 data), remains at the centre of the global fight 
against hunger and undernutrition (World Bank 2013c).13 The region has recorded 
remarkable progress on key economic development indicators such as economic growth 
rates during the last two decades driving down the incidence of income poverty. For 
instance, Bangladesh, despite not too long ago widely considered a ‘basket-case’ of 
development, has made tremendous strides: mean annual growth rates of nearly 6 per cent 
per year have brought poverty ratios down from 49 per cent in 2000 to 31.5 per cent in 2010 
(World Bank 2013a). 
Within the region, poverty incidences vary substantially by country (and within countries).14 
Yet the sheer size of (rising) populations in the region means that the absolute number of 
income-poor people remains daunting, and hunger and undernutrition continue to be major 
development challenges.15 
South Asia’s share of the global number of chronically undernourished people has increased 
from 31 per cent (314 million people) in 1990–92 to 35 per cent (295 million people) in 2011–
2013 (FAO 2013). On a more positive note the proportion of undernourished as a share of 
total South Asia populations has been brought down to 16.8 per cent in 2011–13 from 25.7 
per cent in 1990–92 (FAO 2013); this has been roughly equal to the rate of progress made 
by the regional giant, India, during this period. South Asia has also more than halved (129 to 
60 per thousand live births) under-five mortality rate between 1990 and 2012 (UNICEF 
2014). 
Data for 2008–12 indicate the high prevalence of underweight (32 per cent), stunting (38 per 
cent) and wasting (16 per cent) among children under five years of age. While 90 per cent 
(2011 data) of South Asian populations have access to improved water sources only 38 per 
cent (2011 data) use improved sanitation, both of which are key factors in nutrition (UNICEF 
                                               
13 The World Bank definition of South Asia includes: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan, and Sri 
Lanka. These are also the countries in the South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC). 
14 Thus, shares of populations earning less than US$1.25 a day are, using 2007–11 data, in Bangladesh (43.3%), Bhutan 
(10.2%), Nepal (25.2%), Pakistan (21%); and, using 2002–06 data, India (32.7%) and Sri Lanka (7%) (UNDP 2013b). Data for 
Afghanistan and Maldives not available. 
15 A broader multi-dimensional measure of poverty shows that South Asia as a whole still contains 51 per cent of the global poor 
(Alkire, Roche and Seth 2013). 
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2014). For many of these indicators, geographic and social inequities are notable within 
countries. Urban–rural divisions are substantial; for example, population access to sanitation 
is 61 per cent in the urban sector and 29 per cent in the rural sector in South Asia. 
Even in a country such as Sri Lanka, which is categorised ‘high’ in Human Development 
Index (HDI) terms (in fact highest in South Asia with an HDI rank of 92), the proportion of 
undernourished is 22.8 per cent (UNDP 2013b). Another crucial inequality, with non-trivial 
implications for hunger/nutrition, relates to education: UNDP (2013b: 30) suggests that 
education inequality in South Asia is worse than in sub-Saharan Africa. 
The HANCI includes five South Asian countries (Bhutan, Maldives and Sri Lanka are not 
included in the HANCI 2013 because of absence of data for selected indicators). The HANCI 
2013 scores and ranks for these countries are listed in Table 4.1. Nepal, closely followed by 
Bangladesh, is the top-ranked country in South Asia; Afghanistan is at the bottom. India and 
Pakistan are ranked adjacently. The rest of this section looks more closely at four of the 
countries in Table 4.1 (excluding Afghanistan) using primary data. The primary in-country 
data gives a more nuanced assessment of political commitment within the diverse 
sociopolitical and economic circumstances of these countries. 
Table 4.1 HANCI results for South Asian countries 
 HRCI  
Score 
NCI  
Score 
HANCI  
Score 
HRCI  
Ranks 
NCI  
Ranks 
HANCI  
Ranks 
Nepal 79 123 202 19 2 6 
Bangladesh 65 112 177 27 8 16 
India 95 74 169 10 28 19 
Pakistan 52 95 147 37 17 28 
Afghanistan 14 90 104 45 20 39 
 
4.2 Country analysis: Bangladesh 
Summary 
● HANCI 2013 ranking: 16th out of 45 (2012: 12th) 
● HANCI 2013 score < HANCI 2012 score 
● Hunger: 25 million (17 per cent of population) 
● Stunting: 41 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
● Wasting: 16 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 
4.2.1 Hunger and undernutrition in Bangladesh 
In the past two decades, Bangladesh’s solid economic performance has driven rapid 
declines in poverty headcount ratios. In the last decade, growth rates averaged nearly 6 per 
cent per year, and poverty ratios came down from 49 per cent in 2000 to 31.5 per cent in 
2010 (World Bank 2013a). 
Significant growth in agricultural productivity, driven by a combination of factors including 
macroeconomic stability, liberalisation of input markets and opening up of the economy, has 
helped Bangladesh to meet the MDG hunger target (reducing the number of people in 
hunger by half), and it also appears to be on track to achieve its MDG target of reducing the 
percentage of children who are underweight to 33 per cent by 2015 (FAO 2013). 
Because population growth rates are high, 25 million Bangladeshis still face hunger and this 
number has been rising slowly since the mid-2000s. Recent political instability has, however, 
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affected economic performance and caused disruption in people’s mobility and slowed down 
business, affecting people’s access to food (GoB 2013).16 
Considerable regional disparities in hunger prevalence persist, suggesting that growing 
incomes alone are not sufficient to reduce undernutrition (FAO 2013). Recent surveys 
(including the Bangladesh Democratic and Health Survey [DHS] 2011) show that 
Bangladeshi women suffer a double burden of malnutrition. Although 24.2 per cent of women 
in Bangladesh are suffering from chronic energy deficiency intake (expressed in a body mass 
index (BMI) of <18.5), 16.5 per cent suffer from overweight (BMI>=25). Women in the 
wealthiest quintile are seven times more likely to be overweight or obese than women in the 
poorest wealth quintile (GoB 2013). The Bangladesh DHS 2011 found that 20 per cent of 
ever-married women aged 15–49 reported ‘sometimes’, ‘rarely’ or ‘never’ having access to 
three meals a day, and this amounted to nearly 50 per cent of all women in the lowest wealth 
quintile (GoB 2013). Seasonal starvation varies by district: from 2 to17 per cent outside the 
monga period and from 26 to 58 per cent during the monga17 period (2006 data). However, 
this hunger is receding, as remittances from women working in factories and from men 
working in construction have also helped reduce rural poverty (World Bank 2013g: 197). 
While agricultural wages are increasing (GoB 2013), gender-based differences in wages 
(amounting to 40 per cent) and in access to inputs and markets drive gendered food security 
and nutrition outcomes (FAO 2013; GoB 2013). 
Bangladesh ranks 58th in the 2013 Global Hunger Index (GHI) (IFPRI et al. 2013), and 
estimates suggest that malnutrition costs the country US$1 billion a year in lost economic 
productivity (FAO 2012). Population growth, vulnerability of improved crop varieties to pests 
and diseases, poor access to food due to poverty, vulnerability to price shocks, deteriorating 
access to increasingly scarce natural resources (with nearly no agricultural land left untilled), 
climate change shocks, and worsening soil fertility pose key challenges to food security (ACF 
2012; FAO 2013). 
Figure 4.1 gives the latest nutrition data, drawing on the Bangladesh Demographic and 
Health Surveys. It shows that a steady reduction in underweight prevalence has been 
achieved during 2004–11. The prevalence of wasting declined from 1990 to 2000, but then 
increased steadily until 2007 when it reached 17 per cent. Wasting rates stand at 16 per 
cent, still exceeding the emergency threshold (FAO 2012; UNICEF 2013). Nearly one in six 
children suffers from acute shortages in food intake, and severe wasting is on the rise. The 
Government of Bangladesh (GoB) has set clear numeric time-bound targets to be achieved 
by 2015 (GoB 2013): 
● Undernourishment prevalence of (three-year average) 17 per cent of general 
population; 
● Underweight prevalence of 33 per cent of all children aged 0–59 months; 
● Stunting rates of 38 per cent for the children under five years of age. 
Deficiencies of micronutrients consumption are also widespread in Bangladesh. Vitamin A, 
iron, iodine and zinc deficiencies are of particular relevance to public health, with the 
prevalence of iron-deficiency anaemia among young infants, adolescent girls and pregnant 
women remaining very high: for instance affecting 33 per cent of pre-school children (Ahmed, 
Mahfuz, Ireen et al. 2012; GoB 2013). Little progress has been made in reducing the 
proportion of women who are anaemic (42 per cent in 2011 compared with 45 per cent in 
2004) (FAO 2013). 
                                               
16 For instance, in December 2013, on 25 days shops were closed in Dhaka due to hartals (strikes) ahead of the January 2014 
elections. For instance, for day labourers, a loss of income may immediately affect hunger. 
17 Monga is the seasonal hunger associated with the monga period – between transplanting and harvesting paddy – when 
household food stocks are depleted. 
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Figure 4.1 Trends in nutritional status of children under five, Bangladesh, 
2004–11 
 
Note: Rates are based on WHO Child Growth Standards (Bangladesh Demographic and Health Survey 2011). 
Source: Adapted from BDHS (2011). 
While Bangladesh achieved good reductions in stunting rates during the 1990s, recently the 
rate of progress has sharply declined (in 2004–07 from 51 per cent to 43 per cent compared 
to only a 2 per cent reduction in the period 2007–11). Moreover, country-level statistics 
presented above hide regional, urban/rural and wealth-based disparities. Rural children are 
more likely to be stunted than urban children (43 per cent compared with 36 per cent), and 
children living in Khulna and Rajshahi divisions show lowest stunting prevalence (34 per cent 
each) (Ahmed, Mahfuz, Ireen et al. 2012). Furthermore, among the poorest 20 per cent of 
households 54 per cent of children are stunted (GoB 2013). 
The effects of the global food price crisis are likely to have contributed substantially to 
reversing progress on undernutrition in the period 2007–11. Household expenditure surveys 
for 2005 and 2010 show that consumption levels per capita dropped for key foods such as 
cereals, vegetables, pulses and fish for people from the lowest income quintiles living in 
urban areas (Miah and Haque 2013). Recently, some concerns have been raised about 
reduced application of complementary feeding practices in the country. However, 
community-based nutrition interventions combined with national media campaigns have 
shown to be successful in enhancing infant and young child feeding practices such as hand 
washing with soap before feeding, early initiation of breastfeeding and exclusive 
breastfeeding for the child’s first six months. More successes are clearly needed as only 
about 21 per cent of children are deemed to enjoy a minimum acceptable diet at 6–23 
months of age as compared to the government target of 52 per cent for 2015 (GoB 2013). 
Encouragingly also, some of the underlying social factors that help to drive reduced stunting 
outcomes have seen improvements, notably (FAO 2012): 
● Literacy rates for young females (aged 15–24 years) have doubled, rising 
from 38 per cent in 1991 to 77 per cent in 2009. 
● The coverage of vitamin A supplementation for children aged 6–59 months 
(which started in the 1990s) is now nearly universal, and consumption of 
iodised salt has also increased substantially in recent years. 
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● The use of oral rehydration salts to treat diarrhoea has nearly doubled, from 
35 per cent in 2000 to 68 per cent in 2007. 
● A substantial increase in exclusive breastfeeding during the first six months of 
life, from 43 per cent in 2007 to 64 per cent in 2011. 
4.2.2 HANCI findings 
The politics of hunger are foundational to Bangladesh; government interventions on hunger 
therefore benefit from high levels of legitimacy across social groups (Hossain 2013). In 2012, 
the GoB reaffirmed its commitment to food security ‘for all people of the country at all times’ 
(Ahmed, Mahfuz, Ireen et al. 2012; GoB 2013). 
The GoB has also actively pursued nutrition policies and programmes at least since the mid-
1990s. Hunger and nutrition are also clearly identified development issues in the current 
Sixth Five Year Plan 2011–15, and a National Food Policy was adopted in 2006 that aims to 
enhance availability, access and utilisation of food. A detailed Plan of Action (2008–15) was 
devised to identify interventions, with a Country Investment Plan (CIP, 2011–15) providing a 
detailed planning, fund mobilisation and alignment tool. The CIP is designed to achieve the 
MDGs, is embedded in the Sixth Five Year Plan and is aligned with the Bangladesh’s Scaling 
Up Nutrition (SUN) campaign efforts. Having already taken action on many aspects of the 
SUN agenda, in September 2013 Bangladesh officially joined the SUN movement. The 
Prime Minister, H.E. Sheikh Hasina, thus became a member of the SUN Lead Group (SUN 
2013b). 
The approach to nutrition is multi-sectoral, as suggested by the Health, Population and 
Nutrition Sector Development Programme (2011–16) (CSNSI 2012). National Nutrition 
Services mainstream nutrition services within regular operations of the Ministry of Health and 
Family Welfare’s (MoHFW) Directorates General of Health Services and Family Planning; 
this is likely to improve access to nutrition interventions for the poorest, and for those living in 
hard-to-reach areas. 
The GoB puts a strong focus on the first 1,000 days of a child’s life, and targeted nutrition 
interventions for scaling up tally with those recommended by the authoritative Lancet series 
on maternal and child undernutrition (SUN 2011). Government efforts also invest substantial 
resources in demand creation for nutrition, through public awareness building and community 
mobilisation (SUN 2011). 
While not all nutrition programmes have yet been implemented at scale to reach the entire 
population (notably programmes against Severe Acute Malnutrition), the Expanded 
Programme on Immunization and vitamin A supplementation have been very successful 
(Ahmed et al. 2012). The coverage of vitamin A supplementation in Bangladesh is near 
universal, and zinc treatment for diarrhoea is 20 per cent, which is the highest among 
countries with high burdens of undernutrition. The GoB is scaling up its infant and young 
child feeding programmes throughout the country and provides community nutrition 
interventions through community clinics (SUN 2011). Exclusive breastfeeding for the first six 
months, followed by complementary feeding, is actively promoted. Bangladesh has taken 
measures to substantially enshrine the provisions of the International Code of Marketing of 
Breastmilk Substitutes in domestic law, yet there are concerns about the lack of enforcement 
(GoB 2013). A draft National Food Safety Act (2013) is expected to be soon presented to 
Parliament, and a draft National Food Safety and Quality Policy is under review (GoB 2013). 
The budget of the GoB contains a separate line for nutrition, enhancing transparency and 
accountability of government spending on nutrition. The CIP provides the template for 
breaking down direct nutrition and nutrition-sensitive investments for SUN. CIP has a budget 
of US$9.8 billion. US$6.2 billion is already financed of which so far US$1.7 billion has been 
used. So far, the GoB has invested US$1.65 for every dollar invested by the development 
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partners in the CIP (GoB 2013). However, current spending amounts to just half of the 
allocated budgets (GoB 2013). 
Other government interventions supporting the reduction of hunger and undernutrition 
include substantial investments in agriculture and health. The GoB has successfully 
promoted the adoption of new rice varieties and supported expansion of irrigation 
infrastructure, and these have driven agricultural growth rates of over 3 per cent per annum, 
which contribute substantially to reduced hunger. The World Development Report 2013 
highlights that Bangladeshi farmers have shifted from growing low-yield, single-crop, deep-
water rice to double cropping of short maturity, high-yield rice. There has also been a 
pronounced shift away from sharecropping into fixed-rent leasehold tenancy. Landless and 
marginal farmers have been the major beneficiaries of this change (World Bank 2012). The 
GoB also seeks to promote complete self-sufficiency in rice production (GoB 2013). 
Strengthening agricultural extension services has an important role to play in this respect. 
While the Department of Agricultural Extension is the largest public agency in the country 
with 12,875 extension workers and 2,000 other extension personnel at district, upazila (sub-
district) and village levels, more staff and greater efficiency is needed because workloads are 
too high.18 While various other non-state agencies are involved in providing extension 
services, farmers in marginal areas (e.g. chars [sandbanks], hoars [natural depressions] river 
bank areas), and aquaculturists with homestead ponds are not always reached. Moreover, 
households headed by women are less likely to obtain extension services than those headed 
by men (GoB 2013). 
Delivering on the National Agricultural Extension Policy (2012) requires human and 
infrastructural capacity and the linkages between agricultural research, extension, education 
and farmers to be strengthened. However, public spending on agricultural research (0.32 per 
cent of agricultural GDP in 2009) is lower than in neighbouring countries (e.g. India 0.4 per 
cent) (GoB 2013). 
The share of government spending going to health (8.93 per cent) is double that of Pakistan 
(3.58 per cent), somewhat larger than in India (8.05 per cent) and a little lower than in Nepal 
(9.56 per cent).19 Yet, equitable access to adequate public health systems needs further 
strengthening. For instance, while small improvements were made over the last year (Table 
4.2) 45.4 per cent of all pregnant women are not attended even once by skilled health 
personnel during pregnancy. 
Bangladesh is one of the countries whose scores on the right to food indicator were 
downgraded due to a recategorisation of indicator values (see Chapter 2 for details). Article 
15(a) of the Constitution of Bangladesh references a right to food,20 while ratified 
international treaties such as Article 11 of the International Covenant on Economic, Social 
and Cultural Rights; Article 6 of the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights; 
Articles 24 and 27 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child; and Articles 12 and 14 of the 
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women commit 
Bangladesh to ‘protect’, ‘respect’ and ‘fulfil’ the right to food (GoB 2013). Yet, current 
constitutional provisions take the shape of a directive principle of state policy and thus do not 
carry the status of fundamental rights that are justiciable. Further enshrining the right to food 
as constitutional fundamental rights, as currently demanded by a coalition of civil society 
groups campaigning on the right to food, would show further commitment. 
                                               
18 1,000–1,200 farmers per sub-assistant agricultural officer, as compared to 280 in Vietnam or China (GoB 2013). 
19 Note that the actual share within each country’s health budget benefiting food security and nutrition may differ and cannot be 
determined. 
20 Article 15 recognises the fundamental responsibility of the state to secure for its citizens the provision of the basic necessities 
of life including food. 
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Table 4.2 Bangladesh, changing performance on commitment indicators 
2012–13 
 HANCI 2012 HANCI 2013 Change 
Value Year Value Year 
Government spending on agriculture 7.3 – 8.9 2009 1.62 ↑ 0.6 
Government spending on health 7.4 2010 8.9 2011 1.53 ↑ 0.5 
Security of access to land 3.2 2011 3.3 2012 0.06 ↑ 0.0 
Civil registration of live births 10.0 2006 30.5 2011 20.50 ↑ 0.0 
Vitamin A coverage 100.0 2010 94.0 2011 -6.00 ↓ 6.0 
Access to drinking water 81.0 2010 83.2 2011 2.22 ↑ 0.2 
Access to sanitation 56.0 2010 54.7 2011 -1.27 ↓ 1.0 
Skilled birth attendance 53.0 2010 54.6 2011 1.60 ↑ 0.6 
Constitutional right to food 5.0 2006 1.0 2011 -4.00 ↓ 4.0 
 
The GoB is currently developing a National Social Protection Strategy (FAO 2013) that may 
offer an integrated approach and enduring support for the poor and vulnerable. The GoB has 
introduced various social safety nets for the poor, such as the Vulnerable Group Feeding and 
Vulnerable Group Development schemes (CSNSI 2012). In the wake of repeated food price 
crises, the GoB invested in enhanced public food grain storage capacity, which is filled from 
domestic sources during periods of low prices, thus providing farmers support, and filled from 
international markets during periods of high domestic prices. The GoB has also employed 
open market sales to help control price volatilities in the lean season (chiefly in urban areas 
to Class 4 government employees who are issued with Fair Price Cards) and address natural 
disasters (GoB 2013). Moreover, the GoB instituted an Employment Generation Programme 
(EGP) that is seen to effectively achieve social protection and promote objectives. 
Despite these positive efforts, overall, the social protection system in Bangladesh is 
considered to be fairly rudimentary in terms of both the number of risks and people covered, 
and government efforts are waxing and waning. For example, the number of days of EGP 
employment generated have been scaled down from 4.2 to 2 million between 2010/11 and 
2011/12 (GoB 2013).21 Similarly, spending on social protection programmes as a share of 
total public spending is declining, from 12.9 per cent in 2010/11 to 8.8 per cent in 2012/13. 
For the Vulnerable Group Feeding (VGF) schemes, this reflects the weakened necessity to 
respond to short-term disasters and food price crises. However, the share of safety net 
spending within social protection spending is slowly declining, and this is a concern, as 
currently the size of safety net benefits is just enough to let people survive but too small to 
escape poverty; 60 per cent of beneficiaries receive less than Tk100 per month (<US$2 p/m). 
These investments could also be more efficiently used, as inclusion errors (14.5 per cent) 
and exclusion errors (19 per cent) are sizeable (GoB 2013). 
Other areas in which further improvements can be achieved that would accelerate hunger 
and undernutrition reduction include enhancing coverage rates of the civil registration 
system. Despite recent improvements, coverage levels remain very low, at only 30 per cent 
of the population. Enhancing civil registration may help to improve access to essential public 
services, including health and education. Second, other services that need strengthening 
concern access to improved drinking water (currently 83 per cent of the population benefits) 
and improved sanitation (54 per cent). Third, in order to reduce women’s disproportionate 
suffering from and vulnerability to hunger, further government action may be taken to effect 
women’s economic rights, which exist on paper but are not effectively enforced (CIRI 2010). 
                                               
21 It may be noted that the non-governmental organisations (NGOs) in Bangladesh have successfully rolled out substantial 
social protection schemes, e.g. BRAC’s Targeting the Ultra Poor programme. These operate in parallel with government 
provisioning. 
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Similarly, while women have de jure equal rights to access and own productive agricultural 
land, various discriminatory practices prevent their realisation (OECD undated) and thus 
continue to keep women disproportionally vulnerable to hunger. Finally, at a systemic level, 
improvements in what the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators (World Bank 2013e) 
identify as a relatively ineffective public governance system are likely to have major impacts 
on the successful delivery of the various government interventions aimed at reducing hunger 
and undernutrition. 
4.2.3 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
In Bangladesh, 40 experts (29 men, 11 women) were interviewed in the period July–
September 2013 by a team of two consultants. This team had also conducted the survey in 
previous years, so it was well-versed in the practicalities of arranging and conducting the 
survey. Efforts were made to obtain a balanced sample with substantial representation of 
government officials (14), civil society organisations (10), research and academic institutions 
(10), international donors and UN (4) and media (2). All survey respondents were selected 
on the basis of having substantial knowledge and expertise in the areas of hunger and 
nutrition, food policy, agriculture, health and social policy. 
We first discuss expert findings for the theme of public expenditures and then investigate 
areas of strength and areas in need of improvement for government policies and 
programmes, before we have a final discussion of aspects of political leadership and 
stakeholder support for GoB efforts addressing hunger and nutrition. 
Overall, experts consider that current public expenditures as well as policy by the GoB signal 
a fairly strong commitment to hunger reduction and a moderate commitment to reduce 
undernutrition (Table 4.3).22 
Table 4.3 Government of Bangladesh commitment scores by policy and 
spending theme and by hunger and nutrition subject areas  
 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Public spending 60% (fairly strong) 46% (moderate) 58% (fairly strong) 48% (moderate) 
Policy 55% (moderate) 51% (moderate) 59% (fairly strong) 54% (moderate) 
 
Additionally, when looking at individual questions, clear differences occur in the assessment 
of commitment to hunger reduction and nutrition. 
Table 4.3 shows that in 2013, experts assessed public spending on hunger to be fairly strong 
(58 per cent) whereas for nutrition this is seen to be moderate (48 per cent). Indeed, Table 
4.4 shows that in 2013, for four out of five questions on public spending, nutrition scores 
were distinctly weaker than for hunger, at high levels of statistical significance. In a country 
that is frequently plagued by emergencies and natural disasters, budget expenditures on 
hunger are deemed to be sensitive to such events, signalling a level of responsiveness of the 
state to the needs of its citizenry. Budget expenditures on hunger are also deemed fairly 
sensitive to electoral cycles, more so than for nutrition.23 The transparency of spending 
mechanisms on hunger and nutrition saw a temporal improvement from fairly weak to 
moderate score for both hunger and nutrition. However, this (and other) temporal changes 
between 2012 and 2013 shown in Table 4.4 are statistically significant. 
                                               
22 Tabulated questions are shortened. For the full questionnaire see Annex A. 
23 We interpret sensitivity to electoral cycles as a good thing (signalling responsiveness to voter concerns). A more cynical 
interpretation would be that this constitutes an attempt at manipulating voters. Even if that were to be the case, it affirms hunger 
to be part of party political agendas in Bangladesh. 
38 
 
Table 4.4 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, Bangladesh, 2011–2013 
Questions 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are government policy 
preferences reflected in budget 
expenditures? 
50% 61% 48% 60% 46%### 
How strong or weak would you, in 
general, characterise the government’s 
absolute (in money terms) budget 
expenditures on hunger and nutrition? 
49% 57% 43% 51% 41%### 
How sensitive are government budget 
expenditures on hunger and malnutrition 
to electoral cycles? 
65% 65% 48% 60% 50%### 
How sensitive are government budget 
expenditures on hunger and malnutrition 
to emergencies/disasters? 
71% 77% 56% 72% 57%### 
How well has the national government 
developed transparent financial 
mechanisms for earmarked funding? 
– 41% 36% 48% 45% 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
 
As for public policy, experts identified several aspects indicating fairly strong to strong 
commitment to reducing hunger and undernutrition by the GoB (Table 4.5). The GoB is 
assessed as giving significantly stronger priority to hunger than to nutrition, and this 
translates into policy goals and outcome targets. In 2013, for all questions raised, experts 
gave stronger commitment scores for hunger than for nutrition (and for many, differences 
were highly statistically significant). Accordingly, budget lines are better developed for hunger 
(fairly strong) than for nutrition (moderate). Ownership of policy between national and 
subnational levels of administration is likely to be good because the same agencies that 
design policy are involved in implementing them. Divergent interests are represented fairly 
well in decision-making and hunger policy is fairly strongly accessible to public scrutiny. 
Agencies in charge of policy design as well as implementation do fairly well building 
social/political support for policy and interventions. 
In terms of temporal change between 2012 and 2013, the survey shows differences to be 
statistically significant for two aspects: the GoB’s use of improved hunger budget lines, and 
its improved use of evidence to guide hunger and nutrition policy change. In terms of the 
latter, improvements are statistically significant at the 5 and 1 per cent levels respectively for 
hunger and nutrition. Nevertheless, hunger policies continue to be statistically significantly 
more sensitive to strong new evidence than nutrition policies. 
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Table 4.5 Public policy in Bangladesh: aspects of stronger commitment to 
reduce hunger and undernutrition 
Questions 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
What kind of a priority does the 
government give to hunger and nutrition? 
63% 78% 66% 74% 62%### 
How well are the goals of improving (a) 
hunger and (b) nutrition expressed in 
policies? 
– 74% 67% 76% 68% 
How well defined are (a) hunger and (b) 
nutrition outcome targets in policies? 
– 74% 67% 72% 59% 
How well are budget lines related to 
hunger and nutrition developed in 
government budgets? 
– 54% 47% 63%* 54% 
How accessible is government policy on 
hunger and nutrition to public scrutiny? 
36% 56% 56% 62% 56%## 
How likely are government policies for (a) 
hunger and (b) nutrition to be adjusted 
when strong evidence suggests change 
in course? 
49% 52% 50% 69%** 61%***## 
How well do policy strategies/decision-
making bodies allow representation of 
divergent interests in area of (a) hunger 
and (b) nutrition? 
36% 52% 53% 62% 58%# 
How well do agencies responsible for the 
design of (a) hunger and (b) nutrition 
policies build social/political support? 
56% 67% 64% 64% 58%## 
How well do agencies responsible for the 
implementation of (a) hunger and (b) 
nutrition policies build social/political 
support? 
50% 55% 49% 61% 54%### 
To what extent are agencies that design 
policy in charge of managing their 
implementation? 
64% 76% 77% 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests): # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
Furthermore, the expert surveys highlight several areas in which the GoB could showcase 
greater political commitment (Table 4.6). The 2013 survey highlights that for each of the 
questions shown, commitment to hunger reduction is shown to be statistically significantly 
higher than commitment to addressing undernutrition. 
While at the national level cross-agency coordination is considered to be fairly strong for 
hunger, it is only moderately so for nutrition. Two ministries are involved in cross-sectoral 
policy coordination. The Ministry of Health and Family Welfare (MoHFW) houses the national 
focal person for the SUN movement, is in charge of the National Nutrition Services and has 
set up a Steering Committee for Nutrition Implementation.24 The MoHFW Secretary heads a 
Steering Committee for Nutrition Implementation (SNCI) that meets quarterly for inter-agency 
and multi-sector coordination. The MoHFW also coordinates multi-sectoral contributions and 
seeks to mainstream nutrition across ministries and health services (GoB 2013). It is, 
                                               
24 Further, enhanced coordination between the National Nutrition Services and maternal, neonatal, child and 
adolescent health services could maximise impact (GoB 2013).  
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however, the Ministry of Food (MoF) that is in charge of carrying out the National Food 
Policy, which requires coordination between 13 lead ministries including the MoHFW25 and a 
multitude of implementing agencies. Within the MoF, the Food Planning and Monitoring 
Committee was set up to provide strategic high-level inter-sectoral collaboration at the 
Cabinet level.26 
Strengthened coordination between Steering Committee for Nutrition Implementation in the 
MoHFW and the Food Monitoring and Planning Unit in the Ministry of Food is needed on the 
monitoring of the National Food Policy, its Plan of Action and the CIP (GoB 2013). 
Accordingly, suggestions have been mooted to re-involve the Office of the Prime Minister to 
provide supportive leadership in the national coordination of hunger and nutrition (GoB 
2013). 
Moreover, experts noted that policy coordination between national and sub-national levels as 
well as policy implementation is considered of moderate strength for hunger but fairly weak 
for nutrition. While the GoB is making fairly strong steps enhancing the administrative 
capacity delivering hunger programmes, this is not yet the case for nutrition programmes. 
The government could also more effectively utilise existing administrative and financial 
capacities to address these issues. Finally, the structural inability of administrative systems in 
Bangladesh to incentivise individuals and agencies involved in policy design and policy 
implementation to make positive contributions to the fight against hunger and undernutrition 
remains the experts’ greatest concern. 
On a more positive note, expert scores showed a statistically significant improvement in the 
GoB’s willingness to experiment and innovate with novel policy approaches for hunger (and 
to a lesser extent for nutrition). The surveys also show a strengthening of government 
systems that generate knowledge and evidence for (a) hunger and (b) nutrition policy. In the 
last few years, concerted efforts have been made to consolidate datasets to actively monitor 
the performance of the National Food Policy’s Plan of Action and CIP using a set of clearly 
identified indicators. Two national information systems are being implemented currently: a 
Food Security and Nutrition Information System (in the Food Monitoring and Planning Unit) 
and a Nutrition Information System (in the Institute of Public Health and Nutrition) (GoB 
2013).27 Accordingly, policy is informed by up-to-date and robust evidence. The government 
has conducted nationally representative sampling surveys investigating nutrition status in 
2004, 2007 and 2011. This compares favourably to, for example, India. National statistical 
data is also collected through a variety of surveys including Bangladesh Demographic and 
Health Surveys, Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey (MICS), Household Income and 
Expenditure Surveys, a National Micronutrient Survey, a Nutrition Health and Demographic 
Survey, etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
25 The most important are the Ministries of Agriculture, Local Government Development, and Health and Family Welfare, which 
together oversee approximately two-thirds of spending on the National Food Policy (GoB 2013). 
26 The Food Monitoring and Planning Unit in the MoF monitors the CIP. It is technically and operationally supported by a multi-
sectoral National Committee and a Food Policy Working Group comprising four Technical Teams (GoB 2013) 
27 Furthermore, development partners with local partners are setting up a Nutrition Planning and Information Unit that seeks to 
collate various datasets (GoB 2013). 
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Table 4.6 Public policy in Bangladesh: commitment aspects in need of 
strengthening  
Questions 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
How successful is/are the government 
body/ies in delivering a coordinated 
cross-agency approach to addressing (a) 
hunger and (b) nutrition at the national 
level? 
42% 64% 53% 60% 51%# 
What is the strength of coordination 
efforts by national government with sub-
national (e.g. State) government efforts 
to improve (a) hunger and (b) nutrition 
outcomes? 
– 49% 42% 49% 43%### 
How good is the implementation of public 
policies on (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
38% 50% 42% 54% 44%### 
How developed are government systems 
that generate knowledge and evidence 
for (a) hunger and (b) nutrition policy? 
41% 47% 46% 54% 49%## 
To what extent does the government 
experiment and innovate new policy 
approaches for (a) hunger and (b) 
nutrition? 
46% 49% 46% 57%** 48%*### 
To what extent does the government 
enhance administrative capacity to 
address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
39% 49% 42% 58% 48%### 
To what extent does the government 
utilise administrative capacity to address 
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
41% 52% 45% 56% 45%### 
To what extent does the government 
utilise financial capacity to address (a) 
hunger and (b) nutrition? 
38% 49% 40% 55% 46%### 
What is the strength of credible 
incentives for individual policymakers and 
implementers, and their agencies to 
perform well? 
28% 25% 25% 36% 32%≠ 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests): # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level 
 
In addition, experts also commented on aspects of political leadership in the country (Table 
4.7). They noted that top-level leadership is considered to be strong for hunger and fairly 
strong for nutrition, and this difference is statistically significant at 5 per cent level. Political 
leaders speak out fairly strongly on hunger and nutrition, and hunger (but not nutrition) 
features fairly strongly in political party manifestos. However, leaders’ levels of understanding 
of status, causes and potential solutions addressing hunger and undernutrition are only 
moderate, and could thus be strengthened to enable them to provide more effective 
leadership. 
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Table 4.7 Political leadership on hunger and undernutrition in 
Bangladesh 
Questions 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
How developed is presidential/prime 
ministerial leadership in the country on 
hunger and nutrition? 
– 70% 63% 74% 67%## 
How well are (improved) hunger and 
nutrition outcomes set out as goals in 
political party manifestos? 
– 61% 49% 66% 48%### 
To what extent do senior political leaders 
speak out against hunger and 
undernutrition? 
67% 59% 56% 
How well do senior politicians understand 
the status of hunger and undernutrition in 
the country? 
55% 56% 55% 
How well do senior politicians understand 
causal factors of hunger and 
undernutrition in the country? 
46% 49% 44% 
How well do senior politicians understand 
solutions to hunger and undernutrition? 
38% 45% 47% 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests): # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
 
Furthermore, the experts considered who supports the GoB in its efforts to combat hunger 
and undernutrition. As compared to 2012, statistically significant improvements were 
witnessed for donors (who are now seen to strongly support) and for the general public (who 
now give fairly strong support regarding hunger, but just moderate support regarding 
nutrition). Interestingly, donors are seen to somewhat more strongly support hunger than 
nutrition efforts, and this is also reflected in the stronger allocation of donor aid to aspects of 
food availability and access rather than utilisation (GoB 2013). Political opposition parties 
continue to be viewed as providing weakest support; perhaps no surprise given the polarised 
political climate in the country (Table 4.8). 
Table 4.8 Who supports the Government of Bangladesh to combat 
hunger and undernutrition? 
 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Donors 66% 67% 75%
** 71%# 
Media 60% 56% 57% 55% 
Civil society 59% 53% 61% 58% 
The general public 54% 48% 65%
** 51%### 
Opposition political parties 25% 26% 34%
* 29%# 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
 
Finally, experts were requested to identify their priority areas for the government to 
demonstrate commitment to reduce hunger and nutrition. Their scores were very similar to 
those allocated in 2012, with clear preferences for policies and programmes, and public 
spending (Table 4.9). 
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Table 4.9 Experts’ and community members’ subjective weighting 
schemes, Bangladesh  
 Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
Experts 22% 19% 42% 42% 37% 39% 
Communities 24% n.a. 53% n.a. 23% n.a. 
 
 
4.3 Country analysis: India 
Summary 
● HANCI 2013 ranking: 19th out of 45 (2012: 29th) 
● HANCI 2013 score > HANCI 2012 score 
● Hunger: 214 million (17 per cent of population) 
● Stunting: 41 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
● Wasting: 11 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
4.3.1 Hunger and undernutrition in India 
India’s strong economic growth over the last two decades has driven sharp reductions in the 
share of its population living in poverty. Although reclassified by the World Bank as a lower 
middle-income country, India continues to be the country with the highest absolute number of 
poor people. Economic growth has proved to be insufficient for addressing hunger and 
undernutrition, which remain potent development challenges, with persistent social (gender, 
religious, caste, class) and geographical inequalities of outcomes. 
India currently has the largest number of undernourished people (213.8 million) in the world, 
equating to 17 per cent of its 1.2 billion population (FAO 2013). Agriculture continues to be 
the primary source of livelihood for the majority of Indian households, and its performance is 
critical for food security outcomes. The majority of India’s farmers are smallholders whose 
access to land, credit, inputs, insurance and product markets is constrained (Gillespie, Harris 
and Kadiyala 2012). 
India is making insufficient progress to reach MDG 1 target on hunger and undernutrition 
(FAO 2013). The prevalence of young child undernutrition has changed very little in the last 
two decades (IIPS 2007; Gillespie et al. 2012). The economic losses associated with 
malnutrition are estimated at 3 per cent of India’s GDP annually (Horton 1999; in: Naandi 
Foundation 2011). The persistence of high child undernutrition is particularly alarming. In the 
period between the two latest National Family Health Surveys (NFHS) (1998–99 and 2005–
06) stunting rates of children under three were reduced by around 6 per cent; rates for 
underweight children were reduced by 3 per cent; while wasting rates actually increased by 
around 3 per cent (Figure 4.2). In order to meet the MDG target of reducing the proportion of 
underweight children under the age of five to 27 per cent by 2015, India needs to double its 
annual rate of reduction from the current 0.87 percentage points to at least 1.6 per cent 
(Mohmand 2012). 
Approximately one-third of the world’s malnourished children live in India (60 million). India 
has one of the highest incidences of stunting in the world, affecting almost half the children 
under five (Gillespie et al. 2012; UNICEF 2013). Moreover, 43 per cent of children under five 
in India are underweight, and 23 per cent are wasted (IIPS 2007). Children belonging to 
scheduled castes, scheduled tribes or other castes that are educationally and socially 
disadvantaged have relatively high levels of undernutrition according to all three measures 
(wasting, stunting and underweight). For instance, 28 per cent of children from scheduled 
tribes suffer from wasting. Inadequate nutrition is a problem throughout India, but 
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undernutrition is substantially higher in rural areas than in urban areas, and is most 
pronounced in Madhya Pradesh, Bihar and Jharkhand (IIPS 2007). Micronutrient deficiencies 
are also rampant, with 70 per cent of children between the ages of 6 and 59 months being 
anaemic (IIPS 2007), and one in three at risk of iodine deficiency (Ved and Menon 2012). 
Figure 4.2 Trends in nutritional status of children under five, India, 1998–
99 vs 2005–06 
 
Source: Adapted from IIPS (2007) 
 
Undernutrition among adults is substantial too: around one-third of all Indian women have a 
body mass index (BMI) below 18.5 (Ved and Menon 2012); and more than half of women (55 
per cent) have anaemia (NFHS-3). Anaemia, which is a major health problem in India, has 
become more widespread among both women and children over the period between the last 
two editions of the National Family Health Survey (IIPS 2007). 
Although a new round of the National Family Health Survey is now planned for 2014–15, the 
last nationally representative nutrition survey in India was conducted in 2005–06. Hence, 
possible improvements in stunting rates achieved since are not yet recorded in rigorous 
NFHS data. In the meanwhile, the large but nationally non-representative HUNGaMA 
(Hunger and Malnutrition) Survey conducted by the Naandi foundation across 112 rural 
districts provides the most recent reliable data, showing that child malnutrition is still 
widespread across states and districts. In 100 ‘focus districts’, for children under two years of 
age, the prevalence of underweight children had decreased from 53 per cent (in 2004) to 42 
per cent in 2010, yet nearly 59 per cent of children in the surveyed districts are moderately or 
severely stunted (Naandi Foundation 2011). In contrast, Maharashtra, the wealthiest state in 
India, offers a good example of how determined actions and focus on service delivery can 
contribute to a dramatic decline in stunting rates; 39 per cent of children under age two were 
stunted in 2005–06, but by 2012, according to a state-wide nutrition survey, the prevalence 
of stunting had dropped to 23 per cent (UNICEF 2013). 
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4.3.2 HANCI findings 
After Nepal, and jointly with Burundi, India has shown greatest improvements in HANCI 
scores between the 2012 and 2013 editions of the index. 
Public investments in agriculture and health have risen substantially (Table 4.10). 
Table 4.10 India, changing performance on commitment indicators 2012–
2013 
 HANCI 2012 HANCI 2013 Change 
Value Year Value Year 
Government spending on agriculture 1.35 2008 6.8 2010 5.46 ↑
Government spending on health 3.6 2010 8.1 2011 4.45 ↑
Security of access to land 3.5 2011 3.6 2012 0.13 ↑
Status of safety nets 4.0 2010 5.0 2012 1.00 ↑
Vitamin A coverage 34.0 2010 66.0 2011 32.00 ↑
Access to drinking water 92.0 2010 91.6 2011 –0.37 ↓
Access to sanitation 34.0 2010 35.1 2011 1.09 ↑
Skilled birth attendance 75.0 2010 74.2 2006 –0.80 ↓
National nutrition policy, plan or strategy 0.0 2012 1.0 2013 1.00 ↑
Constitutional right to food 4.0 2006 2.0 2011 –2.00 ↓
 
 
India is one of the world’s pioneers employing a rights-based approach to development, as 
testified by the recognition in public policy, statutory law and jurisprudence of citizens’ rights 
to education, employment and food. These rights may be of critical importance for ensuring 
better hunger and nutrition outcomes for all Indian citizens now and in future. Civil society 
groups have been often instrumental in advocating for rights, such as the right to food, which 
the Supreme Court has interpreted as being part of Indian citizens’ fundamental ‘right to life’ 
enshrined in Article 21 of the Constitution. In August 2013, the National Food Security Bill 
(NFSB) was passed in the lower house of Parliament, aiming to assist realisation of the right 
to food. Over the years, the Government of India (GoI) and the state governments have also 
devised some innovative policy interventions, notably in the area of social protection (Table 
4.11). Consequently, India improved its HANCI score on the social safety nets indicator 
compared to 2012. 
Yet, while programmes, schemes and legislation at national and state levels proliferate, 
bringing sectors together to deliver a common goal on hunger and nutrition remains a major 
challenge (Ved and Menon 2012). While a National Food Security Mission has been put in 
place, a strategy and stakeholder coordination mechanism that could actively promote 
linkages between planning, managing and implementing nutrition-specific and nutrition-
sensitive interventions across sectors is missing. Moreover, India has not developed a 
separate budget line for nutrition, has not identified clear time-bound nutrition targets, and 
coverage of access to sanitation (35 per cent) remains very low. 
Yet, nutrition is gradually rising on the policy agenda through a combination of advocacy 
around the finding that economic growth has not generated nutritional benefits, a strong 
rights-based movement led by the Right to Food initiative, and a growing stakeholder 
consensus of the need for multi-sectoral action (Gillespie, Haddad, Mannar, Menon and 
Nisbett 2013). 
46 
 
Table 4.11 Centrally sponsored social protection schemes addressing 
hunger and nutrition 
Scheme Key features that help to address hunger and 
undernutrition 
Mahatma Gandhi National Rural 
Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA) 
Establishes an employment guarantee of 100 days of work 
per annum for every household 
Integrated Child Development Services 
(ICDS) 
Establishes Anganwadi Centres (AWCs) in all habitations, 
with priority coverage for Scheduled Caste/Scheduled Tribe 
hamlets and urban slums. AWCs offer supplementary 
nutrition, growth monitoring, nutrition and health education, 
immunisation, referral and pre-school education to every 
child under the age of six, all pregnant women and lactating 
mothers and all adolescent girls 
Mid day meal scheme (MDM) School feeding programme reaching out to about 120 
million children 
Public Distribution System (PDS) Distribution of food grain and other basic commodities at 
subsidised price through Fair Price Shops 
National Family Benefits Scheme 
(NFBS) 
Cash assistance of Rs10,000 to below the poverty line 
(BPL) families in case of demise of the primary breadwinner 
Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension 
Scheme (IGNOAPS) 
Provides a small monthly pension to senior citizens with no 
assured means of subsistence 
National Maternity Benefits Scheme 
(NMBS)/ Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY) 
Maternity benefits of Rs500 cash to BPL pregnant women. 
The NMBS was modified in 2005 into a new scheme, JSY. 
The JSY provides Rs1,400 cash assistance to promote 
institutional deliveries. 
 
The effectiveness and coverage of implementation of schemes and policies varies widely 
between and within states, and inequitable coverage of social groups remains a significant 
concern. Although inputs to reduce child undernutrition must be implemented at scale to 
achieve rapid reductions in undernutrition, essential nutrition interventions in India do not 
cover half of the group they are intended for (Menon and Aguayo 2011). For instance, 
despite a near universal practice of breastfeeding, only 46 per cent of children under six 
months are exclusively breastfed, as WHO recommends; and adequate vitamin A 
supplementation covers just 66 per cent of children between six and 59 months (UNICEF 
2013). 
4.3.3 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
The expert surveys were conducted in three states in India: Bihar, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh. 
Here we analyse the responses of 107 experts, 34 of whom were from Bihar, 38 from Odisha 
and 35 from Uttar Pradesh. These represented a wide range of development actors including 
the government, NGOs and academics. Table 2.4 tabulates the distribution of experts within 
these categories. 
Experts’ opinion regarding public spending on hunger and on nutrition are summarised in 
Table 4.12. The table tabulates mean scores for state-level assessments according to 
whether the assessment related to hunger reduction or to improving nutrition. Across the 
three states the strongest aspect of spending commitments is the sensitivity of spending to 
emergencies/disasters. But worryingly the weakest aspect across all three states is absolute 
spending levels (average figure for all states of 37 per cent) and transparency of financial 
mechanisms (38 per cent). 
More granular information can be extracted by examining the cases of each state separately. 
In Bihar, the experts’ opinion is that the overall picture with regard to spending is fairly weak 
(average score of 40 per cent). When we separate this overall assessment into hunger and 
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nutrition elements, the results suggest that in Bihar spending on nutrition is less weak than 
spending on hunger. For certain aspects of spending in Bihar such as policy preferences and 
budget expenditure the difference in favour of nutrition is marginal. In the case of sensitivity 
to electoral cycles, which we interpret as a positive thing, expenditure on nutrition is deemed 
fairly strong (58 per cent) and is significantly different from the moderate (45 per cent) 
sensitivity of expenditure on hunger. 
The overall assessment regarding spending in Odisha (average of 53 per cent) is moderate. 
Contrary to the picture in Bihar, the data in Table 4.12 also highlights that in Odisha spending 
on hunger is marginally stronger than that on nutrition. However, for none of the questions 
considered in Table 4.12, are the differences between hunger and nutrition assessments 
statistically significant at the 5 per cent level. 
The average of all scores for Uttar Pradesh in Table 4.12 (44 per cent) suggests that 
spending indicators show a moderate level of commitment by the state government. The 
average score for all five questions for hunger is fairly weak (40 per cent) and for nutrition the 
score suggests moderate commitment (49 per cent). The statistically significant difference in 
favour of nutrition is emphasised in the two questions on budget sensitivity to electoral cycles 
and to emergencies; however, no such differences were recorded for the other questions on 
spending. 
Table 4.12 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, India 2012 
Questions Bihar Odisha Uttar Pradesh 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are state government 
policy preferences reflected in budget 
expenditures? 
39% 43% 56% 50%# 56% 55% 
How strong or weak would you, in general, 
characterise the state government’s 
absolute (in money terms) budget 
expenditures on hunger and nutrition? 
27% 29% 47% 42% 37% 38% 
How sensitive are state government 
budget expenditures on hunger and 
undernutrition to electoral cycles? 
45% 58%## 66% 63% 24% 47%### 
How sensitive are state government 
budget expenditures on hunger and 
undernutrition to emergencies/disasters? 
41% 54%# 59% 60% 43% 65%### 
How well has the state government 
developed transparent financial 
mechanisms for earmarked funding? 
34% 33% 44% 42% 38% 38% 
Notes: Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score and nutrition score based on paired sample T tests: # at 
10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
 
Further to examining mean scores across the hunger/nutrition divide, we also examined 
whether the inter-state differences implied by experts’ responses were in fact statistically 
significant. Annex D contains the results of these tests, which were based on a series of one-
way ANOVA tests examining whether the mean scores for each question were different 
among states. The annex covers two types of tests: (1) one overall ANOVA test where the 
null hypothesis was that at least one pair out of the three pairs of states had statistically 
different means (this is an F-test); and (2) three pair-wise post hoc tests (Bihar–UP, Odisha–
Bihar, and UP–Odisha) where the null hypothesis was that the mean scores of two states 
were equal. The annex tabulates the significance level of each of these four tests. The 
results were separated into hunger and nutrition elements when the data permitted it. 
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The ANOVA test results for intra-state differences in the five questions in Table 4.12 are 
reported in the first five rows in Annex D. The ANOVA result for these five questions shows 
that intra-state differences are more pronounced for spending on hunger than for spending 
on nutrition: the responses for three out of the five questions are significant at the 5 per cent 
level for hunger. Further, the post hoc tests for these three questions (Annex D) identify that 
the intra-state differences are due to Odisha scoring higher than Bihar for these three 
questions. In what follows we will discuss only post hoc results; first, because they are more 
interesting and relevant for the present discussion and, second, because the overall F-test 
results is often just a summary of the post hoc tests. In other words the F-test is almost 
always significant only if at least one post hoc test is significant. 
In terms of public policy, the experts identified some relatively strong aspects and some 
weaker aspects of commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. Table 4.13 presents 
average scores for each of the policy-related questions that were asked and organises these 
by state as well as according to whether they related to hunger or nutrition. The averages of 
these numbers suggest that Bihar has the weakest commitment (an average score for all 
questions is 42 per cent – fairly weak) and Odisha the strongest commitment (47 per cent – 
moderate) from among the three states. The ANOVA results in Annex D shed more light on 
this inter-state comparison. These results, in particular the F-tests, identify three public policy 
aspects that diverge significantly across states: (1) priority given by state governments to 
hunger and nutrition; (2) national and state government (vertical) coordination; and (3) the 
use of knowledge and evidence in policy. 
Let us pay closer attention to the above three aspects that show significant variation between 
states. In regard to the priority given to hunger and nutrition, though Odisha (42 per cent) 
scores stronger than both Bihar (37 per cent) and Uttar Pradesh (27 per cent), all three 
states are fairly weak in this regard. This reflects that in many cases states implement GoI 
schemes and there is a risk that ownership of these centrally driven schemes is low in the 
states. Looking at vertical coordination, the post hoc results in Annex D suggest that this 
result is driven by the fairly strong commitment in Uttar Pradesh in contrast to moderate 
commitment in Bihar and Odisha. Regarding the use of knowledge and evidence in policy the 
result is driven by Bihar’s weak commitment, which contrasts significantly with 
‘moderate’/‘fairly weak’ commitment in other two states. 
Expert opinion scores in Table 4.13, when averaged across all three states, suggest that the 
development of budget lines is the strongest aspect (average of 58 per cent) in all three 
states and the lack of credible incentives is the weakest (13 per cent) aspect of commitment. 
At individual state level these strengths and weaknesses differ. In the case of Bihar, 
surprisingly, the strongest aspect is cross-agency coordination28 (H: 75 per cent, N: 65 per 
cent), for Odisha it is development strategies (H: 63 per cent, N: 61 per cent) and for Uttar 
Pradesh it is vertical coordination (H: 67 per cent, N: 68 per cent). Though the experts’ 
observations seem to suggest that there are differences between average scores for hunger 
policy and nutrition policy, only one of these differences is statistically significant at the 5 per 
cent level: Bihar’s state government seems to give more attention to prioritising hunger (39 
per cent – fairly weak) than to nutrition (33 per cent – fairly weak). 
We further find that state governments’ efforts to enhance financial and administrative 
capacities to act on hunger and undernutrition are fairly weak. All three state governments 
also show very weak commitment to putting in place a regime of credible incentives. The 
experts’ scores on credible incentives averaged from 10 to 18 per cent (Table 4.13). 
                                               
28 However, it should be noted that on this particular question there were many missing values in the analysis. 
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Table 4.13 Indian public policy: aspects of stronger commitment to reduce 
hunger and undernutrition 
Questions Bihar Odisha Uttar Pradesh 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are flagship policies on 
hunger and nutrition implemented by the 
agencies that design these policies? 
37% 42% 27% 
What kind of a priority does the State 
government give to hunger and nutrition? 
39% 33%## 61% 57% 44% 44% 
How well are the goals of improving 
hunger and nutrition outcomes expressed 
in State development strategies/policies? 
52% 52% 63% 61% 55% 57% 
How successful is/are the government 
body/ies in delivering a coordinated cross-
agency approach to addressing hunger 
and nutrition at the State level? 
75% 65% 63% 50% 41% 43% 
What is the strength of (vertical) 
coordination efforts between national and 
State governments to improve hunger and 
nutrition outcomes? 
52% 45% 46% 46% 67% 68% 
How developed are State government 
systems that generate knowledge and 
evidence to inform policy? 
25% 26% 44% 45% 39% 40% 
To what extent does the State government 
enhance administrative capacity to 
address hunger and nutrition? 
32% 35%# 39% 37% 39% 38% 
To what extent does the State government 
enhance financial capacity to address 
hunger and nutrition? 
33% 35% 40% 41% 40% 40% 
How well are budget lines for hunger and 
nutrition developed? 
54% 56% 59% 58% 61% 62% 
How accessible is State government policy 
on hunger and nutrition to public scrutiny? 
45% 48% 58% 58% 62% 62% 
What is the strength of credible incentives 
for individual policymakers and 
implementers, and their agencies, to 
perform well, at State level? 
16% 18% 12% 12% 10% 11% 
Notes: Statistical Significance of the difference between hunger score and nutrition score based on paired sample T tests: # at 
10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
The expert survey in India also raised a set of questions about political leadership on hunger 
and undernutrition issues (Table 4.14). The expert view on political leadership is that it needs 
to be strengthened further: even the strongest aspect of leadership, chief ministerial 
leadership, is assessed to be of moderate strength (average of 53 per cent across states). At 
the other extreme, the weakest aspect across states seems to be the level of understanding 
of solutions among senior politicians (average 38 per cent across all states – signifying fairly 
weak commitment). At individual state level the picture is different, as the weakest and 
strongest scores are obtained on different questions. As for the weakest commitment 
aspects: within Odisha the senior politicians have a moderate level of understanding of the 
status of hunger and undernutrition and have a fairly weak understanding of possible 
solutions addressing these. In Bihar issues of hunger and undernutrition receive only fairly 
weak attention in election manifestos. In Uttar Pradesh, senior political leaders only weakly 
speak out on matters of hunger and undernutrition. Table 4.14 also shows that in all states, 
for none of the questions did experts score political leadership as more than moderately 
committed to acting on hunger and undernutrition. In fact, in most cases, political 
commitment was deemed to be fairly weak. 
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As seen in Table 4.14 only two questions on political leadership sought information 
separated into hunger and undernutrition elements. These did not reveal significant 
differences between how political leadership deal with hunger and with undernutrition. Annex 
D reveals that the intra-state differences concerning political leadership are negligible. 
Table 4.14 Political leadership on hunger and undernutrition in three 
states in India 
Questions Bihar Odisha Uttar Pradesh 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent do senior political leaders 
in the State speak out against hunger and 
undernutrition? 
44% 47% 29% 
How well do senior politicians in the State 
understand the status of hunger, 
undernutrition in the country? 
42% 47% 40% 
How well do senior politicians in the State 
understand causal factors of hunger and 
undernutrition? 
42% 42% 37% 
How well do senior politicians in the State 
understand solutions to hunger and 
undernutrition? 
39% 38% 37% 
How developed is Chief Ministerial 
leadership in the State on hunger and 
nutrition? 
51% 47% 52% 50% 57% 57% 
How well are (improved) hunger and 
nutrition outcomes set out as goals in 
political party manifestos? 
34% 34% 54% 50% 36% 36% 
 
 
Finally, the survey noted the existence of fairly strong/moderate support from donors and 
from the media to state governments to tackle hunger and undernutrition issues (see Table 
4.15). While opposition parties are the least supportive in all three states, the state-level 
picture regarding the support of the opposition varies significantly between Odisha and Uttar 
Pradesh (see Annex D). It would be interesting to know what Odisha is doing to gain 
‘moderate’ levels of public support when both Bihar and Uttar Pradesh attract only ‘fairly 
weak’ levels. However, ANOVA analysis did not identify these differences as statistically 
significant. Returning to Table 4.15, none of the states are seen to have statistically 
significant differences between support structures against hunger and undernutrition. 
Table 4.15 Who supports state governments to combat hunger and 
undernutrition? 
 Bihar Odisha Uttar Pradesh 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Donors 56% 56% 65% 67% 57% 57% 
Media 54% 54% 67% 64% 67% 67% 
Civil society 52% 52% 49% 48% 57% 57% 
The general public 40% 39% 52% 49% 42% 42% 
Opposition political parties 28% 27% 43% 39%
# 24% 24% 
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4.3.4 Community perspectives on political commitment 
As part of the primary research, nine focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted at one 
urban and two rural sites each in three states: Bihar, Odisha and Uttar Pradesh. This section 
highlights how participants perceived their government’s intentions and actions towards the 
reduction of hunger and undernutrition. Focus group participants mostly belonged to lower 
socioeconomic classes. In rural areas participants were landless labourers and wage 
labourers under the Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act 
(MNREGA). Inhabitants of the urban informal settlements involved factory, construction and 
other industrial workers and female domestic workers. 
The rural participants were often involved in some form of food crop cultivation for household 
consumption, as sharecroppers or subsistence farmers on small plots of land, whose 
proceeds were enough to provide consumption needs for up to six months (Uttar Pradesh, 
Odisha). For the rest of year they had to buy food grains. In all states it was indicated that 
meals lack nutritional balance. For instance, in Odisha people generally consume a local 
preparation of rice and water called handia. Green vegetables are only consumed when 
available, and non-vegetarians can rarely afford meat. Participants noted food consumption 
differences by gender. In rural Bihar, men generally eat three full meals per day whereas 
women eat only once or twice a day. This gap widens during crisis periods (Odisha). In 
Odisha, villagers noted that hunger was rampant in their area because of limited access to 
rice, constraints related to employment and the area’s vulnerability to repeated droughts. 
While starvation deaths were not unheard of in Uttar Pradesh, villagers there had not 
experienced such dramatic hunger effects. 
Access to and utilisation of public health services is reported to be limited due to factors such 
as: corruption and caste discrimination (Bihar); unavailability of drugs and supplies in local 
health sub-centres, forcing people to travel long distances to get treatment (Odisha); or 
irresponsive or passive village-level health workers such as the Accredited Social Health 
Activists (ASHA) and Auxiliary Nurses and Midwives (ANM) (Uttar Pradesh). Respondents 
from urban areas mentioned that public hospital employees were sometimes rude and 
waiting times considerable, which often led people to seek private health care. 
‘Those who cannot afford to reach the district or state headquarters die at home.’ 
(Participant, Odisha) 
Effective access to drinking water was highly specific to the localities visited. In rural areas of 
Uttar Pradesh and Bihar bore-wells were found to be the main source of drinking water. In 
the urban area in Bihar community members reported no longer having access to drinking 
water due to a poorly maintained municipal water pipe. In Odisha one of the villages visited 
had only one dried-up well for drinking water, though in other sites villagers were satisfied at 
having access to at least one well per 20 households. 
Community participants demonstrated particular awareness of a range of some of the 
Government of India’s flagship social protection schemes such as the Public Distribution 
System (PDS); Mahatma Gandhi National Rural Employment Guarantee Act (MNREGA); 
Indira Gandhi National Old Age Pension Scheme (IGNOAPS); Maternity Benefits scheme 
(MBS)/Janani Suraksha Yojana (JSY); Family Benefits Scheme (FBS); Integrated Child 
Development Services (ICDS) and Mid Day Meal scheme (MDM). Among these, the ICDS is 
the most geared towards addressing undernutrition issues, whereas the others contribute to 
addressing hunger and impoverishment in particular. 
Community members acknowledged the benefits of the assistance given through the 
targeted PDS scheme, which provides subsidised food grains from ‘fair price’ shops. In 
Odisha, for instance, people can buy rice at Rs2 per kg regularly through the PDS. The 
scheme employs eligibility criteria: BPL (below the poverty line) households obtain a ration 
52 
 
card, while the poorest households can obtain a special Antyodaya Anna Yojana (AAY) card 
that makes them eligible for further benefits. 
In all but one village in Uttar Pradesh participants noted that access to subsidised PDS food 
was unpredictable, as they could not obtain their full entitlements, or only after delays. 
Across the villages visited, idiosyncratic variations in access were reported, and participants 
noted that forged ration cards were in circulation benefiting non-targeted groups at their 
expense. Furthermore, some people in villages in Uttar Pradesh noted that eligible poor 
families had been excluded from receiving a ration card, whereas others were under the 
(false) impression that the government had stopped issuing new ration cards. In urban Uttar 
Pradesh irregularities make inhabitants resort to private food shops, even for those who have 
ration cards, whereas many urban dwellers in Bihar noted that their lack of personal identity 
documents made it impossible to gain access to ration cards and the PDS. Effective access 
to PDS subsidised food grains is further constrained by physical and social factors. For those 
who live further away from the shops, uncertainty regarding effective entitlements deters 
visits, whereas caste discrimination compounds access constraints. In all three states, lower 
caste families’ access to subsidised food was reported to be impeded by prejudiced 
shopkeepers. 
‘The contractor responsible for issuing ration cards fills wrong information in the 
forms. Sometimes they change the name of husbands and fathers. At times surname 
of father and son do not match.’ 
(Participant, Bihar) 
The MNREGA, which aims to enhance the livelihood security of people through a 
government-guaranteed right to 100 days of employment a year, was another scheme many 
community members knew about. As for the PDS, the scheme functions better in some 
areas than in other. In Uttar Pradesh, the MNREGA was reported to be functioning well in 
both villages visited. People were getting 80 to 90 days work per year on average in one of 
the villages and up to 100 days in the other village. Timely payments of Rs120 per day were 
received in people’s bank accounts. Overall, community members thought the scheme was 
useful, though urban participants wanted greater application of the scheme in urban settings. 
However, in Bihar people reported a lack of awareness of job cards provided under the 
MNREGA, and in Odisha they had to pay a commission to contractors (20 rupees per day) to 
gain access to the work and were receiving lower than prescribed wages, at Rs75 to 90 
rather than the recommended Rs100 per day. 
The IGNOAPS, the national old age pension scheme, benefited some impoverished elderly 
people in most of the areas visited. Persons of 65 years (and above) and belonging to the 
below the poverty line category were reported to be receiving a small social pension (Rs200 
per month). However, as with the PDS and the MNREGA scheme, implementation of the 
scheme is fragmented, and subject to manipulation by local officials. Respondents in one of 
the villages in Uttar Pradesh complained that elderly people were not receiving their pension 
and that the Block Development Officer (BDO) did not pay any attention to it, despite the 
village head’s efforts to raise the issue and submit supporting documents. Furthermore, even 
when older people did receive a pension, cases of mismanagement were noted in many 
areas. Various examples of mismanagement were cited, such as: the postmaster deducting 
a percentage of the pension for people receiving it from the post office (e.g. Bihar); delayed 
or irregular payments. Thus one of the female respondents in Bihar had not received her 
pension payments for nine months and in Odisha participants reported receiving the pension 
once every three to four months and also that not all entitled people received the pension. 
‘Everyone takes their cut along the line leaving little or none for the local people.’ 
(Participant, Bihar) 
53 
 
The Mid Day Meal school feeding programme and the ICDS scheme were also reported to 
be providing some relief to many families. Community members in Odisha, Bihar and Uttar 
Pradesh reported that the MDM was generally working quite well. While people in both rural 
Bihari villages reported that the Anganwadi Worker (AWW) regularly cooked for 10–20 
children, caste discrimination inhibits dalit children in both Bihar and Odisha from benefiting 
from the schemes, despite being often most in need. In Odisha, tribal children were restricted 
access to Anganwadis by the upper caste Anganwadi workers. As Anganwadi Centres were 
located away from the hamlets inhabited by dalits, they were often not receiving the meals 
except during visits by ICDS supervisors. 
In all, community members were appreciative of the various schemes but insisted that their 
implementation would need to be improved, especially by taking strict actions against ‘middle 
men’ manipulation. They prioritised schemes to support them in access to food and drinking 
water, health services, education for children (especially girls) and work. In agricultural areas, 
demands included provision for: loans for small farmers; irrigation; and availability of bio-
fertilisers for agriculture. They also felt that government should focus on land reforms, 
housing and sanitation. Following the visits, local researchers made several 
recommendations including: universalising the PDS scheme; training lower caste women as 
service providers; employing social exclusion indicators in programme monitoring; and 
implementing transparent payment mechanisms for schemes such as MNREGA and 
IGNOAPS. 
4.3.5 Exercise: weighing political commitment dimensions 
At the end of every FGD, respondents were divided into two separate groups of men and 
women (wherever feasible) and asked which of three areas of government intervention they 
would prioritise as demonstrating political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. 
They were asked to distribute 100 points as per their preferences across legal frameworks; 
policies and programmes; and government expenditures. Table 4.16 shows the results for 
each focus group in rural and urban areas, and by gender in Bihar, Odisha and Uttar 
Pradesh, and across the three states. 
Table 4.16 Community prioritisation of government effort 
State Rural/urban 
FGD 
Legal  
frameworks 
Policies and 
programmes 
Budget  
expenditure 
Men Women Men Women Men Women 
Bihar Rural (1) 40 40 40 30 20 30 
Rural (2) 50 25 25 
Urban (1) 30 30 20 20 50 50 
Odisha Rural (3) 40 30 30 30 30 40 
Rural (4) 40 30 30 30 30 40 
Urban (2) 20 20 10 30 70 50 
Uttar Pradesh Rural (5) 50 30 30 30 20 40 
Rural (6) 30 20 30 30 40 50 
Urban (3) 30 60 20 20 50 20 
Mean 36.67 34.44 26.11 27.22 37.22 38.33 
Overall mean across gender 35.56 26.67 37.78 
 
Overall, the picture shows a fairly consistent pattern in men’s and women’s preferences for 
spending and legal frameworks above policies and programmes. However, unlike in Odisha 
and Uttar Pradesh, in all locations visited in Bihar, the women and men in the focus groups 
substantially agreed on preferences. Urban dwellers in both urban locations in Bihar and 
Odisha gave less preference to policies and programmes and laws, to emphasise budget 
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spending. However, this was not the case in urban Uttar Pradesh, where women 
emphasised the importance of legal frameworks to combat hunger and undernutrition. 
Indeed, the greatest diversity between men’s and women’s preferences was noted in urban 
settings. 
4.4 Country analysis: Nepal 
Summary 
● HANCI 2013 ranking: 6th out of 45 (2012: 18th) 
● HANCI 2013 score > HANCI 2012 score 
● Hunger: 5 million (18 per cent of population) 
● Stunting: 41 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
● Wasting: 11 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
4.4.1 Hunger and undernutrition in Nepal 
Having emerged from a decade-long internal conflict in 2006, Nepal is among the poorest 
countries in the world, currently ranking 157th out of 187 countries on the Human 
Development Index. Yet since the end of the conflict tremendous advances have been 
achieved. Poverty headcount rates have halved, leaving about one-quarter of the population 
in poverty, and about 18 per cent of the population is undernourished (FAOSTAT 2013). 
Nepal also is on track for achieving MDG 1 cutting hunger incidence by half by 2015 
(UNICEF 2013; World Bank 2013b). 
The nutritional status of children has also improved substantially over the past 15 years. 
Child underweight rates have been halved and now amount to 29 per cent of all children 
aged 6–59 months. Stunting rates in this group have also declined from 57 per cent in 2001 
to 41 per cent in 2011 (UNICEF 2013). Stunting is slightly higher in male children (41 per 
cent) than in female children (40 per cent). Children in rural areas are more likely to be 
stunted (42 per cent) than those in urban areas (27 per cent). Among the development 
regions, stunting is highest among children in the mid-western region (50 per cent) (MOHP, 
New ERA and ICF International 2012). At national level, 11 per cent of children under five 
years of age are wasted, highlighting the significant incidence of acute hunger (Figure 4.3.) 
Figure 4.3 Trends in nutritional status of children under five, Nepal, 
2001–2011 
 
Source: Adapted from Nepal Demographic and Health Surveys, MOHP, New ERA and ICF International (2012). 
57
11
43
49
13
39
41
11
29
0
10
20
30
40
50
60
Stunting Wasting Underweight
Per cent
2001 NDHS 2006 NDHS 2011 NDHS
55 
 
Nepal has been very successful in combating maternal mortality rates, achieving a reduction 
of over 50 per cent since the early 1990s, making it one of the few countries in the world that 
are on track to achieve MDG 5 (Engel, Glennie, Adhikari, Bhattarai, Prasai and Samuels 
2013). As malnourishment rates for women are high (18 per cent) and only improving at a 
slow pace (MOHP, New ERA and ICF International 2012), this raises the question whether 
additional lessons can be learnt from the action on maternal mortality that could successfully 
translate to addressing undernutrition. 
Successes in reducing child stunting were achieved by combining important health and 
nutrition strategies. Key factors included a community-based programming approach, 
facilitated by: a national cadre of female community health volunteers (FCHVs29); the 
improved coverage of safe motherhood programmes; provision of iron and folic acid 
supplementation to all pregnant women and breastfeeding mothers; deworming; and 
maternal care and child survival interventions (UNICEF 2013). But although 70 per cent of 
infants aged 0–5 months are exclusively breastfed, only a quarter of children age 6–23 
months are fed appropriately (based on recommended infant and young child feeding 
practices) (MOHP, New ERA and ICF International 2012; UNICEF 2013). 
4.4.2 HANCI findings 
Nepal has made the biggest improvement in HANCI scores out of all 45 countries and 
accordingly moved from 18th to 6th rank in the index. Here we discuss its performance on 
key HANCI indicators. 
Nepal joined the SUN movement on 5 May 2011 and Prime Minister Baburam Bhattara 
serves as a SUN Lead Group member. A high-level Nutrition and Food Security Steering 
Committee (NFSSC), under the auspices of the National Planning Commission, involves 
multiple stakeholders from across sectors. In 2012, the Government of Nepal, 
representatives from UN agencies, development partners, civil society and the private sector 
signed a Declaration of Commitment for an Accelerated Improvement in Maternal and Child 
Nutrition (SUN 2013b). 
Nepal's Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Plan (MSNP), approved in 2012, provides a common results 
framework to scale-up nutrition, including nutrition-specific and nutrition-sensitive policies 
and strategies for key sectors. It is currently in an early stage of implementation and rolled 
out in six (out of a total of 75) districts in Nepal. The National Planning Commission 
coordinates efforts across line ministries and intends to implement the MSNP throughout the 
country by 2017. The National Nutrition Policy and Strategy (2004), which is due to be 
reviewed and updated, may provide an important opportunity to reinforce the MSNP. The 
government is prioritising the implementation of the MSNP, as well as the development of a 
long-term National Food Security and Nutrition Action Plan (NFSNAP), institutional 
strengthening and capacity building of key sectors for efficient implementation of the MSNP 
and the NFSNAP; and strengthening of multi-sectoral nutrition information systems (SUN 
2013b). Such an information system would enable the government to keep track of its 
performance towards its time-bound nutrition targets. 
A basket fund for the Multi-Sectoral Nutrition Plan is being established which will receive 
funding from the government and development partners (SUN 2013b). The government 
budget line for nutrition-specific interventions, which is channelled through the Ministry of 
                                               
29 Nepal created the FCHV programme in 1988 to improve community participation and increase health service outreach. It had 
expanded to cover all 75 of the country’s districts by 1993. The work of the FCHVs has expanded beyond vitamin A 
supplementation and deworming to include: community-based integrated management of childhood illnesses (Including acute 
malnutrition); educating pregnant women, parents and caregivers about nutrition; distributing oral rehydration salts; providing 
iron and folic acid tablets to pregnant women; and spreading information about nutrition, health and family planning. 
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Health and Population, has doubled from US$4.9 million to US$11.7 million since 2011. 
Additionally, external assistance for scaling up nutrition has jumped from US$0.2 million to 
US$5 million. 
As agriculture is the mainstay of Nepal’s economy, enhancing efficient irrigation systems will 
be critical to increase agricultural productivity, incomes and rural livelihoods (World Bank 
2013b). As about 30 per cent of the poor are in female-headed households engaged in 
agriculture, public policies could further support this group (FAO 2013). It is hence 
encouraging that, in the last year, public investments in agriculture nearly doubled and now 
amount to 8.5 per cent of all public spending. Poor farmers’ access to agricultural extension 
services is currently moderately unsatisfactory and may benefit from these new investments. 
Another area in need of strengthening concerns security of agriculture tenure, which is found 
to be neither satisfactory nor unsatisfactory. 
Government spending on health has also increased over the last year (Table 4.17). Pregnant 
women’s access to skilled birth attendants saw a substantial 14 per cent improvement within 
the last year, making an important contribution to Nepal’s success towards declining 
maternal mortality rates. Whereas a small drop in access to improved sources of drinking 
water was noticed (87.6 per cent), access to sanitation increased to 35.4 per cent. Despite 
such improvements, limited access to sanitation continues to impede the achievement of 
better nutrition outcomes. 
Table 4.17 Nepal, changing performance on commitment indicators, 2012–
2013 
 HANCI 2012 HANCI 2013 Change 
Value Year Value Year 
Government spending on agriculture 4.3 2007 8.5 2011 4.24 ↑
Government spending on health 7.9 2010 9.6 2011 1.66 ↑
Civil registration of live births 42.0 2011 42.3 2011 0.30 ↑
Access to drinking water 89.0 2010 87.6 2011 -1.45 ↓
Access to sanitation 31.0 2010 35.4 2011 4.42 ↑
Skilled birth attendance 44.0 2006 58.3 2011 14.30 ↑
Constitutional right to food 2.0 2006 3.0 2011 1.00 ↑
 
The Government promotes complementary feeding practices and has enshrined the 
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes fully into domestic law. Other legal 
indicators show that currently the Constitution of Nepal does not contain a right to food but 
does recognise a right to social security. While women have equal legal rights to access and 
own agricultural land, discriminatory practices nullify these in everyday life. Moreover, while 
some economic rights do exist for women under law, in practice, the government does not 
enforce these effectively, tolerating a moderate level of discrimination against women. 
In general, vulnerable groups in Nepal are not yet supported by effective social protection 
systems. 
4.4.3 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
The pool of Nepal-based experts overall considered the government to be moderately 
committed to addressing hunger and nutrition. HANCI cross-country rankings showed Nepal 
doing very strongly on nutrition commitment in contrast to hunger commitment. Interestingly, 
while the experts’ opinion focused just on Nepal (and therefore cannot be easily compared to 
the cross-country comparisons), the experts gave a marginally stronger score for nutrition 
than for hunger just on policy indicators (Table 4.18). 
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Table 4.18 Mean Government of Nepal commitment scores by policy and 
spending theme and hunger and nutrition subject areas, 2013  
 Hunger Nutrition 
Public expenditure 46% (moderate) 46% (moderate) 
Policy 52% (moderate) 54% (moderate) 
 
As Table 4.19 shows, for only one of the five questions on public spending, did the experts 
assign a statistically significantly higher commitment score for nutrition than for hunger. 
Experts consider that the spending on hunger and nutrition (in absolute terms) is fairly weak, 
as are transparent financial mechanisms tracking these, whereas spending is only 
considered to be moderately sensitive to electoral cycles and disasters and emergencies. 
Table 4.19 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, Nepal, 2013 
Questions Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are government policy preferences reflected in budget 
expenditures? 
46% 49% 
How strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the government’s 
absolute (in money terms) budget expenditures on hunger and nutrition? 
39% 37% 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and 
undernutrition to electoral cycles? 
47% 46% 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and 
undernutrition to emergencies/disasters? 
54% 46% 
How well has the national government developed transparent financial 
mechanisms for earmarked funding? 
42% 43%≠ 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
The expert assessments also highlight areas of better and worse performance in respect to 
policies and programmes (Table 4.20). The Government of Nepal is assessed as giving 
stronger attention to nutrition than to hunger policies, and this difference is statistically 
significant at the 1 per cent level. Hunger as well as nutrition policy goals are expressed fairly 
strongly but again significantly more so for nutrition. Another sign of good commitment is that 
agencies that design public policy addressing hunger and nutrition are in charge of 
implementation chains; that policies are likely to be adjusted based on strong evidence; and 
that hunger and nutrition policies are equally accessible to public scrutiny. 
Table 4.20 Public policy in Nepal: aspects of stronger commitment to 
reduce hunger and undernutrition, 2013 
Questions Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are flagship policies on hunger and nutrition implemented by the 
agencies that design these policies? 
73% 73%≠ 
What kind of a priority does the government give to hunger and nutrition? 59% 68%
### 
How well are the goals of improving hunger and nutrition outcomes expressed in 
government development strategies/policies? 
63% 69%## 
How accessible is government policy on hunger and nutrition to public scrutiny? 61% 61% 
How likely are government policies to be adjusted when strong evidence 
suggests change in course? 
61% 61%≠ 
How successful is/are the government body/ies in delivering a coordinated 
cross-agency approach to addressing hunger and nutrition at the national level? 
57% 57%≠ 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
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For all policy-related questions, experts allocated stronger scores for nutrition commitment 
than for hunger commitment. For several, nutrition commitment was scored higher in a 
statistically significant manner also. 
Whereas at the national level coordination between sectors and government departments is 
(just about) assessed as fairly strong, coordination between national and local government 
authorities is of only moderate strength (Table 4.21). Other aspects of moderate strength 
include the extent to which the government experiments with new approaches in policy 
(especially for nutrition); the existence of budget lines; overall policy implementation; and the 
mobilisation of political and social support for its programmes. 
Table 4.21 Public policy in Nepal: commitment aspects in need of 
strengthening, 2013 
Questions Hunger Nutrition 
What is the strength of (vertical) coordination efforts between national and 
subnational governments to improve hunger and nutrition outcomes? 
49% 50% 
How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and 
evidence to inform policy? 
43% 45% 
To what extent does the government experiment and innovate with new 
policy approaches? 
49% 54%## 
How strong is policy implementation on hunger and nutrition? 45% 47%
# 
To what extent does the government enhance administrative capacity to 
address hunger and nutrition? 
42% 44% 
To what extent does the government enhance financial capacity to address 
hunger and nutrition? 
42% 45% 
How well are budget lines for hunger and nutrition developed? 52% 56%
# 
How well do agencies responsible for the design of (a) hunger and (b) 
nutrition policies build social/political support? 
54% 58%≠ 
What is the strength of credible incentives for individual policymakers and 
implementers, and their agencies, to perform well? 
40% 42%≠ 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
The government’s efforts in generating knowledge and evidence to inform policy are 
considered fairly weak, as are its efforts to enhance administrative and financial capacity to 
deliver hunger and nutrition programmes more effectively. The most serious concern about 
government commitment raised by respondents is fairly weak (positive and negative) 
incentives for policymakers and policy implementers, as individuals or at the agency level, to 
deliver better hunger and nutrition outcomes. Building such incentives into governance 
mechanisms may make an important contribution towards accelerating the reduction of 
hunger and undernutrition in the country. 
The survey also raised a set of questions about political leadership on hunger and 
undernutrition issues (Table 4.22), and this appears to be an area in need of clear 
strengthening. The experts considered that top-level political leadership in the country is only 
of moderate strength, and senior political leaders do not strongly speak out on these issues. 
These leaders have a fairly weak understanding of the status, and a weak understanding of 
underlying factors and potential solutions to these problems. Political party manifestos also 
do not give strong attention to hunger and nutrition issues in the country. 
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Table 4.22 Political leadership on hunger and undernutrition in Nepal, 
2013 
Questions Hunger Nutrition 
How developed is presidential/prime ministerial leadership in the country 
on hunger and nutrition? 
47% 48% 
To what extent do senior political leaders speak out against hunger and 
undernutrition? 
45% 
How well do senior politicians understand the status of hunger and 
undernutrition in the country? 
35% 
How well do senior politicians understand causal factors of hunger and 
undernutrition in the country? 
31% 
How well do senior politicians understand solutions to hunger and 
undernutrition? 
28% 
How well are (improved) hunger and nutrition outcomes set out as goals in 
political party manifestos? 
47% 42%# 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
 
Additionally, the survey showed that the media, civil society and the general public appear 
lukewarm towards hunger and nutrition development agendas. Whereas opposition political 
parties give fairly weak support to the government’s hunger and nutrition agendas, it is the 
donors that are fairly strongly supportive of hunger, and significantly more strongly to 
nutrition (Table 4.23). 
Table 4.23 Who supports the Government of Nepal to combat hunger and 
undernutrition, 2013? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Donors 66% 76%
### 
Media 53% 53% 
Civil society 48% 54% 
The general public 51% 54% 
Opposition political parties 39% 43% 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
4.4.4 Community voices 
As part of the primary research, focus group discussions were conducted in two rural 
locations in Nepal: in Jagatpur Village Development Committee and Bharatpur Municipality in 
Chitwan District and in Patkauli village and Ramgram Municipality in Nawalparasi District. In 
each area of study, two FGDs were conducted with men and women separately. This section 
briefly introduces experiences of hunger and undernutrition in these communities, and then 
highlights how community members perceive their government’s intentions and actions 
towards the reduction of hunger and undernutrition. Finally, the communities employ a 
weighting scheme to identify what they perceive as key aspects of government political 
commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. 
In both Chitwan and Nawalparasi, rural communities visited depend predominantly on 
agriculture to access food, cultivating paddy (dhaan), wheat (gahun) and mustard (tori). 
Land-owning farmers consume the food they produce, bonded labourers get food in return 
for their work, and others buy food. Community members in Chitwan noted that farmers 
increasingly lease out land to depend more on food purchases. In urban localities, 
communities depend on purchases to access food. 
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The communities defined hunger as not having enough food to eat, and undernutrition as a 
condition arising from not only a lack of essential nutrients in the diet but also poor hygiene 
and sanitation. However, they reported that there tends to be a lack of awareness of these 
issues in remote villages and food might not be utilised in the most beneficial manner. For 
instance, people use millet (kodo) for brewing and thus do not benefit from its nutritious 
properties. 
Seasonal hunger occurs in the winter (Chitwan) and during the bhadra month 
(August/September) (Nawalparasi) when demand for agricultural work has slowed down and 
home-stored food supplies are getting depleted. The members of the community most 
affected by hunger and undernutrition are socially and economically disadvantaged groups 
such as the dalits and the Chepang; poor, large families; and landless farmers. 
By design the Nepalese health delivery system is designed to have a strong presence at the 
local level through the establishment of Sub-Health Posts in every Village Development 
Committee (VDC)30 area. Yet, its services are often underdeveloped. In Chitwan, for 
instance, villagers noted they could only reach health posts after travelling for hours. 
Community members in both districts had daily (if intermittent) access to drinking water from 
underground water (Chitwan) and other sources (Nawalparasi). 
Community members had some awareness about government policies on hunger and 
undernutrition, although responses varied, and some expressed not knowing any, while 
others were appreciative of specific government efforts. 
‘Well, so far we have not seen any concrete programmes. They are limited to 
trainings and seminars. The government is not paying much attention… and should 
have paid attention to other areas like providing the seeds, fertilisers, pesticides, 
equipment, land, technology and others.’ 
(Female participant, Chitwan District) 
The initiatives respondents were aware of, and appreciated, include government efforts 
directed particularly to mothers and children: micronutrient supplementation, oral rehydration 
salts promotion, and biannual vitamin A distribution (Nawalparasi District). Villagers also 
noted the delivery of health and nutrition services by female community health volunteers 
(UNICEF 2013). 
‘Female community health volunteers are playing their role to care of the mother and 
child… they even teach how to rear a child with it.’ 
(Female participant, Nawalparasi District) 
In both districts many farmers rely on rainfall for irrigation. Chitwan farmers thus welcomed 
the government-initiated irrigation project ‘Narayani Brihat Sichai Yojana’ (comprehensive 
Narayani irrigation plan), but felt let down that it had not been implemented to a satisfying 
extent. Indeed, in all focus group discussions, participants complained about the lack of 
government-run programmes supporting farmers. However, community members in 
Nawalparasi District noted that the government’s Agriculture and Nutrition Extension Project 
(ANEP), piloted by the Ministry of Agriculture and Ministry of Health and Population in 
selected areas, has greatly helped improving agriculture practices in the VDC. ANEP targets 
poor and socially excluded rural and urban households that have the potential to improve the 
production and marketing of nutritious foods and improve nutrition. 
All consulted communities were adamant that the government should have a great role to 
play in tackling hunger and undernutrition. Communities in general highlighted their desire for 
                                               
30 The VDC is the level of institution that interacts between communities and local government. 
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the government to tackle poverty and hunger by executing long-term, well-implemented and 
fairly distributed programmes for health services, agriculture production (e.g. irrigation 
systems, agricultural techniques and training, etc.), and employment creation (e.g. 
industries). Food relief would then only be needed in case of emergency. 
‘In the neighbouring country like India there is high subsidy for the farmers… We do 
not have a good market… The cost of bran and rice is very high compared to the cost 
of paddy… It is a plight for us.’ 
(Male participant, Nawalparasi District) 
They also stressed the importance of effective monitoring and implementation of government 
programmes, especially at the district and local government levels, for a more efficient and 
fair delivery of services. People with political connections were often seen to benefit from 
programmes to the detriment of targeted groups. However, communities also appreciated 
that the unstable political condition impeded the government in exercising the monitoring 
function properly. 
‘Government has a good intention but at the implementation part, situation is weak’. 
(Female participant, Nawalparasi District) 
‘There is utter need of the role of government. The role of government cannot be 
denied [but] it is inadequate. The government should focus on mobilising people and 
safeguarding the rights of the people. The government has launched the 
programmes, but has not reached the target people.’ 
(Male participant Chitwan District) 
‘We hear that the corruption is increasing day by day and before it [a programme 
benefit] reaches the targeted group, it disappears. They [corrupt officials] distribute it 
among themselves.’ 
(Female participant, Chitwan District) 
Where suffering from hunger and undernutrition occurs, community members often feel 
unheard by the government and believe that political leaders, traditional leaders, the media 
and civil servants have a greater role to play in speaking out publicly. Respondents also 
expected political leaders to visit more frequently and hear them, rather than just around 
election times. 
‘Even the local authority doesn’t hear us. So the central government is too far from 
our reach.’ 
(Male participant, Chitwan District) 
4.4.5 Weighting schemes: community and expert preferences 
Overall, community weighting preferences were very similar to those of the experts surveyed 
(Table 4.24). They clearly prioritised public spending, followed by the initiation of appropriate 
public policies and programmes, and gave least priority to legislation as signifiers of their 
government’s political commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition. Within communities, 
minor differences were observed by gender, with men giving less priority to laws than did 
women. 
Table 4.24 Community and expert weightings by theme, Nepal, 2013 
 Hunger and nutrition 
Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
Experts 22% 30% 48% 
Communities 18% 28% 55% 
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5 HANCI findings: primary data for 
Southern and Eastern Africa 
The HANCI covers nine countries in the Southern African Development Community (SADC). 
Although most of SADC’s 15 member countries are experiencing significant economic 
growth, the region is suffering a devastating HIV/AIDS epidemic, and deep vulnerability to 
food and nutrition insecurity (as witnessed by high levels of child undernutrition) that is 
compounded by climactic and market shocks (SADC 2012a, 2012b). 
The data for the nine SADC countries in Table 5.1 shows the disparate hunger prevalence 
from 1990–92 through to 2011–13. Not only are current levels of hunger very different across 
countries, temporal change has been uneven. While some countries such as Angola and 
Malawi have already achieved the MDG1 goal of halving the proportion of people 
undernourished, others, such as Madagascar and Zambia, have seen the proportion of 
undernourished people increase. SADC (2012b: Table 1) traces the trends in food-insecure 
populations in member countries, finding massive fluctuations in these numbers through the 
last seven years: 11.9 million in 2005/06, 4.5 million in 2006/07, 6.6 million in 2007/08, 7.8 
million in 2008/09, 3.1 million in 2009/10, 4.4 million in 2010/11, and 3.8 million in 2011/12. 
Such persistently high numbers of food-insecure people, despite general increases in food 
supply and availability over the past few years, are attributed to chronic vulnerability and high 
levels of poverty in the region (SADC 2012b). 
Table 5.1 Undernourishment in selected SADC countries, 1990–92 to 
2011–13 
 Proportion of undernourisheda 
1990–92 2011–13 
Angola 63.2 24.4 
Congo, DR 42.4 33.0 
Malawi 45.2 20.0 
Madagascar 24.4 27.2 
Lesotho 17.0 15.7 
Mozambique 57.8 36.8 
Tanzania – 33 
South Africa <5 <5 
Zambia 33.8 43.1 
a Source: Based on FAO (2013). 
Table 5.2 SADC countries in HANCI 
 Borda scores Ranks 
HANCI HRCI NCI HANCI HRCI NCI 
Malawi 214 99 115 3 9 5 
Madagascar 209 106 103 5 2 11 
Tanzania 196 78 118 7 20 4 
South Africa 170 106 64 18 2 35 
Mozambique 156 58 98 25 34 15 
Zambia 139 64 75 30 28 27 
Lesotho 113 87 26 35 16 44 
Congo, DR 94 52 42 41 37 41 
Angola 93 54 39 42 35 42 
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The HANCI 2013 scores and ranks for the nine SADC countries are listed in Table 5.2. 
Malawi is the highest-ranked SADC member in the HANCI. Angola is the lowest-ranked 
SADC member. Note that the HANCI measures current political commitment; this should not 
be conflated with past temporal trends in undernourishment outcomes. The rest of this 
section looks more closely at three of the countries in SADC using primary data. 
5.1 Country analysis: Malawi 
Summary 
● HANCI 2013 ranking: 3rd out of 45 (2012: 2nd) 
● HANCI 2013 score > HANCI 2012 score 
● Hunger: 3 million (20 per cent of population) 
● Stunting: 47 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
● Wasting: 4 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
5.1.1 Hunger and undernutrition in Malawi 
Malawi has in recent years benefited from substantial agricultural growth, and with 80 per 
cent of the population working in this sector, reductions in hunger, food insecurity and 
poverty were achieved. Malawi ranks 40th in the 2013 Global Hunger Index, and has seen its 
GHI scores improve in the last decade (IFPRI et al. 2013). It is expected to meet the MDG 
hunger target by 2015 (FAO 2013; UNICEF 2013). 
The food insecurity and malnutrition situation in Malawi relates to at least six key factors: 
fragile macroeconomic stability; low levels of education; land pressure and low yields; 
nutritional dependence on maize; climatic shocks and natural disasters; and widespread 
poverty (GoM 2013). Poverty incidence remains high. National Statistical Office data based 
on the Integrated Household Survey (IHS) indicates poverty incidence declined from 52.4 per 
cent (IHS 2, 2004/05) to 50.7 per cent (IHS 3, 2010/11). Big differences occur between urban 
(17.3 per cent) and rural poverty incidence (56 per cent) in 2010/11 (GoM 2012). 
More than half of the population lives on less than US$1.25 per day (UNDP 2013b) and a 
quarter of the population is considered ultra-poor (NSO 2013, in: GoM 2013). Food insecurity 
is hence widespread. It affects 21 out of 28 districts in the country (GoM 2013) and around 
20 per cent of the population (around 3 million people) suffer from chronic hunger (FAO 
2013). A recent (statistically non-representative) survey found that 42 per cent of households 
spend more than 75 per cent of their income on food (GoM 2013). 
While considerable gains have been made in child survival and maternal health, child 
nutrition indicators have not seen such acceleration. In fact, reductions in stunting rates have 
been worryingly low (Figure 5.1), from 53 to 47 per cent between 2004 and 2010, to remain 
among the highest on the continent. Wasting rates have decreased from 6 to 4 per cent in 
this period (NSO and ICF Macro 2011). 
Stunting is high in all regions;31 however, there are small regional variations for wasting and 
underweight levels. The Central and Southern Regions have levels of wasting that are the 
same as the national average (4 per cent), whereas the percentage of children wasted in the 
Northern Region is lower than average (2 per cent). Children in the Central and Southern 
Regions are the most likely to be underweight (14 and 13 per cent respectively). Some 8 per 
cent of children under five years in Malawi are overweight (NSO and ICF Macro 2011). 
                                               
31 Each region comprises multiple districts. 
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Figure 5.1 Trends in nutritional status of children under five, Malawi, 
2004–2010 
 
Source: Adapted from NSO and ICF Macro (2011). 
While boys and girls are equally likely to be wasted (4 per cent each), male children are more 
likely to be stunted (51 per cent) and underweight (14 per cent) than female children (43 and 
12 per cent respectively). Children in rural areas are more likely to be stunted (48 per cent) 
and underweight (13 per cent) than those in urban areas (41 and 10 per cent respectively). 
High prevalence of micronutrient deficiency disorders such as anaemia and vitamin A 
deficiency also poses a major challenge (especially in a context of high HIV/AIDS incidence); 
55 per cent of children between 6 and 59 months suffer from anaemia, and so do 13 per cent 
of pregnant women (SUN 2011). 
Malawi was ranked second in the HANCI 2012, and its third position in the HANCI 2013 
continues to speak of its strong commitment to addressing hunger and undernutrition 
(relative to the other countries in the index). 
The Government of Malawi (GoM) joined the SUN movement in 2011. National legislation 
covers regulations and guidelines on the marketing of breast milk substitutes, maternity 
leave,32 good nutritional practices, micronutrient provision and therapeutic treatment of acute 
malnutrition, and fortification and salt iodisation (SUN 2013a) and the GoM is developing a 
Nutrition Act. A successful vitamin A supplementation programme reaches 96 per cent of 
children between 6 and 59 months with two high doses (2009 figures) (UNICEF 2012). 
Significant progress is also achieved in exclusive breastfeeding rates, covering, by 2010, 72 
per cent of infants up to five months of age (2010 data, in SUN 2011; SUN 2012a). 
Various policies and strategies guide government efforts, including the Food and Nutrition 
Security Policy (2005), an Agriculture and Food Security Strategic Plan (2007–12) and a 
National Nutrition Policy and Strategic Plan (NNPSP, 2007–12). The latter is currently under 
review, to serve as the policy framework to guide scaling up nutrition efforts. The NNPSP 
                                               
32 The New Labour Act in Malawi has increased maternity leave to 90 days (12 weeks) in the public sector and 60 days (8 
weeks) in the private sector. This increase does not achieve the 14 weeks recommended by the International Labour 
Organization and does not cover the great majority of women workers in the informal economy. 
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includes implementation of nutrition programming around maternal nutrition and care; infant 
and young child feeding practices; intake of essential micronutrients; prevention and 
treatment of common infectious diseases; and management of acute malnutrition. 
The 1,000 Special Days National Education and Communication Strategy (2012–17) has 
been developed to tackle high stunting rates. This community-based action programme uses 
a strong behaviour-change and awareness-raising approach to enhance ‘demand for 
nutrition’. It has set a target of bringing down stunting rates of children under two years of 
age to under 20 per cent (SUN 2013a). The government also intends to scale up the 
coverage of community-based nutrition services in all districts at traditional authority and 
village levels by 2016 and to scale up coverage of Community-based Management of Acute 
Malnutrition (CMAM) from half to 80 per cent of health facilities in every district (SUN 2013a). 
In general, the GoM takes a multi-sectoral approach to nutrition. Nutrition has been 
integrated in sector-wide approaches of Ministries of Agriculture; Gender and Youth; Health; 
Education; Information; Water and Irrigation; Natural Resources; and Local Government 
(SUN 2011). Nutrition is increasingly integrated in key sectoral policies such as the cross-
sectoral policy and strategy for HIV/AIDS and Agriculture (2003), the National School Health 
and Nutrition Strategic plan (2009–18) and a draft social protection policy (2012–16) (SUN 
2013a). 
Moreover, nutrition is benefiting from high-level political endorsement: the Department of 
Nutrition, HIV and AIDS (DNHA), which implements the NNPSP, is located in the Office of 
the President and Cabinet. This Office33 hosts the National Nutrition Committee (NNC). The 
NNC leads coordination on nutrition among technical specialists and development partners. 
Its main function is to mobilise resources and support for the implementation of nutrition 
interventions to be in line with the country’s NNPSP, monitor progress and evaluate impact 
(SUN 2013a). The DNHA also has a key role in steering the district-level roll-out of 
interventions and in increasing sector alignment at the district and community level. In this 
respect, a National Nutrition Monitoring and Evaluation framework has been developed with 
support from the World Bank and is expected to be rolled out in all districts by December 
2013. 
At the June 2013 Nutrition for Growth Summit in London, the GoM pledged to increase the 
proportion of budget allocated to nutrition from 0.1 per cent to 0.3 per cent by 2020. 
The budget of the GoM contains a separate line for nutrition (SUN 2011), and this potentially 
enhances transparency and accountability of government spending on nutrition. Nutrition 
policy in Malawi is also informed by up-to-date and robust evidence. The government has 
conducted nationally representative sampling surveys investigating nutrition statuses in 2004 
and 2010. Moreover, Malawi is also planning for a national micronutrient survey with financial 
support from Irish Aid (SUN 2013a). 
Malawi makes very substantial investments in health and agriculture. Malawi is among a 
select group of countries34 that have in most years since 2003 fulfilled agricultural spending 
commitments of 10 per cent of total government spending, set out in the African Union’s 
Maputo Declaration (Benin and Yu 2013). Indeed, Malawi’s eye-watering agricultural 
                                               
33 The National Nutrition Committee is chaired by the Secretary for Nutrition, HIV and AIDS in the Office of the President and 
co-chaired by UNICEF. It developed and operationalised the SUN Roll-out Framework with support from UNICEF, the World 
Bank, Irish Aid and USAID. 
34 Burkina Faso, Ethiopia, Guinea, Malawi, Mali, Niger, and Senegal (Benin and Yu 2013). 
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spending of 28.9 per cent of total public spending exceeds the commitment almost threefold, 
and we record a sharp rise as compared to the HANCI 2012 data (Table 5.3).35 
These investments may have driven agricultural productivity growth and the important 
improvements in hunger outcomes in Malawi. Yet, not all public spending on agriculture is 
growth-inducing. Those that are, especially agricultural R&D spending, may take time to 
show results; and the right balance between short-term and long-term spending is needed 
(taking into account political as well as economic benefits) (Benin and Yu 2013). Debates in 
Malawi therefore tend to focus not on whether the government invests substantially, but 
rather on whether the ways in which it is investing these funds are sustainable and efficient. 
The GoM has supported crop diversification, small-scale irrigation and improving local 
market systems, but approximately 60 per cent of the agricultural budget is taken up by the 
Farm Input Subsidy Programme (FISP). The FISP provides subsidised fertilisers and seeds, 
targeting the most vulnerable smallholder farming households, to enhance production, 
wages, household income and food security (SUN 2011; Chinsinga 2012a), yet the scale of 
these impacts is not clear. Limitations in data quality and availability persist, and national 
statistics from the 2010/11 IHS3 do not suggest any change in poverty incidence, whereas 
the FISP system involves biases against poorer people receiving subsidised inputs (Chirwa 
and Dorward 2013). Nevertheless, these authors conclude that the FISP has provided a 
good return on investment, even though there is scope for much improved efficiency and 
effectiveness (Chirwa and Dorward 2013). The strong FISP support towards enhancing 
maize production may, however, have sustained unbalanced diets and a nutritional 
(over)dependence on this crop, and may be crowding out investments in critical extension 
services and agricultural research and development. 
Public spending on health in Malawi amounts to 18.5 per cent of government budgets, a 4 
percentage point increase compared to HANCI 2012 data. An impressive rate of 94.7 per 
cent of all pregnant women are attended at least once by skilled health personnel during 
pregnancy (and these rates increased – see Table 5.3). 
While appreciating these various government efforts, clearly more needs to be done, as 
hunger and undernutrition remain major challenges. Here we identify some of the areas in 
which further improvements can be achieved that would accelerate hunger and 
undernutrition reduction. First, while the Constitution of Malawi enshrines a right to social 
security and implicitly references a right to food, women’s economic rights and agricultural 
property rights can be strengthened to reduce their vulnerability to hunger. Some economic 
rights for women exist on paper, though they are not effectively enforced (CIRI 2010). 
Similarly, while women have de jure equal rights to access and own productive agricultural 
land, various discriminatory practices prevent their realisation (OECD undated). 
Consultations with Malawian stakeholders highlighted that, especially in rural areas, legal 
rights set out in statutory law can clash with discriminatory customary traditions and practices 
such as inheritance systems privileging sons. In such patriarchal rural settings, during 
marriage, not owning land means that women have limited control over its use and produce 
(e.g. whether or not to grow cash crops or food crops) and cannot use land as collatoral 
against credit borrowing, while divorce and widowhood cut women off from the land and thus 
enhance their vulnerability to hunger (pers. comm. September 2013). Key services that need 
strengthening to enhance people’s access concern improved drinking water (83 per cent of 
the population benefits) and improved sanitation (52 per cent). Further, as the current welfare 
regime is rudimentary and covers few groups against limited risks, accordingly the GoM’s 
development of a National Social Support Policy and a more comprehensive cash transfer 
programme are a positive step forward. This strategy may also consider supporting (a 
recently weakening) system of comprehensive registration of live births. Coverage rates 
                                               
35 It has been noted though that the ten per cent target itself may be too low to undertake the expensive but necessary 
investments to achieve stated development results (Benin and Yu 2013). 
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dropped substantially and are now very low (16.7 per cent), although consultations in Malawi 
suggest that this may not necessarily impede children benefiting from essential services 
(pers. comm. September 2013). 
Table 5.3 Malawi, changing performance on commitment indicators, 
2012–2013 
  HANCI 2012 HANCI 2013 Change 
Value Year Value Year 
Government spending on agriculture 12.2 2007 28.9 2010 16.70 ↑
Government spending on health 14.2 2010 18.5 2011 4.32 ↑
Civil registration of live births 50.0 - 16.6 2008 -33.40 ↓
Access to drinking water 83.0 2010 83.7 2011 0.69 ↑
Access to sanitation 51.0 2010 52.9 2011 1.87 ↑
Skilled birth attendance 92.0 2010 94.7 2010 2.70 ↑
Constitutional right to food 5.0 2006 3.0 2011 -2.00 ↓
 
5.1.2 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
In Malawi, 54 experts (34 men, 20 women) were interviewed in the period September–
October 2013 through a local team of consultants. Experts were carefully selected to ensure 
a balanced sample with substantial representation of government officials, civil society 
organisations, research and academic institutions and international donors. Survey 
respondents were selected on the basis of having substantial knowledge and expertise in the 
areas of hunger and nutrition, food policy, agriculture, health and social policy. Thanks to the 
face-to-face interview approach, response levels were good. While a majority of 
organisations were represented in the surveys in 2012 and 2013, high turnover rates of staff 
at these respondent organisations meant that continuity of individual respondents between 
years was low (19 per cent). 
Our analysis of expert survey findings first discusses the theme of public expenditures, and 
then investigates government policies and programmes and reflects on any major changes 
identified in the scores between the two years of the survey. 
Overall, experts consider that current hunger spending by the GoM is fairly strong (2.59), 
while public expenditures for nutrition are considered moderate (3.23); however, commitment 
scores have come down especially for hunger spending as compared to 2012 (Table 5.4). As 
concerns the policy indicators in the survey, overall scores saw very little change over the 
years, and government policy indicators were assessed as demonstrating fairly strong 
political commitment in case of both hunger and nutrition. 
Table 5.4 Mean Government of Malawi commitment scores by policy and 
spending theme and by hunger and nutrition subject areas in 
2012 and 2013 
 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Public spending 74% (strong) 52% (moderate) 60% (fairly strong) 44% (moderate) 
Policy 67% (fairly strong) 60% (fairly strong) 63% (fairly strong) 61% (fairly strong) 
 
A further analysis of the underlying questions, however, enables a more fine-grained 
assessment of aspects of political commitment on which the GoM is deemed to do well or 
less well by the experts. 
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Expert surveys suggest that in the last year public spending on hunger has weakened (from 
a strong base to a moderate level) and, moreover, in a statistically significant manner (see 
Table 5.5). Experts further note that stated policy preferences are no longer very strongly 
reflected in budget spending (yet still strongly so). Budgets for nutrition were considered 
neither weak nor strong in 2012, and fairly weak in 2013. Possibly, the introduction of a 
nutrition budget line has highlighted the actual inadequacy of public spending. A different 
concern regards weakening transparency of financial mechanisms; although this was 
considered fairly strong in 2012, the latest survey considers it to be of moderate strength 
only. 
Table 5.5 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, Malawi 
Questions 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are government policy preferences for 
addressing (a) hunger and (b) nutrition reflected in 
budget expenditures? 
86% 57% 65%*** 49%### 
How well has the national government developed 
transparent financial mechanisms for earmarked  
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition funding? 
66% 56% 45%*** 46%** 
How government absolute expenditure on  
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition can be characterised 
73% 47% 53%*** 38%### 
Sensitivity of government budget expenditures on  
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition to electoral cycles 
80% 50% 78% 36%### 
Sensitivity of government budget expenditures on  
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition to emergencies/disasters 
64% 51% 65% 54%### 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
In Malawi, hunger and food security are highly politicised; however, the survey indicates that 
this is much less the case for nutrition. Tables 5.4 and 5.5 show that commitment scores for 
nutrition are for the great majority of questions significantly weaker than for hunger. 
Government action on hunger, unlike nutrition, decides elections, and agricultural subsidies 
through the FISP programme are at the heart of the social contract between the Malawian 
state and its citizens (Chinsinga 2012b). Budget expenditures on hunger continue to be 
highly sensitive to electoral cycles, indeed more so than to emergencies and disasters. 
Hence, with elections around the corner in May 2014, one may anticipate a ratcheting up of 
anti-hunger but not of nutrition spending. Yet at the time of the survey (September 2013) 
experts opined that compared to the previous year, hunger policy preferences were 
statistically significantly less strongly expressed in budgets. It is not clear what precipitated 
this sharp drop from very strong to fairly strong commitment. Experts also noted significantly 
lower scores for the transparency of financial mechanisms than in 2012, and a declining 
score for absolute allocations (from strong to moderate). The latter appears to fly in the face 
of the HANCI data reported above, which noted an upsurge in agricultural spending to 28 per 
cent of total government spending. However, it should be noted that these figures relate to 
2010, whereas experts naturally reference the current situation. Local stakeholders also 
noted that there is growing concern about FISP cost effectiveness and implementation 
irregularities, and a generally poor link between spending allocations, expenditures and 
realised outcomes. 
For the policies and programmes theme, the government received fairly positive 
assessments. Below, we set out selected issues on which it is demonstrating strong 
commitment and fairly strong commitment and also identify areas for improvement. Table 5.6 
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sets out questions on which the government was assessed as performing well, that is, 
scoring a strong score (at least 69 per cent) on either hunger or nutrition theme. 
Table 5.6 Malawi public policy: aspects of strong commitment to reduce 
hunger and undernutrition 
Questions 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
What kind of priority does the government give to 
hunger and nutrition? 
85% 64% 86% 70%### 
How well are the goals of improving (a) hunger and  
(b) nutrition expressed in State development 
strategies/policies? 
84% 76% 79% 76% 
How well defined are (a) hunger and (b) nutrition 
outcome targets in policies? 
76% 70% 72% 69%# 
How well are budget lines related to hunger and  
nutrition developed in the government budgets? 
80% 51% 70%* 53%### 
To what extent are agencies that design policy  
in charge of managing their implementation? 
84% 81% 
How well do agencies responsible for the design of  
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition policies build  
social/political support? 
73% 69% 78% 70%### 
How well do agencies responsible for the 
implementation of (a) hunger and (b) nutrition  
policies build social/political support? 
71% 66% 68% 60%### 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
The experts considered that the GoM gives strong priority to hunger and a fairly strong 
priority to nutrition, although in the case of hunger, scores on several questions were 
statistically significantly lower than in 2012. Policy goals and outcome targets are generally 
considered to be defined well. Budget lines for hunger are strongly developed, although for 
nutrition only moderately so. Agencies devising and implementing hunger and nutrition 
policies broadly succeed in building consensus among social and political stakeholders (see 
Table 5.6). 
The experts considered that, overall, government efforts towards delivering policies are fairly 
strong. At national level, policy coordination across sectors is fairly strong for both hunger 
and nutrition issues and this is also the case for vertical coordination between the national 
and subnational administrations. The Joint Task Force on Food Security and Nutrition 
coordinates across various government departments and agencies. Vertical coordination 
between the national government and subnational forms of government is also fairly strong, 
though improvements could be made. For instance, the Office of President and Cabinet has 
a Department of Nutrition, HIV and AIDS at national level but no decentralised structure, and 
accordingly works with Ministry of Agriculture officials at local level. However, horizontal 
coordination mechanisms for hunger policies were deemed less strong in 2013 than in 2012, 
in a statistically significant manner. Vertical coordination for hunger policies also weakened; 
however, this was not the case for nutrition policies. 
The GoM has conducted nationally representative demographic and health surveys (in 2004 
and 2010), and the evidence generated by these is potentially critical for informed public 
policy. Government policymaking and reviewing systems were adjudged as having a fairly 
strong ability to learn and adjust policy on the basis of strong new evidence; however, 
systems to generate evidence on hunger were deemed to have weakened over the last year, 
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in a statistically significant manner. Government policy was also deemed fairly accessible for 
public scrutiny. Furthermore, the government utilised existing administrative and financial 
capacities fairly well. 
Table 5.7 Malawi public policy: aspects assessed demonstrating ‘fairly 
strong’ commitment to reduce hunger and undernutrition 
Questions 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
What is the adequacy of government efforts towards fulfilling 
key policies? 
69% 68% 
How successful is/are the government body/ies in delivering a 
coordinated cross-agency approach to addressing (a) hunger 
and (b) nutrition at the national level? 
75% 63% 62%*** 62% 
What is the strength of coordination efforts by national 
government with subnational (e.g. State) government efforts to 
improve (a) hunger and (b) nutrition outcomes? 
69% 59% 59% 57% 
How accessible is government policy on hunger to public 
scrutiny? 
66% 62% 60% 62% 
How developed are government systems that generate 
knowledge and evidence for (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
71% 58% 60%*** 57% 
How likely are government policies for (a) hunger and (b) 
nutrition to be adjusted when strong evidence suggests 
change in course? 
68% 65% 58% 62% 
To what extent does the government experiment and innovate 
new policy approaches for (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
67% 59% 61% 65% 
To what extent does the government enhance administrative 
capacity to address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
67% 57% 58%* 54%# 
To what extent does the government utilise administrative 
capacity to address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
70% 61% 66% 62%## 
To what extent does the government utilise financial capacity 
to address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
66% 55% 62% 57%## 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
 
So, in what areas was the GoM considered to be doing less well? Three key points emerged 
(Table 5.8). Scores for 2013 saw a statistically significant decline in the extent to which 
diverse interests are allowed representation in government decision-making on hunger. Local 
stakeholders noted that while generally a wide range of views is heard in Malawian policy 
processes, recent initiatives such as the Presidential Initiative on Hunger and Poverty 
Reduction may have closed down some such policy spaces. 
In line with the earlier observation that experts argued that there is insufficient funding for 
nutrition, financial capacities need strengthening. Translating good commitment levels into 
improved hunger and nutrition outcomes is also hampered by the mediocre quality of policy 
implementation, and particularly for hunger this quality was deemed to have worsened over 
the last year. Capitalising on overall commitment may thus require strengthening effective 
policy and programme delivery mechanisms. 
Finally, fairly weak institutional incentives exist to reward agencies and individuals working in 
policymaking and policy implementing organisations for good performance, and fairly weak 
sanctions for weak performance on its anti-hunger and nutrition mandates. Remarkably 
though, scores on this indicator improved between 2012 and 2013. 
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Table 5.8 Public policy in Malawi: moderate commitment aspects  
Questions 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
How well do policy strategies/decision-making bodies  
allow representation of divergent interests in area of  
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
66% 62% 51%*** 57% 
To what extent does the government enhance financial 
capacity to address (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
62% 50% 56% 49%## 
What is the strength of credible incentives for individual 
policymakers and implementers, and their agencies, to 
perform well? 
34% 31% 42%** 40%** 
How good is the implementation of public policies on  
(a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
62% 51% 50%*** 52% 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
 
Further to the questions about the functioning of public administration and policy in Malawi, 
we enquired about political leadership (Table 5.9). The experts highlighted the continued 
strong presidential leadership on hunger and fairly strong leadership on nutrition. Senior 
political leaders speak out strongly on these issues, even more so in 2013 than in 2012, 
possibly because elections are on the horizon in early 2014. Some observers commented 
that the elevation to power of Dr Joyce Banda has resulted in greater political 
acknowledgement of the existence of hunger in the country. 
Table 5.9 Political leadership on hunger and nutrition in Malawi 
Questions 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
How developed is presidential/prime ministerial  
leadership in the country on hunger and nutrition? 
81% 69% 73%* 66%### 
To what extent do senior political leaders speak out  
against hunger and undernutrition? 
67% 82%*** 
How well do senior politicians understand the status  
of hunger, undernutrition in the country? 
56% 66%* 
How well do senior politicians understand causal factors  
of hunger and undernutrition in the country? 
52% 47% 
How well do senior politicians understand solutions  
to hunger and undernutrition? 
41% 40% 
How well are (improved) hunger and nutrition outcomes  
set out as goals in political party manifestos? 
53% 33% 56% 39%### 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
Senior political leaders also have an improving and fairly strong understanding of the status 
of the problem but are not seen to be sufficiently knowledgeable about underlying causes 
and potential solutions on which they could act. Nutrition in particular fails to gain attention in 
political party manifestos, which have an important role in driving future policy priorities. 
Weak attention to hunger in political party manifestos contrasts with the high sensitivity of 
government hunger budgets to elections. 
Finally, the survey noted the lower support for nutrition than for hunger, not just by political 
parties in opposition to the current government, but also by the general public, civil society 
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and the media in Malawi (Table 5.10). Yet all are giving somewhat stronger support for 
nutrition than in the preceding year. Donors continue being the strongest supporter of 
government efforts addressing hunger and nutrition agendas in the country. 
Table 5.10 Who supports the Government of Malawi to combat hunger 
and undernutrition? 
 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Donors 82% 75% 83% 80% 
Media 59% 44% 63% 53%
*# 
Civil society 70% 55% 75% 64%
### 
The general public 69% 53% 69% 54%
*### 
Opposition political parties 56% 37% 52% 40%
### 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. 
5.1.3 Weighting schemes: community and expert preferences 
Chapter 2 showed how the HANCI research team applied an equal weighting scheme to the 
three themes that constitute the Hunger Reduction Commitment and Nutrition Commitment 
sub-indices. Recognising its subjective nature, we identified alternative weighting schemes 
based on the preferences of (a) experts and (b) communities affected by hunger and 
undernutrition. A simple exercise was devised for experts as part of the questionnaire survey 
(Table 5.11). 
Table 5.11 Experts’ and community members’ subjective weighting 
schemes, Malawi 
 Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
Experts 20% 20% 50% 43% 30% 37% 
Communities 22% n.a. 46% n.a. 32% n.a. 
Expert scores were highly similar in 2013 and 2012. In 2012 communities were also asked to allocate scores, which were found 
to be very similar to the experts. 
5.2 Country analysis: Tanzania 
Summary 
● HANCI 2013 ranking: 7th out of 45 (2012: 8th) 
● HANCI 2013 score < HANCI 2012 score 
● Hunger: 15.7 million (33 per cent of population) 
● Stunting: 42 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
● Wasting: 5 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 
5.2.1 Hunger and undernutrition in Tanzania 
Over the past decade, Tanzania’s economy has steadily grown. Although above average 
sub-Saharan African growth levels, this growth has largely failed to generate jobs (CPAN 
2013). The 80 per cent of the country’s poor who live in rural households have benefited less 
than expected because of limited agricultural productivity growth. Poverty headcount levels in 
rural areas have hence remained stagnant at around 37 to 40 per cent since 2001 (World 
Bank 2013d). Tanzania’s progress towards achieving the MDGs has been uneven. While it is 
expected to reach by 2015 MDGs relating to combating HIV/AIDS and reducing infant and 
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under-five mortality, it is lagging in primary school completion, maternal health, poverty 
eradication, malnutrition and environmental sustainability (FAO 2013; World Bank 2013d). 
Current estimates show that 33 per cent of the population (15.7 million people) are 
undernourished (FAO 2013). Tanzania ranks 62nd
 
in the 2013 Global Hunger Index (IFPRI et 
al. 2013). For children under five years of age, malnutrition, although declining, remains 
implicated in over a third of all deaths, and in terms of stunting, Tanzania is one of the ten 
worst affected countries in the world (Save the Children/Sokoine University of 
Agriculture/PANITA 2012). Much progress remains to be made for Tanzania to meet its 
National Nutrition Strategy target to reduce the prevalence of stunting in children aged 0–59 
months from 42 per cent in 2010 to 27 per cent and reduce the prevalence of underweight in 
children aged 0–59 months from 16 per cent in 2010 to 11 per cent by 2015. The 
government reiterated these target commitments in the Nutrition for Growth Summit in 
London in June 2013. 
Figure 5.2 Trends in nutritional status of children under five, Tanzania, 
1996–2010 
 
 
Note: Based on National Center for Health Statistics/Centers for Disease Control and Prevention/World Health Organization 
standards. 
Source: Adapted from NBS and ICF Macro (2011). 
Figure 5.2 sets out the latest available data. Despite a positive trend in reduced stunting 
incidence, levels remain high. At the national level 42 per cent of children under age five are 
stunted (low height for age), 5 per cent are wasted (low weight for height), and 16 per cent 
are underweight (NBS and ICF Macro 2011).36 Stunting levels are highest (55 per cent) in 
children aged 18–23 months and lowest (18 per cent) in children under six months. Gender 
and geographic disparities are not insignificant. A higher proportion of boys than girls are 
stunted (46 per cent compared with 39 per cent) and wasted (6 per cent compared with 4 per 
cent). Children in rural areas are more likely to be underweight (17 per cent) than their urban 
                                               
36 Somewhat confusingly, the Tanzania DHS report presents conflicting data: whereas Figure 5.2 shows that stunting rates 
amount to 35 per cent in 2010, in its narrative sections it speaks of 43 per cent. The HANCI report presents the more 
conservative figures. 
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counterparts (11 per cent). Children in the Central and Southern Highlands are particularly 
disadvantaged: at least half are stunted. 
Moreover, 11 per cent of women are undernourished and more than 50 per cent of pregnant 
women are anaemic (NBS and ICF Macro 2011). 
5.2.2 HANCI findings 
Since June 2011 Tanzania has been a member of the SUN movement. In May 2013, 
President Kikwete issued a Presidential Call for Action on Nutrition, highlighting the need for 
increased accountability in addressing nutrition in the country, and outlining government 
efforts seeking to address the situation (United Republic of Tanzania 2013). 
The Government of Tanzania (GoT) is taking various initiatives to improve hunger and 
nutrition outcomes. Agriculture is one of the six key development areas identified in the 
government’s ‘Big Results Now’ effort to achieve its policy Vision 2025. Investments in 
agriculture have risen somewhat over the last year but remain well below the 10 per cent 
commitment made at the African Union’s Maputo Declaration (2003), and more could be 
done to enhance agricultural productivity that drives hunger reduction. 
The GoT is currently reviewing its National Food and Nutrition Policy and seeking to give 
greater emphasis to nutrition outcomes in the Tanzania Food Security and Investment Plan 
(TAFSIP), as well as in the ongoing design of the Agricultural Sector Development 
Programme (Phase II). In May 2013, the government gazetted national fortification standards 
for oil, wheat and maize flour. 
Furthermore, the Deputy Minister for Constitutional Affairs informed HANCI researchers that 
the government has decided to promote civil registration rates of live births and make it 
easier for people to retrospectively register children at the local government level. Moreover, 
the Tanzanian Deputy Minister for Community Development and Gender highlighted that a 
draft version of the new Constitution that is under discussion in Parliament includes an 
explicit reference to a right to food as well as to nutrition (pers. comm. November 2013). 
A National Nutrition Strategy (NNS) (2009–15) was approved in 2011, aiming to reduce 
stunting rates by 15 per cent points from 42 per cent in 2010 to 27 per cent in 2015 and 
wasting levels to below 5 per cent (United Republic of Tanzania 2011). A National Nutrition 
Implementation Plan is devised to guide decentralised implementation of the NNS. Various 
targeted programmes are in place; Tanzania has been particularly effective at maintaining 
high coverage of vitamin A supplementation among children aged 6–59 months since twice-
yearly supplementation events were introduced in 2001. High coverage is one of the key 
factors in the country’s declining rate of child mortality (UNICEF 2013). 
Various policy coordination mechanisms and multi-stakeholder advisory groups have also 
been set up to support the government. A High Level Steering Committee on Nutrition 
(HLSCN) is convened by the Prime Minister’s Office, and supported by a multi-sector 
Nutrition Technical Working Group (NTWG). A Development Partners Group for Nutrition 
regularly brings together bilateral and multilateral agencies as well as civil society 
organisations (CSOs), including the Partnership for Nutrition in Tanzania (PANITA), a 
coalition of 308 CSOs, which also has a seat in the HLSCN. PANITA has been instrumental 
in supporting the development of a five-year strategy (2013–17) for the Parliamentary Group 
on Nutrition, Food Security and Child Rights. 
The latest data (for 2011) indicate a drop in public health spending. Moreover, uneven spatial 
distribution of health (including nutrition) expenditures among districts explains substantial 
variations in access to and quality of health services in the country (World Bank 2013d). 
Against this background it is encouraging to see that, in recent years, the government has 
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introduced a budget line for nutrition expenditure and has developed nutrition budget 
guidelines to help ministries and local government authorities improve budgeting for nutrition, 
as this may foster greater accountability on spending. The Ministry of Finance, with support 
from UNICEF and the World Bank, started conducting its first public expenditure review of 
nutrition in August 2013 (SUN 2013a). Furthermore, while nutrition officers are established in 
all district councils (United Republic of Tanzania 2013), consultations in the country indicate 
that these nutrition officers may not yet be sufficiently empowered to ensure effective use of 
centrally allocated budgets. 
Table 5.12 presents a brief overview of HANCI commitment indicators on which Tanzania’s 
performance changed over the last year. As most changes are of a small order, Tanzania’s 
HANCI ranking in 2013 (7th) was very similar to 2012 (8th). 
Table 5.12 Tanzania, changing performance on commitment indicators, 
2012–2013 
 HANCI 2012 HANCI 2013 Change 
Value Year Value Year 
Government spending on agriculture 5.5 2005 6.8 2010 1.30 ↑
Government spending on health 13.8 2010 11.1 2011 –2.67 ↓
Security of access to land 4.3 2011 4.0 2012 –0.25 ↓
Civil registration of live births 16.0 2010 16.3 2010 0.30 ↑
Vitamin A coverage 99.0 2010 97.0 2011 –2.00 ↓
Access to drinking water 53.0 2010 53.3 2011 0.34 ↑
Access to sanitation 10.0 2010 11.9 2011 1.91 ↑
Skilled birth attendance 88.0 2010 87.8 2010 –0.20 ↓
Time bound nutrition targets 0.0 2012 1.0 2013 1.00 ↑
Constitutional right to food 4.0 2006 1.0 2011 –3.00 ↓
 
5.2.3 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
In Tanzania, 40 experts were interviewed in the period July–August 2013 through a local 
team led by Professor John Msuya from Sokoine Agricultural University. Experts were 
carefully selected to ensure a balanced sample with substantial representation of 
government officials, civil society organisations, research and academic institutions, 
international donors and some members of the private sector and media. Survey 
respondents were selected on the basis of having substantial knowledge and expertise in the 
area of hunger and nutrition. Thanks to the face-to-face interview approach, response levels 
were high. 
Table 5.13 provides an overview of the aggregated findings. The experts consistently 
assessed the GoT as showing fairly weak commitment in terms of nutrition spending and 
moderate commitment in terms of hunger spending, hunger policy and nutrition policy. 
Table 5.13 Mean Government of Tanzania commitment scores by policy 
and spending theme and by hunger and nutrition subject areas  
 Hunger Nutrition 
Public expenditure 50% (moderate) 33% (fairly weak) 
Policy 48% (moderate) 45% (moderate) 
 
A closer look at the responses to individual survey questions on public spending (that 
underpin aggregated scores) shows that the GoT’s commitment to addressing hunger is 
somewhat stronger than for nutrition (Table 5.14), and in most cases this difference is 
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statistically significant. Yet, scores on single questions are also highly divergent. Thus, the 
experts opined that absolute budgets for hunger are fairly weak and weak for nutrition, and 
also that policy preferences are only weakly reflected in its spending. Furthermore, spending 
is conducted through fairly weak transparent financing mechanisms. However, public 
spending on hunger is fairly strongly sensitive to disasters and emergencies, such as 
droughts. Hunger spending is also strongly sensitive to electoral cycles, in contrast to 
nutrition spending. This suggests that politicians anticipate that people vote on the basis of 
having their stomach filled, but limited knowledge and active physical experience of chronic 
undernutrition makes it harder to translate this into political currency. 
Table 5.14 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, Tanzania 2013 
Questions Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are government policy preferences reflected in  
budget expenditures? 
32% 25%## 
How strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the government’s 
absolute (in money terms) budget expenditures on hunger and nutrition? 
38% 28%### 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and 
undernutrition to electoral cycles? 
79% 41%### 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and 
undernutrition to emergencies/disasters? 
63% 37%### 
How well has the national government developed transparent  
financial mechanisms for earmarked funding? 
37% 34% 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
The expert assessments also highlight areas of better (Table 5.15) and worse (Table 5.16) 
performance in respect of policies and programmes. On most aspects of policy for which the 
GoT is showing strong or fairly strong political commitment, commitment is more pronounced 
for hunger than nutrition, and in a statistically significant manner. The one exception is that 
agencies that design public policy are also in charge of implementation chains (thus helping 
continuity of ownership of policy goals), regardless of whether the policy concerns hunger or 
nutrition. Thus, the GoT gives fairly strong priority to hunger and moderate priority to 
nutrition. Hunger policy goals are expressed strongly, and nutrition goals fairly strongly. At 
the national level, coordination between sectors and government departments is assessed 
as fairly strong for hunger and moderate for nutrition. 
Table 5.15 Tanzanian public policy: aspects of stronger commitment to 
reduce hunger and undernutrition 
Questions Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are flagship policies on hunger and nutrition implemented 
by the agencies that design these policies? 
73% 76%≠ 
What kind of priority does the government give to hunger and nutrition? 64% 55%
## 
How well are the goals of improving hunger and nutrition outcomes 
expressed in government development strategies/policies? 
69% 58%### 
How successful is/are the government body/ies in delivering a coordinated 
cross-agency approach to addressing hunger and nutrition at the national 
level? 
61% 48%### 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
However, the coordination between national and local government authorities is considered 
to be moderate for hunger and fairly weak for nutrition, and the implementation of public 
policy for both hunger and nutrition is fairly weak (Table 5.16). While the government does 
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moderately well at generating knowledge and evidence to inform policy, this is fairly weak for 
nutrition. Moreover, efforts to enhance the administrative and financial capacity of 
government agencies to deliver on their hunger and nutrition policy mandates are deemed 
fairly weak. 
The most serious concern about government commitment raised by respondents is weak 
(positive and negative) incentives for policymakers and policy implementers, as individuals or 
at the agency level, to deliver better hunger and nutrition outcomes. Building such incentives 
into governance mechanisms may make an important contribution towards accelerating the 
reduction of hunger and undernutrition in the country. 
Table 5.16 Tanzanian public policy: aspects of weaker commitment to 
reduce hunger and undernutrition 
Questions Hunger Nutrition 
What is the strength of (vertical) coordination efforts between national  
and subnational governments to improve hunger and nutrition outcomes? 
50% 41%### 
How developed are government systems that generate knowledge and 
evidence to inform policy? 
46% 32%### 
How strong is policy implementation on hunger and nutrition? 42% 35%
### 
To what extent does the government enhance administrative capacity to 
address hunger and nutrition? 
44% 39%## 
To what extent does the government enhance financial capacity to  
address hunger and nutrition? 
41% 34%## 
How well are budget lines for hunger and nutrition developed? 41% 34%
## 
How accessible is government policy on hunger and nutrition to public 
scrutiny? 
31% 27%## 
What is the strength of credible incentives for individual policymakers  
and implementers, and their agencies, to perform well? 
19% 22% 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
The survey also raised a set of questions about political leadership on hunger and 
undernutrition issues (Table 5.17). The experts considered that top-level political leadership 
is demonstrating fairly strong commitment to hunger and undernutrition as, for instance, 
signalled by the Presidential Call for Action on Nutrition in May 2013. Political leaders show 
fairly strong commitment by publicly speaking out on these issues; however, experts were 
not convinced that they have a sufficient grasp of the status, the underlying causes and the 
potential solutions to address hunger and undernutrition. Finally, political party manifestos 
are recognised as important for guiding future policy direction but they fairly weakly set out 
improved hunger outcomes and make even weaker reference to improving nutrition 
outcomes. Accordingly, it may be concluded that there remains clear scope to strengthen 
political leadership in the country. 
Finally, the survey showed (Table 5.18) that while the government receives strong support 
from donors, and fairly strong support from media and civil society groups, the general public 
and political opposition parties only give moderate support to its hunger agenda and only 
fairly weak support for the nutrition agenda.37 This raises important questions about how to 
enhance the sustainability of nutrition on domestic policy agendas. 
 
                                               
37 Note that these figures do not reflect government commitment but provide information on the environment in which 
commitment is generated.   
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Table 5.17 Political leadership on hunger and undernutrition in Tanzania 
Questions Hunger Nutrition 
How developed is presidential/prime ministerial leadership in the country 
on hunger and nutrition? 
67% 64% 
To what extent do senior political leaders speak out against hunger and 
undernutrition? 
63% 
How well do senior politicians understand the status of hunger and 
undernutrition in the country? 
38% 
How well do senior politicians understand causal factors of hunger and 
undernutrition in the country? 
36% 
How well do senior politicians understand solutions to hunger and 
undernutrition? 
33% 
How well are (improved) hunger and nutrition outcomes set out as goals  
in political party manifestos? 
40% 31%## 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
Table 5.18 Who supports the Government of Tanzania to combat hunger 
and undernutrition? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Donors 77% 78% 
Media 62% 54%
## 
Civil society 59% 58% 
The general public 48% 40%
## 
Opposition political parties 45% 40% 
Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on paired sample T 
tests): # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
Finally, experts were asked to identify their preferences regarding the weighting of the legal 
frameworks, policies and programmes and expenditure themes. They allocated 29 per cent 
to legal frameworks, 34 per cent to policies and programmes and 38 per cent to public 
spending.38 
5.2.4 Community perspectives on political commitment 
As part of the primary research, focus group discussions (FGDs) were conducted in the rural 
Lindi District in South-east Tanzania: in the coastal village of Kijiweni and in inland Chiwerere 
village. In each village, two FGDs were conducted with men and women separately. This 
section briefly introduces experiences of hunger and undernutrition in these communities, 
and then highlights how villagers perceive their government’s intentions and actions towards 
the reduction of hunger and undernutrition. 
In both villages, farming activities focus on one cropping season lasting from December to 
June. Chiwerere lies within the district’s best farming area. The main crops grown are 
cassava, maize, sorghum, rice, pulses, legumes, simsim, cashew nuts and coconuts. Most 
households own some livestock and generate income from crop sales, agricultural labour, 
petty trade and small businesses. For villagers in Chiwerere their own crop production is 
critical for ensuring access to food such as cassava, millet, sorghum, maize, groundnuts and 
cowpeas. They only resort to buying food when these supplies run out, often drawing on the 
income generated by working as labourers on other people’s farms. Kijiweni households are 
                                               
38 The weighting scheme exercise was not applied correctly in the villages and hence is not reported on. 
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involved in fishing, collection of sea products (seaweed) and crop sales, and also engage in 
petty trading to generate income. 
Villagers defined malnutrition as the consumption of non-nutritious foods and argued that this 
leads to increased deaths at a young age, undernourished infants and bodily weakness of 
adults. Chronic malnutrition, caused by food insecurity and fuelled by poverty, is a persistent 
problem in the region. Hunger and undernutrition are typically experienced by the most 
vulnerable community members: the elderly, female-headed households, orphans and the 
disabled. Food shortages are endemic, and villagers argued they were caused mainly by the 
increased occurrence of drought and unreliable rainfall patterns. Men in Kijiweni reported that 
there were an increasing number of men who depended on their spouses’ income-generating 
activities to obtain food and other household needs. 
In terms of government services, community members at both sites reported as usually 
having good access to health dispensaries, which typically are located within a few 
kilometres of their residences. However, accessing a hospital is much more challenging 
because of long distances and/or deteriorated road and transport conditions, especially 
during the rainy season. Kijiweni and Chiwerere villagers use bore holes for access to 
drinking water. However, in Chiwerere people depend on the river Mrawishi for drinking 
water, and this source dries up during the hot season. 
Villagers argued that despite Lindi’s routine experience of food deficits, the government has 
not taken major steps to address hunger and malnutrition. Community members were mostly 
not aware of government programmes, and in those cases where they were aware they 
found this support often too small to be meaningful. Villagers were strongly supportive of 
reproductive and child health services, which provide immunisation and clinical services for 
mothers and infants. At both study sites, villagers had also benefited from food relief 
programmes during periods of acute shortages, yet were critical of the size and composition 
of rations. Relief food typically consists of maize, and community members would like to also 
receive beans, dried sardines (dagaa), or even sugar, to constitute a more balanced diet. 
During the hunger year of 2011/12 maize rations per household were too low to meet needs, 
and people were further required to pay TSh50 per kg to cover the transportation cost of the 
relief food. Villagers argued that this was quite unfair, because many households could not 
pay and therefore were denied the food. Accordingly, respondents at both sites argued for 
the government to start targeting groups that are most in need. This would be fairer than 
current, untargeted, practice. Villagers in Kijiweni also noted that relief food did not always 
arrive in time due to long and opaque bureaucratic practices. 
Participants overall were adamant that government should play a major and much bigger role 
in reducing hunger, especially through support of the most vulnerable groups in the 
community, in the shape of provision of farm inputs and through timely and free relief food. 
‘So it helps us a little, because this year we sent a request for help but we haven’t 
seen anything yet. We were registered for help but we haven’t seen anything yet, [I] 
am reminding the government that my request for farming infrastructures should be 
taken into consideration because it will help its citizens.’ 
(Female participant, Chiwerere) 
Community members also discussed aspects of local accountability. They noted that 
politicians, traditional leaders, the media, civil society representatives and civil servants could 
do more to speak out publicly on the hunger and malnutrition experienced in their 
communities. Many villagers noted that for individuals it was very difficult to raise concerns 
about hunger and malnutrition directly with the government. Official village meetings are the 
main institutional mechanism for villagers to interact with local government officials; however, 
these are ineffective and hence often poorly attended. Villagers also distrusted low-level 
officials to pass on any critical feedback they received to senior officials and complained 
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about their involvement in corrupt practices in the distribution of relief food, which often 
meant that the most vulnerable groups did not receive timely relief. 
Serious food shortages do get reported to the District Council, but community members were 
not clear on how that happened, and who had assessed community food needs. Men in 
Kijiweni argued that the process and its outcome depended much on the lobbying power of 
the local officials. Politicians are seen to seek political support by influencing the availability 
of relief food. Although respondents did not seem to consider the ‘votes for food’ practice 
illegitimate, they did feel that politicians had a moral obligation to deliver and not make empty 
promises when seeking votes from the people. Women in Chiwerere also commented that 
had civil society been stronger in the area, the government would have increased the amount 
of relief maize during the hunger year of 2011/12. 
‘Life is difficult, and this is due to lack of rains, hence the income has become too 
little, and there is no support, we only depend on the almighty God to help us, as he 
always enables us to live. Until now the government’s support is very little, since last 
year we have only received two kilos of grain maize, how do you think we are living? 
Therefore, the government has abandoned us, but during the elections they come to 
us humbly, but right now because they have got what they want we don’t see them. If 
we send our complaints they don’t care. I wish that when we request for assistance, 
especially on the issue of food in our village, they should listen to us.’ 
(Male participant, Kijiweni Village). 
5.3 Country analysis: Zambia 
Summary 
● HANCI 2013 ranking: 30th out of 45 (2012: 17th) 
● HANCI 2013 score < HANCI 2012 score 
● Hunger: 6 million (47 per cent of population) 
● Stunting: 45 per cent of children under 5 years of age 
● Wasting: 5 per cent of children under 5 years of age. 
5.3.1 Hunger and undernutrition in Zambia 
Following a decade of rapid economic growth Zambia is now classified as a lower-middle 
income country (World Bank 2013f). However, economic growth has not translated into 
significant poverty reduction; 60 per cent of the population live below the poverty line and 42 
per cent are considered to be in extreme poverty (UNDP 2013a). Moreover, the absolute 
number of poor has increased from about 6 million in 1991 to 7.9 million in 2010, primarily 
due to population growth. There are substantial differences in poverty incidence between 
urban and rural areas. In mining areas such as the Copperbelt and Lusaka provinces, 
poverty incidence is fairly low (22 per cent and 34 per cent respectively). In contrast, in areas 
dominated by agriculture, poverty rates are greater than 70 per cent, and it is here that the 
great majority and worst cases of poverty occur (World Bank 2013f). 
Zambia has not been able to make sufficient progress towards reaching MDG1 (FAO 2013; 
UNICEF 2013). It ranks 69th in the 2013 Global Hunger Index, which deems the hunger and 
undernutrition situation ‘alarming’ (IFPRI et al. 2013). Hunger is highly prevalent: 43.1 per 
cent of people were undernourished in Zambia during the period 2010–12 (FAO 2013). 
Household surveys note that 58 per cent of families reported that within a year they cannot 
always afford three meals a day (Chibuye 2011). 
Figure 5.3 shows key temporal trends in child nutrition in Zambia. At 45 per cent, stunting 
rates are among the highest in the world (Central Statistical Office, MOH, TDRC, University 
of Zambia and Macro International 2009; SUN 2011; UNICEF 2013). Moreover, 5 per cent of 
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children under five suffer from wasting (Central Statistical Office et al. 2009) and 13.3 per 
cent are underweight (UNDP 2013a). 
Boys are more likely than girls to be stunted (48 per cent compared with 42 per cent), wasted 
(6 per cent compared with 5 per cent) and underweight (17 per cent compared with 13 per 
cent). Undernutrition prevalence rates vary substantially by area. Stunting in children under 
five years of age is highest in Luapula Province (56 per cent) and lowest in Western and 
Southern provinces (36 per cent each). There is a small difference in wasting levels between 
children in urban (4 per cent) and rural areas (6 per cent). More than one in ten babies is 
born with low birth weight indicating poor maternal nutrition (Central Statistical Office et al. 
2009; SUN 2011; UNICEF 2013). Similar to stunting prevalence, the proportion of 
underweight children is higher in rural areas than in urban areas. Children in Lusaka are the 
least likely (10 per cent) to be underweight, while children in the North-Western Province are 
the most likely (20 per cent). 
Figure 5.3 Trends in nutritional status of children under five, Zambia, 
1992–2007 
 
Source: Adapted from Central Statistical Office et al. (2009). 
Figure 5.3 shows that since the early 1990s, wasting levels have remained largely stagnant. 
Stunting levels remain very high. While the negative trend of the 1990s seems to have been 
overcome between 2000 and 2007, latest data is now over six years old and unlikely to fully 
capture the negative impacts of the global food price crisis (commencing in 2007, with 
repeats in subsequent years). 
Vitamin A and iron-deficiency anaemia affect over half of all Zambian children (SUN 2011). 
About six in ten infants below six months of age are exclusively breastfed, up from 40 per 
cent in 2001–02 (Central Statistical Office et al. 2009). 
Zambian women in particular face a double burden of nutrition. One in ten women are 
undernourished (BMI<18.5), and about one in five (19 per cent) are overweight or obese. 
Women in rural areas (11 per cent) are more likely to be underweight than those in urban 
areas (8 per cent), while women in the North-Western and Western provinces are more likely 
to be underweight than those in other provinces (14 per cent each) (Central Statistical Office 
et al. 2009). 
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5.3.2 HANCI findings 
Drawing on an updated set of secondary data, Zambia has seen a dramatic decline in 
HANCI scores and ranking. Ranked 17th in the HANCI 2012, this year the country drops to 
30th position, and it is now categorised in the group of countries showing very low 
commitment. In particular, Zambia’s score for nutrition commitment declined sharply over the 
last year. 
The Government of Zambia’s development agenda is set out in the Vision 2030 and the 
(Revised) Sixth National Development Plan (R-SNDP), which identify a significant reduction 
of hunger and poverty as important development goals (World Bank 2013f). Under the 
Compact for the Comprehensive Africa Agriculture Development Programme (CAADP) 
framework, signed in 2011, Zambia also developed a National Agriculture Investment Plan in 
which food security and nutrition are important components (SUN 2013a). New data (for 
2012) suggests that Zambia now spends 10.2 per cent of total public spending on 
agriculture, thus meeting its commitments made under the 2003 Maputo Declaration of the 
African Union. However, it should be noted that these figures include non-planned 
supplementary budgets, and actual allocated budgets for agriculture amount to 8 per cent or 
less of government budgets. As in Malawi, a Farm Input Support Programme (FISP) run by 
the Ministry of Agriculture provides subsidised seed and fertiliser to farmers, driving 
especially increased maize production. A separate intervention, the Food Security Pack 
(FSP), provided by the Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child Health, aims 
to provide a basic level of farm inputs to households in need, encourage crop diversification 
and promote conservation farming practices (Harris and Drimie 2012). 
Public agricultural research and extension activities are moderately satisfactory in terms of 
reaching poor farmers. Extension services target land owners (i.e. men) and rarely identify 
women as the target audience. Also, extension services tend to focus more on cash crops 
(grown mainly by men) than food crops (grown mainly by women) such as nuts, sorghum, 
millet, cowpeas and cassava (Curtis 2013: 63). There appears to be good scope to enhance 
the functioning of extension services by, among others, strengthening budget allocations and 
effective spending for this purpose. In 2011 only about 5 per cent of the Ministry of 
Agriculture’s budget was spend on extension services, and another 1.6 per cent on research 
(Curtis 2013). Moreover, nearly half of budget allocations may not be released (IAPRI 2014). 
While a majority of rural poor households have access to agricultural land, for women and 
indigenous populations security of tenure is not assured. While the law of the land asserts 
women’s equal legal rights, discriminatory practices against their access to and ownership of 
agricultural land persist. Despite women making up the majority of Zambian farmers, they are 
not the explicit focus of any of the roughly 5,000 budget lines in the Ministry of Agriculture’s 
budget contained in the ‘Yellow Book’ that outlines the annual government budget. The 
failure to target spending on women causes massive production losses. According to a World 
Bank study, if women in Zambia benefited from the same capital investments in farm inputs, 
including land, as men, output in Zambia could increase by up to 15 per cent (Curtis 2013: 
63). 
Similarly, women’s broader economic rights are recognised by law, though severely 
restricted by discriminatory practices, thus making women more vulnerable to hunger. In the 
last year, Zambia’s score on this indicator notably worsened. 
Zambia’s Constitution recognises a right to food; however, the right is not justiciable as it is 
not part of the bill of rights, and Zambia’s score on this indicator was accordingly revised 
downwards. The Constitution does not include a right to social security. Moreover, social 
safety nets are still rudimentary and cover only a few risks for a limited number of 
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beneﬁciaries, even though the majority of the population is at risk of poverty. Zambia also 
has a very low civil registration at birth rate: only 14 per cent of live births.39 
The Government of Zambia (GoZ) joined the SUN movement in December 2010, and 
developed its 2011–15 National Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan (NFNSP). The NFNSP 
focuses on child stunting and a child’s first 1,000 days (Harris and Drimie 2012) and 
identifies numeric time-bound nutrition targets. It includes a series of nutrition-specific 
provisions and promotes nutrition-sensitive approaches in key sectors including agriculture 
and food security, poverty reduction, community development and public health (SUN 
2013a). Nutrition interventions within primary health care services include: a national 
breastfeeding programme; growth monitoring and promotion; universal child immunisation; a 
vitamin A supplementation programme; supplementary feeding for malnourished children; 
promotion of consumption of micronutrient-rich foods; and community-based nutrition (Harris 
and Drimie 2012). 
The National Food and Nutrition Commission (NFNC) is in charge of coordinating inputs from 
various ministries towards delivering the National Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan. 
Established in 1967, the NFNC is located within the Ministry of Health (MoH) (Harris and 
Drimie 2012). Currently, civil society groups in the country are campaigning for the NFNC to 
be relocated to the Vice President’s Office, which would require a statutory amendment by 
Parliament. They argue that because the country’s disease burden (HIV/TB/malaria) is very 
high and acute, the MoH tends to focus on this to the detriment of more chronic issues such 
as undernutrition. The MoH also lacks sufficient traction with other line ministries, impeding 
effective policy coordination (pers. comms. November 2013). 
A CSO–SUN Alliance has been set up facilitating dialogue between civil society groups and 
the GoZ. Donors convene in a Nutrition Cooperating Partners’ Group (NCPG) which is 
represented in several multi-sectoral platforms coordinated by GoZ line ministries (SUN 
2013a). 
It is estimated that an investment of an additional US$30 per child under five years of age is 
required to scale up the delivery of high-impact nutrition interventions; to do this the GoZ has 
committed to increasing financial contributions to nutrition at least by 20 per cent annually for 
the next ten years (SUN 2013a).40 Although the GoZ developed a costed nutrition plan, a 
realistic costed plan for implementing the National Food and Nutrition Strategic Plan 2011–
15 continues to be needed (SUN 2012a). Sectoral budgets for nutrition are fragmented, and 
there is no national nutrition budget line, and hence it is hard to monitor the government’s 
promise to annually increase spending on nutrition by 20 per cent. Encouragingly, the 
government is now developing a mechanism to track nutrition funds from pooled funds, direct 
support, as well as government funding for nutrition (SUN 2013a). Further, the CSO–SUN 
Alliance is conducting a budget tracking exercise, which breaks down direct spending 
relating to nutrition-specific interventions that address the immediate determinants of child 
nutrition such as the infant and young child feeding practices, as well as indirect spending. 
Greater transparency on budget allocations and budget tracking may help to avoid significant 
underspend where funds are available. For instance, in 2012, funds to the tune of US$1.2 
million were earmarked for National Food and Nutrition Commission spending, yet 
disbursements often fell short by 50 per cent (SUN 2012a). Hence, while a recent CSO–SUN 
                                               
39 Zambian stakeholders, however, commented that this should not necessarily act as a barrier for children to access health and 
education services, as alternative identity documentation options exist (e.g. through the ‘under 5 card’ issued by a clinic, or an 
affidavit of birth). However, there may be advantages in harmonising with established international birth registration practice, for 
instance, in obtaining better quality data on performance of birth registration schemes (pers. comm. November 2013). 
40 Zambian stakeholders note that while US$30 dollars roughly amounts to ZK190, the Government of Zambia currently spends 
about ZK2.5 per annum per child (pers. comm. November 2013), suggesting that the 20 per cent annual increase will be far 
from sufficient. 
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analysis finds a welcome 33 per cent increase in NFNC budget allocations in 2014 as 
compared to 2013 (pers. comm.), actual spending patterns need to be watched carefully. 
Zambia invests substantially in health services (16 per cent of public spending in 2011 and 
budget allocations of 11.3 per cent in 2013) helping to allow a very high percentage (94 per 
cent) of women to be attended at least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel 
(nurse, doctor or midwife). The GoZ promotes complementary feeding in addition to 
breastfeeding and many provisions of the International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk 
Substitutes have been enshrined in Zambian law. 
One of the most significant detrimental changes over the last year on Zambian HANCI 
indicators concerns vitamin A supplementation (Table 5.19). Coverage of the vitamin A 
supplementation programme has dropped sharply from 92 per cent to 72 per cent of children. 
The GoZ can do more to improve some of the environmental factors that drive better nutrition 
outcomes. Just 64 per cent of the population has access to safe drinking water, representing 
a small rise compared to 2012. In contrast, access to sanitation decreased in the last year, 
and now stands at 42 per cent of the population (in 2011).41 Table 5.19 provides an overview 
of the indicators on which HANCI scores changed between 2012 and 2013. 
Table 5.19 Zambia, changing performance on commitment indicators, 
2012–2013 
 HANCI 2012 HANCI 2013 Change 
Value Year Value Year 
Government spending on agriculture 8.3 2007 10.2 2010 1.90 ↑
Government spending on health 15.6 2010 16.0 2011 0.38 ↑
Nutrition budget 1.0 2012 0.5 2013 -0.50 ↓
Vitamin A coverage 92.0 2010 72.0 2011 -20.00 ↓
Access to drinking water 61.0 2010 64.1 2011 3.15 ↑
Access to sanitation 48.0 2010 42.1 2011 -5.92 ↓
Skilled birth attendance 94.0 2007 93.7 2007 -0.30 ↓
Constitutional right to food 5.0 2006 1.0 2006 -4.00 ↓
Women’s economic rights 1.0 2010 0.0 2011 -1.00 ↓
 
5.3.3 Expert perceptions of political commitment 
In Zambia, 39 experts (27 men, 12 women) were interviewed in the period October–
November 2013 through a team of local consultants. This team had also conducted the 2011 
survey, so was well-versed in the practicalities of arranging and conducting the survey. 
Experts were carefully selected to ensure a balanced sample with substantial representation 
of government officials, civil society organisations, research and academic institutions, 
international donors and some members of the private sector and media. Survey 
respondents were selected on the basis of having substantial knowledge and expertise in the 
area of hunger and nutrition. Thanks to the face-to-face interview approach, response levels 
were very high. 
Expert survey findings are first discussed for the theme of public expenditures and then for 
the theme of government policies and programmes. 
                                               
41 HANCI data draws on World Bank statistics that include pit latrines without a slab. The GoZ uses a narrower definition of 
improved sanitation showing lower coverage rates at 33 per cent (UNDP 2013a).  
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Analysis of the expert surveys of 2012 and 2013 (Table 5.20) affirms the picture of Zambia’s 
declining political commitment scores reported for the global index indicators. Expert surveys 
of 2012 and 2013 finds a decline of 10 percentage points for the policy theme for both 
hunger commitment and nutrition commitment. Smaller reductions in commitment scores 
were found for the spending theme (2 per cent for hunger, 5 per cent for nutrition). 
Table 5.20 Mean Government of Zambia commitment scores by policy and 
spending theme and by hunger and nutrition subject areas  
 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Public spending 65% (fairly strong) 45% (moderate) 63% (fairly strong) 40% (fairly weak) 
Policy 67% (fairly strong) 60% (fairly strong) 57% (fairly strong) 50% (moderate) 
 
Further analysis by expenditure (Table 5.21) and policy (Table 5.22) themes allows for 
greater insight, in particular showing that on some accounts of public policy, the GoZ’s 
commitment did see improvements, though this is not the overall picture. 
Table 5.20 shows that the experts rated the GoZ’s commitment to nutrition as weaker than 
hunger reduction, at the 1 per cent level of statistical significance. Experts thus consider that 
the government’s expressed policy preferences are reflected moderately well in public 
spending for hunger reduction but fairly weakly for nutrition. Furthermore absolute budget 
spending is considered moderate whereas for nutrition it is considered fairly weak. 
Additionally, public spending on hunger is strongly sensitive to both electoral cycles and 
disasters and emergencies, in clear contrast with nutrition spending. Financial mechanisms 
for tracking hunger spending are deemed of moderate strength but fairly weak for nutrition. 
Table 5.21 Expert perceptions of public expenditures towards addressing 
hunger and undernutrition, Zambia 
Questions 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are government policy 
preferences reflected in budget 
expenditures? 
50% 62% 39% 54% 32%### 
How strong or weak would you, in 
general, characterise the government’s 
absolute (in money terms) budget 
expenditures on hunger and nutrition? 
49% 55% 39% 49% 28%***### 
How sensitive are government budget 
expenditures on hunger and nutrition to 
electoral cycles? 
74% 81% 46% 80% 47%### 
How sensitive are government budget 
expenditures on hunger and nutrition to 
emergencies/disasters? 
71% 78% 54% 76% 51%### 
How well has the national government 
developed transparent financial 
mechanisms for earmarked funding? 
- 49% 46% 56% 43%### 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
When comparing expert scores in 2013 with those from 2012, we further note that absolute 
budget expenditures on nutrition are seen to have weakened, seemingly contradicting the 
government’s announcement of spending 20 per cent more on nutrition year by year. 
However, analysis of the 2014 budget by the CSO–SUN Alliance (CSO-SUN 2013: 6) shows 
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that only in the case of the National Food and Nutrition Commission in the Ministry of Health 
did budgets increase by more than 20 per cent (i.e. by 33 per cent). Two other main line 
ministries also saw increases: the Ministry of Community Development, Mother and Child 
Health received an average increase of 13 per cent, and funding to the Ministry of 
Education’s School Health Nutrition programme received an average of 8 per cent increase. 
Yet the Ministry of Agriculture, Livestock, Fisheries and Cooperatives recorded a 2 per cent 
decline in nutrition-related funding from 2013, and this needs to be seen against the 
backdrop of a massive 96 per cent increase in funding to the Food Reserve Agency, which 
has been criticised for being too focused on maize production and thus sustaining a lack of 
dietary diversification. 
In terms of public policy, the expert surveys also helped to identify areas of strength and 
areas in need of improvement (Table 5.22). 
Policy documents express goals and preferences strongly in terms of hunger reduction and 
fairly strongly in terms of nutrition (this difference is statistically highly significant). Public 
policy is fairly open to scrutiny, and the government policymaking and policy implementing 
bodies make fairly strong efforts to involve diverse stakeholders in hunger policy, though 
somewhat (and statistically, significantly) less so in the case of nutrition. This is enabled by 
strong continuity in the agencies involved in policy design and implementation. 
Compared to 2012, horizontal coordination between government agencies was assessed as 
having improved somewhat, although this improvement was not statistically significant. 
Statistically significant improvements over time were, however, noted for the likely 
adjustment of both hunger and nutrition policies on the basis of sound evidence. Hunger 
policy in particular is seen as likely to be amended. As a leader of a local civil society 
collective explained: 
‘Based on our experience in working with policy makers… we have noted that when 
the evidence is compelling (presented in an engaging way) and clearly demonstrates 
what type of interventions will be most cost-effective and how best to implement 
them, policymakers may not hesitate to adjust or develop a policy. This, together with 
the current global focus on nutrition and hunger, and prominent CSOs championing H 
and N, I think may explain in part the [Government’s] openness to change.’ 
(pers. comm.) 
Table 5.22 and particularly Table 5.23 show that for most of the questions on policy, experts 
gave significantly lower commitment scores for nutrition than for hunger. Indeed, even 
though the Zambian Vice President made commitments to greater action at the Nutrition for 
Growth Summit in London in June 2013, experts argue that nutrition is given lower priority in 
2013 than 2012 (Table 5.23). Accordingly, the GoZ is overall seen to give fairly strong priority 
to hunger, but only moderate priority to nutrition. This is reflected in various aspects. Thus, 
whereas vertical coordination for hunger improved since 2012 and now is seen as fairly 
strong, for nutrition this is not yet the case. Local CSO stakeholders note that while the 
government has really done well since 2012 in verbalising and demonstrating (e.g. through 
policy changes) its commitment to nutrition, more time is needed to assess impacts on the 
ground. So far, the spending on nutrition has not been progressive on an annual basis. 
Further, the lack of a nutrition champion (in government) and lack of a systematic and 
coordinated way of implementing the interventions may hinder the achievement of impact 
(pers. comm.). 
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Table 5.22 Zambian public policy: aspects of stronger commitment to 
reduce hunger and undernutrition 
Questions 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
To what extent are flagship policies on 
hunger and nutrition implemented by the 
agencies that design these? 
75% 84% 85% 
How well are the goals of improving 
hunger and nutrition outcomes  
expressed in government  
development strategies/policies? 
- 73% 64% 79% 63%### 
How clear are public policy preferences 
on (a) hunger and (b) undernutrition 
expressed in government documents? 
54% 71% 73% 61%### 
How successful is/are the government 
body/ies in delivering a coordinated 
cross-agency approach to addressing 
hunger and nutrition at the national level? 
41% 55% 50% 59% 56%≠ 
How likely are government policies to be 
adjusted when strong evidence suggests 
change in course? 
51% 55% 50% 67%*** 63%***## 
How accessible is government policy on 
hunger and nutrition to public scrutiny? 
55% 59% 58% 62% 60% 
How well do policy strategies/decision-
making bodies allow representation of 
divergent interests in areas of hunger 
and nutrition? 
50% 59% 60% 60% 55% 
How well do agencies responsible for the 
design of (a) hunger and (b) nutrition 
policies build social/political support? 
58% 57% 54% 66% 56%### 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
Policy implementation for hunger is of moderate strength, but fairly weak for nutrition, and 
implementing agencies are less able to build broad political and social support for nutrition 
programmes. Whereas the GoZ is seen to make fairly strong efforts in enhancing its 
administrative (and financial) capacity to combat hunger, this is not the case for nutrition. As 
discussed above, budget lines for nutrition and the ability of the GoZ to use existing financial 
capacity are seen to be fairly weak, and in case of the latter, significantly more so than for 
hunger. 
The GoZ is less inclined to innovate with policy approaches, and policy is only moderately 
(hunger) to fairly weakly (nutrition) informed by knowledge and evidence-generating 
mechanisms. For instance, Zambia has regularly undertaken demographic and health 
surveys during the last two decades (in 1992, 1996, 2001 and 2007); however, the latest 
representative national survey data is now over six years old and policymakers are thus 
deprived of accurate contemporary data on key indicators such as stunting and wasting. 
Finally, the experts were concerned about what they saw as very weak incentives for 
individual policymakers and implementers, and their agencies, to perform well in the quest 
for hunger and undernutrition reduction. 
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Table 5.23 Zambian public policy: aspects of weaker commitment to 
reduce hunger and undernutrition 
Questions 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
What kind of a priority does the 
government give to hunger and nutrition? 
64% 64% 53% 66% 45%*### 
What is the strength of (vertical) 
coordination efforts between national  
and subnational governments to  
improve hunger and nutrition outcomes? 
– 53% 44% 62% 45%### 
How developed are government  
systems that generate knowledge  
and evidence to inform policy? 
48% 53% 50% 55% 42%### 
To what extent does the government 
experiment and innovate with  
new policy approaches? 
50% 49% 46% 56%* 51%## 
How strong is policy implementation  
on hunger and nutrition? 
43% 48% 39% 50% 37%### 
To what extent does the government 
enhance administrative capacity to 
address hunger and nutrition? 
50% 58% 48% 61% 47%### 
To what extent does the government 
enhance financial capacity to address 
hunger and nutrition? 
45% 53% 44% 54% 34%*### 
How well are budget lines for hunger  
and nutrition developed? 
– 51% 42% 57% 39%### 
How well do agencies responsible for  
the implementation of (a) hunger and  
(b) nutrition policies build social/political 
support? 
51% 55% 53% 59% 49%### 
To what extent does the government 
utilise financial capacity to address 
hunger and nutrition problems? 
– 53% 46% 55% 38%### 
What is the strength of credible 
incentives for individual policymakers  
and implementers, and their agencies,  
to perform well? 
– 25% 23% 14% 13%≠ 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
 
Public spending and public policy are not the only realms in which hunger gains priority over 
nutrition. Top-level leadership in Zambia is seen to be fairly strong in respect to hunger, and 
moderate for nutrition, and this difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level 
(Table 5.24). In comparison, experts in neighbouring Malawi and Tanzania considered their 
top leadership to demonstrate higher commitment. Even though political party manifestos 
give moderate attention to hunger and fairly weak attention to nutrition (and again, this 
difference is statistically significant at the 1 per cent level), Zambian senior politicians are 
seen to speak out fairly strongly against these issues; however, they have just a moderate 
understanding of the status and underlying causal factors of hunger and undernutrition in the 
country, and a fairly weak appreciation of possible solutions. While politicians are 
increasingly discussing hunger and nutrition, none of the political parties have recently 
revised their manifestos to give greater prominence to these issues. Civil society groups note 
that none of the political parties in Zambia provide a clear direction on nutrition, and some do 
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not even mention it. While the current party in government (PF) has verbalised its 
commitment to tackling hunger and nutrition and would have been expected to make a 
strong political statement by revising its manifesto, this has not been done so far. Its 
manifesto currently contains one reference each to hunger and nutrition. 
Table 5.24 Political leadership on hunger and undernutrition in Zambia 
Questions 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
How developed is presidential/prime 
ministerial leadership in the country on 
hunger and nutrition? 
– 61% 50% 62% 46%### 
To what extent do senior political leaders 
speak out against hunger and 
undernutrition? 
69% 66% 66% 
How well do senior politicians understand 
the status of hunger and undernutrition in 
the country? 
50% 43% 54% 
How well do senior politicians understand 
causal factors of hunger and 
undernutrition in the country? 
45% 51% 47% 
How well do senior politicians understand 
solutions to hunger and undernutrition? 
43% 41% 44% 
How well are (improved) hunger and 
nutrition outcomes set out as goals in 
political party manifestos? 
– 48% 38% 60%* 34%### 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
 
The survey findings further show that there are statistically highly significant differences 
between the support given by the general public as well as the Zambian media to GoZ efforts 
to address hunger (fairly strong) and nutrition (moderate). Donors and civil society also 
provide strong support, contrasting with the fairly weak support from opposition political 
parties (Table 5.25). 
Table 5.25 Who supports the Government of Zambia to combat hunger 
and undernutrition? 
 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Donors 75% 75% 72% 81% 78% 
Media – 55% 46% 58% 46%
### 
Civil society 66% 71% 65% 75% 73% 
The general public 66% 60% 47% 60% 49%
### 
Opposition political parties 42% 44% 30% 41% 36%
# 
Statistical significance (change between 2012 and 2013 based on independent sample T tests): * at 10% level; ** at 5% level; 
*** at 1% level. Statistical significance of the difference between hunger score in 2013 and nutrition score in 2013 based on 
paired sample T tests: # at 10% level; ## at 5% level; ### at 1% level. ≠: t-test could not be run. 
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5.3.4 Weighting schemes: community and expert preferences 
Chapter 2 showed how the HANCI research team applied an equal weighting scheme to the 
three themes that constitute the Hunger Reduction Commitment and Nutrition Commitment 
sub-indices. Recognising its subjective nature, we identified alternative weighting schemes 
based on the preferences of (a) experts and (b) communities affected by hunger and 
undernutrition. A simple exercise was devised for experts as part of the questionnaire survey, 
and for community members as part of the focus group discussions. Table 5.26 shows a 
summary of findings. 
Table 5.26 Experts’ and community members’ subjective weighting 
schemes, Zambia 
 Legal frameworks Policies and programmes Public expenditures 
2012 2013 2012 2013 2012 2013 
Experts 19% 20% 49% 32% 32% 49% 
Communities 20% n.a. 40% n.a. 40% n.a. 
 
The Zambian consultants conducted the exercise separately for hunger and for nutrition. 
Interestingly this did not generate any meaningful differences in allocations of weights, hence 
these are not reported on in the table.42 While experts surveyed in 2013 allocated very 
similar weights to legal frameworks, they swapped their allocations for policies and 
programmes and public spending. Accordingly, in 2013, 49 per cent weights were given to 
spending (32 per cent in 2012). 
                                               
42 Hunger and nutrition were allocated respectively 19 per cent and 20 per cent for legal frameworks: 32 per cent and 31 per 
cent for policies and programmes; and 49 per cent each for public spending.  
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6 Awareness raising and policy uptake 
If the HANCI is to add value by highlighting successes and deficits in commitment to ending 
hunger and undernutrition, it has to be well known and easy to access. The project team 
accordingly developed a communications plan. We renewed the website 
(http://www.hancindex.org) and regularly updated it with project research and 
communications products. The website includes a number of interactive data visualisation 
applications. These present HANCI findings in a number of ways and allow users to interact 
with and explore the underlying data. New multimedia products such as photo-slideshows, 
podcasted presentations and TV and radio interviews have been uploaded. 
The HANCI approach has been developed and shared with practitioners in key countries. 
Workshops were run in Bangladesh, Malawi, Tanzania (twice) and Zambia in 2013 (and in 
India in 2012) and a method has been developed through which local partners devised key 
advocacy messages supported by HANCI evidence, for in-country policy advocacy. Most 
prominently, in November 2013 IDS researchers, together with local partners from the 
Partnership for Nutrition in Tanzania (PANITA), presented the results of the Hunger and 
Nutrition Commitment Index to a group of 14 Tanzanian members of the Parliamentary 
Group for Nutrition, Food Security and Children’s Rights, including two deputy ministers. 
Working in partnership with Save the Children and PANITA – who support the Parliamentary 
Group to act as ‘nutrition champions’ – IDS led the process of co-constructing a set of key 
findings with which to target the MPs. They married evidence from the HANCI secondary 
data and primary research conducted in Tanzania to issues in PANITA’s existing advocacy 
strategy and aligned them with ongoing efforts of the Parliamentary Group. The evidence 
was used as the basis for a discussion in which the MPs were encouraged to propose 
solutions, and translate these into personal action. The MPs enthusiastically noted that 
HANCI evidence grounds complex nutrition issues and provides useful ammunition for them 
to exercise political leadership and strengthen their oversight over the government. 
Specifically the MPs were keen to learn from the actions of other African countries that out-
ranked Tanzania (8th) in the Index in order to emulate and leapfrog them in future. 
Consequently, the MPs proposed several actions: 
1. To take the lead in ensuring that nutrition is included as a key development 
issue in the next set of political manifestos (2015–20). 
2. To champion nutrition in their regions and districts. 
3. Seeking to get the National Nutrition Strategy as a permanent agenda item in 
sub-national committees and council meetings. 
4. One MP committed to preparing a private motion for Parliament to demand 
regular and improved collation, access and use of nutrition outcome and 
policy implementation data at the district level throughout the country, thus 
enabling MPs to better hold policy implementers to account and to incentivise 
them to perform better. 
Subsequently, HANCI evidence on problems surrounding political commitment to reducing 
hunger and nutrition, and why they matter, was presented to a roundtable event where eight 
Tanzanian MPs and two British MPs discussed the findings. 
All in all, the visit made a very promising start to what we hope will be an enduring 
relationship with PANITA and with Tanzanian decision-makers, to support them to foster 
greater political action on hunger and nutrition. 
The event also received coverage in Tanzanian media including TV, radio and newspapers. 
MPs were interviewed and were therefore able to make public their commitments for 
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reducing hunger and undernutrition. Such public commitment is an essential part of the 
accountability which the HANCI aims to build. The HANCI team plans to replicate this 
approach in other countries where HANCI research has been undertaken. 
In addition, initial discussions were had on how to link the HANCI structurally with the 
international CSO–SUN network, convened by Save the Children, such that research 
findings and communications products can be successfully used in a wide range of countries. 
The HANCI launch in April 2013 strategically sought to inform the Ireland-hosted Hunger 
Summit in April, the G-8 meeting in the UK in June and also linked to the Lancet series on 
maternal and child malnutrition. HANCI has been successful at reaching a large audience 
through a range of media outlets which include TV (via Al Jazeera, twice) and news items 
aired on radio (BBC World Service, BBC National and Regional and in Russia and the 
Netherlands). Reports in online media and news print have covered the Index internationally, 
for example, Reuters AlertNet, and in countries including Guatemala, Kenya, Tanzania, the 
UK, Finland and the Netherlands. The Index has featured in a number of development and 
news blogs, and two national ministries have sought further information. 
The HANCI has also featured in several IDS internal and external blogs. Table 6.1 gives an 
overview of uptake activities. 
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Table 6.1 HANCI uptake 
 Activities 
Awareness 
raising and 
capacity 
building 
● Four audio slideshows presenting community voices 
● Workshops: Tanzania (2x); Bangladesh; Malawi, Zambia, Nepal 
● One IDS seminar, February 2014 (www.ids.ac.uk/events/the-hunger-and-nutrition-
commitment-index-an-introduction#eventstraming) 
● Training courses: IDS Nutrition Summer Training Course (July 2013); WFP Nutrition 
Training Course (June 2013) 
● Presentations: Irish Aid (November 2013); Child Investment Fund Foundation (April 
2014); Lancet Series on Nutrition (June 2013); McGill University, Global Conference on 
Food Security, October 2013 (http://bcooltv.mcgill.ca/Viewer2/?rid=1070099d-8eb6-
4558-a76d-9c99330b8a52) 
Policy 
influencing 
● Policy workshop Tanzania with 12 MPs and 2 deputy-ministers (November 2013) 
● Roundtable event UK-Tanzanian MPs (with RESULTS UK, November 2013) 
Programmatic 
use and 
academia 
HANCI has been reported as having been used by the Children’s Investment Fund 
Foundation and the Program for Appropriate Technology in Health to support decisions on 
country and partner selection. The DFID-funded Operations Research and Impact 
Evaluation (ORIE) project in Northern Nigeria uses HANCI data for its M&E plan for the 
DFID. PATH uses HANCI as part of its criteria for selecting applications to award funds to 
CSOs through the DFID Nutrition Embedded Evaluation Programme (NEEP). References 
are also made to HANCI in, among others: Lancet Series 2013; World Economic and 
Social Survey report (www.un.org/en/development/desa/policy/wess/index.shtml); IFPRI 
2013 Global Food Policy Report 
Radio, TV, 
newspapers 
coverage 
● Tanzania policy workshop: covered in ten Tanzanian TV broadcasts and broadsheet 
articles 
● TV interviews D. te Lintelo on Al-Jazeera, June 2013 
(www.aljazeera.com/programmes/insidestory/2013/04/201341375931646699.htm) and 
on 16 October, World Food Day 
● News items and interviews with D. te Lintelo aired on Radio: BBC World Service, BBC 
National and Regional; Radio Moscow 
(http://english.ruvr.ru/radio_broadcast/25298789/221967970/) and the Netherlands 
(www.rnw.nl/africa/article/poverty-no-bar-fighting-deadly-undernutrition) 
● Reports in online media and news print have covered the Index internationally e.g. 
Reuters (www.trust.org/alertnet/news/emerging-economies-lag-in-commitment-to-
tackle-hunger-index), and in countries including: 
 o Guatemala (www.dca.gob.gt/index.php/template-features/item/16505-
reconocen-lucha-contra-el-hambre.html) 
o Kenya (www.the-star.co.ke/news/article-116616/kenya-among-countries-not-
committed-fighting-hunger-says-report, Tanzania), 
o Tanzania (http://thecitizen.co.tz/news/4-national-news/30488-new-index-
shows-tanzania-most-devoted-to-war-on-famine-in-east-africa) 
o UK (www.guardian.co.uk/global-development/2013/apr/11/guinea-bissau-
countries-commitment-hunger) 
o Finland (www.kepa.fi/uutiset/10032) 
o Netherlands (www.nieuwsbank.nl/inp/2013/06/05/Y087.htm) 
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Blogs IDS blogs: IDS Povertics blog (June, October 2013); Development Horizons blog by 
Lawrence Haddad (June, October, November 2013). Externally, IDS authored blogs 
featured on AllAfrica (http://allafrica.com/stories/201304140158.html and 
http://allafrica.com/stories/201304121076.html, April 2013) and on ReliefWeb (April 2013); 
ChildWatch International Research Network (May 2013) 
Several development bloggers also picked up on HANCI, including: 
● Roger Thurlow, IFPRI (http://outrageandinspire.org/2014/01/28/gimme-nutrition/). 
● Scott Bleggi, Bread for the World, May 2013 (http://notes.bread.org/2013/05/whos-
walking-the-walk-country-commitments-to-fighting-malnutrition.html) 
● Duncan Green, Oxfam, http://oxfamblogs.org/fp2p/does-hunger-make-you-want-to-cry-
if-so-get-your-hanci-out/ April 2013 and also featured on World Bank’s ‘People, spaces, 
deliberation’ blog, http://blogs.worldbank.org/team/duncan-green 
● Sight and life (July 2013) www.sightandlife.org/news/news-details/article/The-Hunger-
And-Nutrition-Commitment-Index-HANCI-2012.html 
● OneWorld South Asia (April 2013) http://southasia.oneworld.net/resources/ids-
launches-hunger-and-nutrition-commitment-index-hanci - .U4TQBSgvTwB 
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7 Conclusions 
The HANCI 2013 is the second issue of the Hunger and Nutrition Commitment Index for 
developing countries. It measures government commitment to reducing hunger and 
improving nutrition because this is something governments can be held accountable for by 
civil society actors. 
We employ two methods for assessing commitment: secondary data for cross-country 
comparisons, and primary data based on community and ‘expert’ opinion to further assess 
political commitment within selected countries. The primary data provides a complementary 
and up-to-date perspective on political commitment to reducing hunger and undernutrition, as 
it interrogates a set of commitment indicators for which little to no secondary data is available 
for most countries. 
The HANCI 2013 compares 45 countries’ performance over 22 indicators on public spending, 
policies and programmes and legal frameworks; instruments that governments can employ to 
enhance access, availability and utilisation of food and nutrition. The HANCI aggregates 
relative political commitment levels and offers a comparative analysis with the HANCI 2012 
findings. While the HANCI cannot aggregate absolute levels of commitment across 
indicators, changes in performance on individual indicators allow an opportunity to assess 
country commitment over time. 
Main findings for the HANCI 2013 include: 
● Guatemala, followed by Peru and Malawi, tops the list of 45 countries in terms 
of relative political commitment to addressing hunger and undernutrition. 
● Guinea Bissau, Sudan and Myanmar languish at the bottom of the rankings. 
● Guatemala retains the number one position on the HANCI, despite declining 
commitment scores. 
● Competition for the HANCI’s top spot is heating up. 
● At the bottom regions of the index, some countries are witnessing significant 
improvement in committed action on hunger and nutrition. 
● Worryingly, several countries that are already at the bottom of the HANCI 
ranking, including Guinea Bissau, the Yemen and Sudan, are demonstrating a 
decline in relative commitment. These countries are increasingly getting left 
behind. 
When countries are grouped by commitment levels and cross-tabulated against critical 
context variables such as hunger and undernutrition levels and trends, wealth and 
governance effectiveness, findings for the HANCI 2013 were strikingly similar to those for the 
HANCI 2012. 
● Significantly, within areas of high and growing hunger and undernutrition 
prevalence, some countries are clearly showing much greater political 
commitment to addressing these problems than others. 
● Among those countries with high stunting levels and with ‘serious’ or 
‘alarming’ status on the Global Hunger Index, there is high variation in relative 
commitment levels. 
● Worryingly, in those countries that have seen stunting increase over the last 
two decades, current levels of political commitment are low to very low. Many 
countries in this position are currently or have recently been afflicted by 
conflict (Sierra Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Yemen, Afghanistan and 
Sudan). 
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● The countries showing relatively highest commitment are found in diverse 
wealth groups. Low wealth is not necessarily an impediment for taking 
committed action on hunger and undernutrition. 
● Countries in the highest wealth group (>$3,500 per year per capita) are more 
likely to undertake committed action than those that are less well off. Some 
middle-income countries that were shown to lag in commitment in the HANCI 
2012 are now reported as demonstrating improved efforts at addressing 
hunger and undernutrition. 
● Economic growth has not necessarily led to a commitment from governments 
to tackle hunger and undernutrition. 
● The relative commitment to hunger reduction does not predict the relative 
commitment to nutrition. This is shown by both secondary and primary 
research findings from expert perception surveys in Bangladesh, India, 
Malawi, Nepal, Tanzania and Zambia. The expert surveys thus show that the 
general public, the media and civil society organisations as well as senior 
political party leadership are generally less supportive of government action 
on nutrition than on hunger. One major challenge therefore is to not just 
change government commitment, but to enhance commitment towards 
nutrition within non-state sections of society. 
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Annex A Questions in Expert Surveys 
General information of respondent 
 
Date of interview: Day Month Year 
  
Name of interviewer: 
First and last name. 
 
  
Name of respondent: 
First and last name. 
 
  
Respondent ID (to be allocated by interview team) 
 
 
  
Place, State (respondent base): 
 
 
  
Gender: 
 
Female Male 
  
Educational background: 
Highest education level 
 
  
Organisation/Institution the respondent is working for: 
 
 
  
Position held in the organisation: 
 
 
  
Type of organisation: 
 
 
  
Main area of expertise: 
Circle those that apply 
1. Health 
2. Nutrition 
3. Agriculture 
4. Food Policy 
5. Education 
6. Social Policy 
7. Other (please state) 
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Q1. In your opinion, how important are hunger and undernutrition problems in the country? 
 1. Highly critical 
 2. Important 
 3. Somewhat important 
 4. Of limited importance 
 5. Unimportant 
 6. Don’t know 
99. Refrain to answer 
 
Q2. In your opinion, what kind of a priority does your national government give to improving 
hunger and nutrition outcomes? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very high priority   
 2. High priority   
 3. Moderate priority   
 4. Low priority   
 5. Very low priority   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q3. In its efforts to address hunger and undernutrition, which groups does the national 
government prioritise (e.g. children, orphans and vulnerable children, landless people)? 
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NB: QUESTIONS REFER TO NATIONAL POLICIES AIMING 
TO REDUCE HUNGER AND UNDERNUTRITION 
Government policies 
Q4. Could you name those policies that the national government considers most relevant 
and currently undertakes to reduce hunger and undernutrition (name up to 5)? 
For each, 
A. Can you tell whether it was initiated by the implementing agency? 
B. If not, can you identify which agency initiated the policy? 
Interviewer: For each, note whether it is predominantly focused on (a) nutrition, (b) hunger or (c) focused on both. 
Name of policy 4A. To what extent was this 
policy initiated by the State 
agency responsible for 
executing it? 
4B. If not fully or mostly, what 
other agency drove this policy?* 
  1. Fully 
 2. Mostly 
 3. Somewhat 
 4. Hardly 
 5. Not at all 
 6. Don’t know 
99. Refrain to answer 
 
1. (a/b/c)   
2. (a/b/c)   
3. (a/b/c)   
4. (a/b/c)   
5. (a/b/c)   
*Interviewer: consider agencies within/outside government, inc. Donors (4B). Prompt respondents where required on 
appropriate policies. 
 
Q5. For the policies you mentioned in question 4, could we ask you a few more questions? 
A. How important does the National government consider this policy? 
B. How sufficient are current National government efforts towards fulfilling policy 
goals? 
b 5A. How important does the 
National government consider 
this policy? 
5B. How adequate are National 
government efforts towards 
fulfilling policy goals? 
 1. Very important 
2. Important 
3. So-so 
4. Unimportant 
5. Very unimportant 
1. Very sufficient 
2. Somewhat sufficient 
3. So-so 
4. Somewhat insufficient 
5. Very insufficient 
1.   
2.   
3.   
4.   
5.   
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Stakeholders 
Q6. In your opinion, how well do National government agencies43 responsible for 
designing/implementing these policies build broad-based social and political support in order 
to ensure their success and longevity? 
 Agencies designing Agencies implementing 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strongly     
 2. Strongly     
 3. So-so     
 4. Weakly     
 5. Very weakly     
 6. Don’t know     
99. Refrain to answer     
 
Q7. In your opinion, how likely are flagship (most important) policies (identified in question 
Q4 above) to challenge powerful entrenched interests? 
 1. Very likely 
 2. Likely 
 3. Somewhat likely 
 4. Not likely 
 5. Not at all likely 
 6. Don’t know 
99. Refrain to answer 
 
Q8. In your opinion, how well do policy strategies and decision-making bodies at the national 
level allow the representation of divergent interests, including those of opposing 
stakeholders, in the area of hunger and nutrition? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strongly   
 2. Strongly   
 3. So-so   
 4. Weakly   
 5. Very weakly/not at all   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q9. In your opinion, how successful do national government agencies in charge 
of/implementing key policies muster adequate and ongoing support to overcome resistance 
from stakeholders whose interests are threatened? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very successfully   
 2. Successfully   
 3. Somewhat successfully   
 4. Not very successfully   
 5. Not at all successfully   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
                                               
43 Agencies designing policy refer to both state and national government bodies. The question on implementation can consider 
non-government bodies. 
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Q10. In your opinion, what levels of support do National government efforts towards hunger 
reduction receive from: 
Interviewer: circle response for each category. 
 Very 
strong 
Strong Moderate Weak Very 
weak 
Don’t 
know 
Refrain to 
answer 
The general public 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Civil society groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Central Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Political opposition (State) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Civil Service (State) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
International donors 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Private sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Media 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
 
Q11. In your opinion, what levels of support do National government efforts towards 
improved nutrition receive from: 
Interviewer: circle response for each category. 
 Very 
strong 
Strong Moderate Weak Very 
weak 
Don’t 
know 
Refrain to 
answer 
The general public 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Civil society groups 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Central Government 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Political opposition (State) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Civil Service (State) 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
International donors 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Private sector 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
Media 1 2 3 4 5 6 99 
 
 
Leadership 
Q12. In your opinion, to what extent do senior political leaders, civil society representatives 
and civil servants leaders at the national level speak out publicly against hunger and 
undernutrition? 
 Political leaders Civil society Civil servants 
 1. Very strongly    
 2. Strongly    
 3. So-so    
 4. Weakly    
 5. Very weakly    
 6. Don’t know    
99. Refrain to answer    
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Q13. In your opinion, how convincing are public statements made by senior (a) politicians (b) 
civil society representatives and (c) civil servants at the national level in relation to hunger 
reduction and undernutrition? 
 Political leaders Civil society Civil servants 
 1. Highly convincing    
 2. Convincing    
 3. So-so    
 4. Not very convincing    
 5. Highly unconvincing    
 6. Don’t know    
99. Refrain to answer    
 
 
Analysis, learning and adaptation 
Q14. How clearly are public policy preferences aiming to address hunger and undernutrition 
set out in national government documents? 
 1. Very clearly 
 2. Clearly 
 3. Somewhat 
 4. Unclearly 
 5. Very unclearly 
 6. Don’t know 
99 Refrain to answer 
 
Q15. How well are the goals of improving hunger and nutrition outcomes expressed in 
national development strategy (Five Year Plans, PNSPs, Vision 2020, etc)? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strongly   
 2. Strongly   
 3. So-so   
 4. Weakly   
 5. Negligibly/not at all   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q16. How well are budget lines related to hunger and nutrition developed in the State 
budgets? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very clearly   
 2. Clearly   
 3. Somewhat clearly   
 4. Unclearly   
 5. Very unclearly   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
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Q17. How well defined are (a) hunger and (b) nutrition outcome targets in national (1) 
policies and (2) political manifestos of the ruling political party/coalition? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Policies Political 
manifestos 
Policies Political 
manifestos 
 1. Very clearly     
 2. Clearly     
 3. Somewhat     
 4. Unclearly     
 5. Negligibly/not at all     
 6. Don’t know     
99. Refrain to answer     
 
Q18. How important is scientific evidence in national level hunger and nutrition policymaking 
processes? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very important   
 2. Important   
 3. So-so   
 4. Unimportant   
 5. Very unimportant   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q19. How developed are national government systems generating knowledge and evidence 
(regular monitoring and surveillance, M&E, etc) for informing (a) hunger and (b) nutrition 
policy? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Strongly developed   
 2. Developed   
 3. Somewhat   
 4. Poorly developed   
 5. Non-existent   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q20. In general, how likely are national government policies on (a) hunger and (b) nutrition to 
be adjusted (e.g. to objectives, instruments, strategies and funding) when strong evidence 
piles up that suggests a change of course? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very likely   
 2. Likely   
 3. Somewhat likely   
 4. Not very likely   
 5. Very unlikely   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
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Q21. To what extent does the national government innovate and experiment with new policy 
approaches developed domestically or abroad to combat hunger and undernutrition? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strongly   
 2. Strongly   
 3. So-so   
 4. Weakly   
 5. Negligibly/not at all   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q22. How accessible is national government policy (aiming to address hunger and 
undernutrition reduction) to public scrutiny (by citizens, civil society, media, etc)?  
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Fully accessible   
 2. Fairly accessible   
 3. So-so   
 4. Fairly inaccessible   
 5. Inaccessible   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q23. In your opinion, what level of empirical understanding do senior (a) politicians; (b) civil 
society representatives; and (c) civil servants at the national level have of the 
a. status of hunger and undernutrition in the country 
b. causal factors and 
c. potential solutions? 
 Status Causal factors Potential solutions 
Senior politicians    
Senior civil servants    
Civil society leaders    
 
 1. Very high 
 2. High 
 3. Moderate 
 4. Weak 
 5. Very weak 
 6. Don’t know 
99. Refrain to answer 
 
Q24. In your opinion, how developed is presidential/prime ministerial leadership in the 
country on (a) hunger and (b) nutrition? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strongly   
 2. Strongly   
 3. So-so   
 4. Weakly   
 5. Very weakly/not at all   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
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Budgets 
Q25. To what extent are national government policy preferences for addressing hunger and 
nutrition reflected in its budget allocations and expenditures? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Allocation Expenditure Allocation Expenditure 
 1. Very strongly     
 2. Strongly     
 3. So-so     
 4. Weakly     
 5. Very weakly/not at all     
 6. Don’t know     
99. Refrain to answer     
 
Q26. In your opinion, how well has the national government developed transparent financial 
mechanisms for earmarked hunger and nutrition funding?  
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strongly   
 2. Strongly   
 3. So-so   
 4. Weakly   
 5. Very weakly/not at all   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q27. In your opinion, how strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the national 
government’s absolute (in money terms) budget allocations and expenditures on hunger and 
nutrition (keeping in mind the nature of the problem, and local context)? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Allocation Expenditure Allocation Expenditure 
 1. Very strong     
 2. Strong     
 3. So-so     
 4. Weak     
 5. Very weak     
 6. Don’t know     
99. Refrain to answer     
 
Q28. In your opinion, how sensitive are national government budget expenditures on hunger 
and nutrition to (a) electoral cycles; (b) emergencies/disasters? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Electoral  
cycles 
Emergencies/
disasters 
Electoral  
cycles 
Emergencies/
disasters 
 1. Very strongly     
 2. Strongly     
 3. So-so     
 4. Weakly     
 5. Very weakly     
 6. Don’t know     
99. Refrain to answer     
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Institutional incentives 
Q29. As hunger and nutrition issues are typically relevant to multiple departments/agencies, 
could you inform whether the national government has appointed a coordinating body/ies 
that promote(s) joined up thinking/action? 
 1. Yes: (a) one  
(b) multiple, i.e.  
 2. None ( skip next question) 
 6. Don’t know 
99. Refrain to answer 
 
Q30. If yes, how successful is/are the body/ies in delivering a coordinated cross-agency 
approach to addressing hunger and nutrition? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Name(s)  Name(s)  
 1. Very successful   
 2. Successful   
 3. So-so   
 4. Quite unsuccessful   
 5. Unsuccessful   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q31. In your opinion, what is the strength of coordination efforts by national government with 
subnational (e.g. State) government efforts to improve (a) hunger and (b) nutrition 
outcomes?  
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strong   
 2. Strong   
 3. So-so   
 4. Weak   
 5. Very weak   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q32. For national government agency/agencies in charge of (a) designing and (b) 
implementing hunger and nutrition policy, is achievement or failure to achieve public policy 
objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned (e.g. through budget rises/cuts, win/loss of 
political gravitas, gain/loss of respect, etc)? 
 Policy design agencies Implementing agencies 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Always     
 2. Mostly     
 3. Sometimes     
 4. Occasionally     
 5. Never     
 6. Don’t know     
99. Refrain to answer     
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Q33. Similarly, for individuals within the national government agencies in charge of (a) 
designing and (b) implementing hunger and undernutrition policy, is achievement or failure to 
achieve public policy objectives credibly rewarded or sanctioned (e.g. through promotions, 
training opportunities, budget rises/cuts, win/loss of political gravitas, etc)? 
 Policy designers Policy implementers 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Always     
 2. Mostly     
 3. Sometimes     
 4. Occasionally     
 5. Never     
 6. Don’t know     
99. Refrain to answer     
 
Q34. In your opinion, generally, how good is the implementation of public policies (re: hunger 
and undernutrition) in the country? 
 Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very good   
 2. Quite good   
 3. Moderately good   
 4. Quite poor   
 5. Very poor   
 6. Don’t know   
99. Refrain to answer   
 
Q35. In your opinion, to what extent does the national government enhance (a) 
administrative capacity and (b) financial capacity within the country to effectively address 1. 
hunger and 2. nutrition problems in the country? 
 Administrative capacity Financial capacity 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strongly     
 2. Strongly     
 3. So-so     
 4. Weakly     
 5. Very weakly     
 6. Don’t know     
99. Refrain to answer     
 
Q36. In your opinion, to what extent does the national government utilise existing (a) 
administrative capacity and (b) financial capacity to effectively address 1) hunger and 2) 
nutrition in the country? 
 Administrative capacity Financial capacity 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
 1. Very strongly     
 2. Strongly     
 3. So-so     
 4. Weakly     
 5. Very weakly     
 6. Don’t know     
99.  Refrain to answer     
108 
 
Q37. If you were to be the prime minister/president, and really committed to reduce hunger 
and undernutrition, with a free hand in allocating resources (100 ‘points’), how would you 
allocate these across three areas? 
(Note: Any combination or concentration of points is permitted, totalling 100) 
Legal frameworks  
Policies and programmes  
Government expenditures  
Interviewer: count total  
[Interviewer: make sure that all add up to 100] 
 
Q38a. Prior to being contacted about this survey, had you heard about HANCI or not? 
[ ] Yes 
[ ] No 
Q38b. If yes, how did you learn about it? 
[ ] I participated in the expert survey before 
[ ] via my organisation 
[ ] via in-country partners 
[ ] via internet – general 
[ ] via social media (blogs, tweets, social/professional networking) 
[ ] via media or news items 
[ ] other (specify)  
 
Finally 
Are there any other comments or feedback that you would like to share? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
THANK YOU VERY MUCH FOR YOUR COOPERATION! 
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Annex B HANCI raw data (22 indicators, 45 
countries) 
 Government 
spending on 
agriculture 
Government 
spending on 
health 
Nutrition 
budget 
Security of 
access to 
land 
Access to 
agriculture 
extension 
services 
Civil 
registration 
of live births 
Status of 
safety 
nets 
Vitamin A 
coverage 
Afghanistan 3.7 3.34 0.0* 2.75 3.08* 37.4 1 100 
Angola 3.5 6.14 0.0* 3.00 3.33* 29.4 4 55 
Bangladesh 8.9 8.93 1.0* 3.25 3.83* 30.5 3 94 
Benin 4.3 10.52 0.0* 3.00 4.50* 80.2 4 98 
Brazil 2.0 8.69 1.0* 4.44 4.50* 93.4 7 29* 
Burkina Faso 10.8 12.84 0.5 3.50 4.50* 76.9 3 87 
Burundi 10.3 8.14 0.0* 4.00 3.17* 75.2 3 83 
Cambodia 4.8 6.32 0.0* 3.63 3.17* 62.1 3 92 
Cameroon 1.3 8.53 0.0* 3.50 4.08* 61.0 4 55.3 
China 9.0 12.49 0.0* 4.19 4.08* 90.0* 5 29* 
Congo, DR 1.1 10.79 0.0* 2.75 3.00* 27.8 1 98 
Côte d’Ivoire 2.5 6.81 1.0* 2.00 3.00* 65.0 2 100 
Ethiopia 21.2 14.64 1.0* 3.88 4.33* 6.6 3 71 
Gambia 7.8 11.28 1.0* 3.98 4.00* 52.5 2* 93 
Ghana 9.1 11.87 0.0* 3.50 4.00* 62.5 5 73.7 
Guatemala 2.0 14.73 1.0* 3.75 3.67* 96.7 4 28 
Guinea Bissau 0.9 7.79 0.0* 3.25 3.00* 24.1 1* 100 
India 6.8 8.05 0.5* 3.63 4.00* 74.5* 5 66 
Indonesia 2.6 5.32 1.0* 3.88 3.50* 67.0 5 76 
Kenya 4.6 5.94 1.0* 4.00 4.00* 60.0 3 62* 
Lesotho 2.9 14.61 0.0* 3.75 3.67* 45.1 3 33.8 
Liberia 2.9 18.88 0.0* 2.94 2.83* 3.6 3 96 
Madagascar 8.3 15.27 1.0* 3.50 4.33* 79.7 3 91 
Malawi 28.9 18.52 1.0* 3.75 3.67* 16.6 3 96 
Mali 11.1 12.25 0.5* 3.38 3.67* 80.8 5 96 
Mauritania 6.3 10.86 0.5* 3.25 4.33* 59.0 4 100 
Mozambique 5.5 7.75 1.0* 4.00 4.00* 48.0 4 100 
Myanmar 8.0 1.3 0.0* 2.75 2.83* 72.4 1 96 
Nepal 8.5 9.56 1.0* 3.50 3.08* 42.3 2 91 
Niger 12.7 11.08 1.0* 3.00 4.00* 63.9 3 95 
Nigeria 5.7 7.51 0.0* 3.75 3.25* 42.0 4 73 
Pakistan 1.0 3.58 0.0* 3.38 4.00* 31.9 3 90 
Peru 1.2 15 1.0* 4.44 3.67* 96.0 5 5.8 
Philippines 5.9 8.48 0.0* 4.00 4.08* 90.0 5 91 
Rwanda 7.3 23.75 1.0* 4.50 4.33* 63.2 5 76 
Senegal 13.9 11.92 1.0* 3.63 4.17* 74.6 4 97* 
Sierra Leone 1.7 11.69 1.0* 3.13 4.00* 78.0 4 99 
South Africa 1.8 12.71 1.0* 4.00 3.33* 95.0 6 44 
Sudan 7 10.57 0.0* 3.63 3.67* 59.0* 1 82* 
Tanzania 6.8 11.13 1.0* 4.00 5.00* 16.3 4 97 
Togo 9.1 15.38 0.0* 3.25 2.33* 77.9 3 22 
Uganda 3.9 10.82 0.5 4.50 4.33* 29.9 4 60 
Vietnam 3.9 9.43 0.5 3.88 3.33* 95.0 6 99 
Yemen 1.1 4.33 0.0* 4.50 4.00* 17.0 3 9 
Zambia 10.2 15.98 0.5 3.50 4.00* 14.0 4 72 
Note: * employed HANCI 2012 data where no updated data was available. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex B (cont’d.) 
 Governments 
promote 
complementary 
feeding 
Access to 
drinking 
water 
Access to 
sanitation 
Skilled birth 
attendance 
Extent of 
nutrition 
features in 
national 
development 
policies/ 
strategies 
National 
nutrition 
policy, plan 
or strategy 
Multi-sectoral 
and multi-
stakeholder 
coordination 
mechanism 
Afghanistan 1 60.6 28.5 47.9 0.19* 1* 1* 
Angola 1* 53.4 58.7 79.8 0.00* 1 1* 
Bangladesh 1 83.2 54.7 54.6 0.56* 1 1* 
Benin 1* 76.0 14.2 85.8 0.23* 1 1* 
Brazil 1 97.2 80.8 98.2 0.24* 1 1* 
Burkina Faso 1* 80.0 18.0 94.3 0.10* 1 1* 
Burundi 1* 74.4 50.1 98.9 0.19* 1 1* 
Cambodia 1* 67.1 33.1 89.1 0.33* 1 1* 
Cameroon 1 74.4 47.8 84.7 0.06* 1 0* 
China 1 91.7 65.1 94.1 0.00* 1 0* 
Congo, DR 0* 46.2 30.7 88.8 0.15* 1 1* 
Côte d’Ivoire 1* 79.9 23.9 90.6 0.30* 1 1* 
Ethiopia 1* 49.0 20.7 42.5 0.02* 1 1* 
Gambia 1 89.3 67.7 98.1 0.33* 1* 1* 
Ghana 1 86.3 13.5 96.4 0.14* 1 1* 
Guatemala 1 93.8 80.2 93.2 0.00* 1 1* 
Guinea Bissau 1* 71.7 19.0 92.6 0.12* 1* 0* 
India 0 91.6 35.1 74.2 0.47* 1 0* 
Indonesia 1 84.3 58.7 92.7 0.09* 1 1* 
Kenya 1 60.9 29.4 91.5 0.08* 1 1* 
Lesotho 1 77.7 26.3 91.8 0.17* 0* 0* 
Liberia 0* 74.4 18.2 79.3 0.29* 1* 1* 
Madagascar 1* 48.1 13.7 86.3 0.27* 1 1* 
Malawi 1 83.7 52.9 94.7 0.90* 1 1* 
Mali 1* 65.4 21.6 70.4 0.02* 1 1* 
Mauritania 1* 49.6 26.6 75.4 0.32* 1* 1* 
Mozambique 0 47.2 19.1 92.3 0.59* 1 1* 
Myanmar 1* 84.1 77.3 83.1 0.11* 1 1* 
Nepal 1 87.6 35.4 58.3 0.09* 1 1* 
Niger 1* 50.3 9.6 83 0.53* 1 1* 
Nigeria 1* 61.1 30.6 57.7 0.08* 1 1* 
Pakistan 1 93.0 59.5 73.1 0.09* 1 1 
Peru 1 85.3 71.6 95.4 0.17* 1 1* 
Philippines 1 92.4 74.2 91.1 0.18* 1 1* 
Rwanda 1* 68.9 61.3 98 0.30* 1 1* 
Senegal 0* 73.4 51.4 93.3 0.44* 1 1* 
Sierra Leone 1* 57.5 12.9 93 0.12* 1 1* 
South Africa 1* 91.5 74.0 97.1 0.00* 1 0* 
Sudan 1* 55.4 23.5 55.9 0.00* 1 0* 
Tanzania 1* 53.3 11.9 87.8 0.00* 1 1* 
Togo 0* 59.0 11.4 71.6 0.36* 1 0* 
Uganda 1 74.8 35.0 93.3 0.16* 1 1* 
Vietnam 1 95.6 74.8 93.7 0.05* 1 1* 
Yemen 0* 54.8 53.0 64.8 0.09* 0 1* 
Zambia 1 64.1 42.1 93.7 0.24* 1 1* 
Note: * employed HANCI 2012 data where no updated data was available. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex B (cont’d.) 
 Time- bound 
nutrition 
targets 
National 
nutrition 
survey 
Constitutional 
right to food 
Women’s 
access to 
agricultural 
land 
Women’s 
economic 
rights 
Constitutional 
right to social 
security 
Enshrine 
ICMBS in 
domestic 
law 
Afghanistan 1* 1 1* 0.5* 0 0* 9* 
Angola 0* 1 2* 0.5* 1 1* 3* 
Bangladesh 1* 1 1 0.5* 1 1* 8* 
Benin 1* 1 1 0.0* 1 0* 9* 
Brazil 0* 0* 3 0.5* 1 1* 9* 
Burkina Faso 0* 1 1 0.5* 1 1* 9* 
Burundi 1* 1 2 0.0* 0 0* 4* 
Cambodia 1* 1 2 1.0* 1 1* 8* 
Cameroon 0* 1 1 0.0* 0 0* 9* 
China 1* 0* 1 0.5* 1 1* 8* 
Congo, DR 0* 1 3 0.5* 0 1* 7* 
Côte d’Ivoire 0* 1 1 0.5* 1 1* 4* 
Ethiopia 1* 1 2 0.5* 0 1* 7* 
Gambia 1* 1 1* 0.0* 1 0* 9* 
Ghana 1* 1 2 0.0* 1 1* 9* 
Guatemala 1* 0 3 0.5* 1 1* 9* 
Guinea Bissau 0* 1 1* 0.5* 0 0* 7* 
India 0* 0* 2 0.5* 1 1* 9* 
Indonesia 1* 1 1 1.0* 1 1* 8* 
Kenya 0* 1 3 0.5* 0 1 6* 
Lesotho 0* 0 2 1.0* 2 0* 3* 
Liberia 1* 1 2* 1.0* 2 1* 5* 
Madagascar 0* 1 1 0.5* 2 1* 9* 
Malawi 1* 1 3 0.5* 1 1* 8* 
Mali 0* 1 1 0.5* 0 1* 8* 
Mauritania 0* 1 1 0.5* 1 0* 3* 
Mozambique 0* 1 1 0.5* 1 0* 9* 
Myanmar 0* 1* 1* 0.5* 1* 0* 3* 
Nepal 1* 1 3 0.5* 1 1* 9* 
Niger 0* 1 1 0.5* 1 0* 8* 
Nigeria 1* 1 1 0.5* 0 1* 8* 
Pakistan 0* 1 2 0.5* 1 1* 9* 
Peru 0* 1 2 0.5* 1 1* 9* 
Philippines 1* 0 1 0.5* 1 1* 9* 
Rwanda 0* 1 1 0.5* 2 0* 4* 
Senegal 0* 1 1 1.0* 0 0* 8* 
Sierra Leone 1* 1 1 0.0* 0 1* 4* 
South Africa 0* 0 3 0.5* 1 1* 6* 
Sudan 0* 1 1 0.0* 0 1* 2* 
Tanzania 1* 1 1 0.5* 0 1* 9* 
Togo 1* 1 1 0.5* 1 1* 4* 
Uganda 1* 1 1 0.0* 0 1* 9* 
Vietnam 1* 1 1 0.5* 1 1* 8* 
Yemen 0* 0 1 0.5* 0 0* 9* 
Zambia 1* 0 1* 0.5* 0 0* 8* 
Note: * employed HANCI 2012 data where no updated data was available. 
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Annex C Political commitment within context 
Two principles are applied to demarcate four country groupings. First, each of the four 
groups contains the nearest approximation of a quarter of all Borda points that were 
distributed in the scoring process. As such, groups with the relatively higher commitment 
levels (based on aggregate Borda scores across themes and HRCI and NCI sub-indices) 
contain fewer countries. Second, countries with the same number of Borda points must be 
located in the same group. Table C.1 sets out resultant groupings. 
 
Table C.1 Relative political commitment groupings HANCI 2013 
High 
commitment 
HANCI 
Borda 
score 
Moderate 
commitment 
HANCI 
Borda 
score 
Low 
commitment 
HANCI 
Borda 
score 
Very low 
commitment 
HANCI 
Borda 
score 
Guatemala 227 Burkina Faso 195 South Africa 170 Zambia 139 
Peru 221 Gambia 195 India 169 Liberia 134 
Malawi 214 Ghana 194 China 163 Burundi 129 
Brazil 211 Philippines 192 Benin 162 Côte d’Ivoire 124 
Madagascar 209 Indonesia 190 Ethiopia 161 Nigeria 120 
Nepal 202 Rwanda 190 Niger 160 Lesotho 113 
Tanzania 196 Senegal 184 Mali 157 Togo 112 
  Vietnam 183 Mozambique 156 Mauritania 110 
Bangladesh 178 Cambodia 155 Cameroon 108 
Uganda 173 Kenya 148 Afghanistan 104 
  Pakistan 147 Yemen 95 
Sierra Leone 146 Congo,DR 94 
  Angola 93 
Myanmar 85 
Sudan 79 
Guinea Bissau 63 
 
113 
 
Table C.2 HANCI commitment levels and stunting levels for children 
under 5 years of age 
 % of under 5 stunting (severe and moderate) 
Low (<20) Medium (20–29) High (30–39) Very high (>=40) 
High 
commitment 
Brazil Peru  Guatemala 
Malawi 
Madagascar 
Nepal 
Tanzania 
Moderate 
commitment 
 Gambia 
Ghana 
Senegal 
Vietnam 
Burkina Faso 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Uganda 
Rwanda 
Bangladesh 
Low 
commitment 
China South Africa Mali 
Kenya 
India 
Benin 
Ethiopia 
Niger 
Mozambique 
Cambodia 
Pakistan 
Sierra Leone 
Very low 
commitment 
 Côte d’Ivoire 
Mauritania 
Angola 
Lesotho 
Togo 
Cameroon 
Myanmar 
Sudan 
Guinea Bissau 
Zambia 
Liberia 
Burundi 
Nigeria 
Afghanistan 
Yemen 
Congo, DR 
 
Worryingly, in those countries that have seen stunting increases over the last two 
decades, current levels of political commitment are low to very low. 
Many countries in this position are currently or have recently been afflicted by conflict (Sierra 
Leone, Côte d’Ivoire, Burundi, Yemen, Afghanistan and Sudan). 
Figure C.1 also shows that several countries buck the trend. Mauritania and Angola are 
among the countries showing the highest past decadal stunting reduction rates, yet they 
record low levels of current political commitment. In Angola, substantial non-agricultural 
economic growth (oil based) has lifted average incomes to among the highest in sub-
Saharan Africa. 
Alternatively, political commitment levels can be compared to countries’ hunger and 
undernutrition statuses as defined by the Global Hunger Index (Table C.3). The GHI is a 
composite index, calculated by combining hunger prevalence, child mortality and stunting 
prevalence data (IFPRI,Concern, Welthungerhilfe and IDS 2013). 
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Figure C.1 Decadal stunting trends (1990s–2000s) by country and HANCI 
country ranks 
 
Note: 1990s data is the average of 1992–2001 and 2000s data is the average of 2002–2011. 
 
Table C.3 HANCI political commitment and hunger and undernutrition 
status as per GHI 
 Low  
(<=4.9) 
Moderate  
(5.0–9.9) 
Serious  
(10.0–19.9) 
Alarming  
(20.0–29.9) 
Extremely 
alarming 
(>=30.0) 
High 
commitment 
Brazil Peru Guatemala 
Malawi 
Nepal 
Madagascar 
Tanzania 
 
Moderate 
commitment 
 Ghana 
Vietnam 
Gambia 
Philippines 
Indonesia 
Rwanda 
Senegal 
Bangladesh 
Uganda 
Burkina Faso  
Low 
commitment 
 South Africa 
China 
Benin 
Mali 
Cambodia 
Kenya 
Pakistan 
Ethiopia 
India 
Niger 
Mozambique 
Sierra Leone 
 
Very low 
commitment 
 Afghanistan 
Congo, DR 
Liberia 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Nigeria 
Lesotho 
Togo 
Mauritania 
Guinea Bissau 
Zambia 
Yemen 
Sudan 
Burundi 
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Table C.4 HANCI political commitment groupings versus Gross National 
Income 
 GNI per capita 2013, PPP (current international $) 
<1000 1000–1499 1500–1999 2000–3499 >=3500 
High 
commitment 
Malawi 
Madagascar 
Nepal Tanzania  Guatemala 
Peru 
Brazil 
Moderate 
commitment 
 Burkina Faso 
Rwanda 
Uganda 
Gambia 
Ghana 
Senegal 
Bangladesh Philippines 
Indonesia 
Vietnam 
Low 
commitment 
Niger Ethiopia 
Mali 
Mozambique 
Sierra Leone 
Benin 
Kenya 
Cambodia 
Pakistan 
South Africa 
India 
China 
Very low 
commitment 
Liberia 
Burundi 
Togo 
Congo,DR 
Guinea Bissau Zambia 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Afghanistan 
Nigeria 
Lesotho 
Mauritania 
Cameroon 
Yemen 
Sudan 
Angola 
 
Figure C.2 compares change in average annual GNI growth rates between the periods of 
1990–1999 and 2000–2011. The average growth rate for the two periods was calculated 
using purchasing power parity adjusted GNI per capita. We removed Angola from the figures, 
being a strong outlier. The overall fitted linear trend is weakly negative and statistically 
insignificant. This suggests that countries that reported increasing growth between the two 
decades were not able to achieve statistically significant reductions in stunting rates, 
affirming similar findings by Headey (2011). 
Figure C.2 sets out on the X-axis the difference in mean economic growth rates in the 2000s 
compared to the 1990s. Countries on the right-hand side of the Y-axis (in quadrants Q2 and 
Q3) experienced a acceleration of growth rates during the 2000s. Guatemala, Peru and 
Malawi, our top three countries, are in this group. Countries above the X-axis (Q1 and Q2) 
show worsening stunting rates during this period. In quadrant 2, therefore, we see countries 
that experience an acceleration of economic growth as well as stagnating or worsening 
stunting rates. For instance, in Sierra Leone strongly increased mean growth rates of up to 8 
per cent per annum (compared to the previous decade) did not go hand in hand with 
accelerations in stunting declines. In case of Benin, a 6 per cent GNI growth rate per annum 
is accompanied by worsening stunting rates. Nevertheless, for the majority of countries (Q3) 
positive economic growth trends go together with reducing rates of stunting. 
Figure C.3 presents the same data as Figure C.2 with a twist: it adds a coding scheme of 
symbols that demonstrates which countries have relatively high, moderate, low or very low 
political commitment (HANCI 2012 data). The diagram shows clearly that all countries above 
the X-axis (those with increasing stunting rates) are countries currently showing low or very 
low current political commitment. It also, somewhat puzzlingly, shows that two countries with 
the fastest stunting declines over the past two decades, Mauritania and Angola, currently 
have low levels of commitment. This report has not further investigated these outliers, and 
this is something that requires further attention in future. 
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Figure C.2 Change in mean annual GNI growth vs mean annual change in 
stunting rates for 1990s vs 2000s 
 
 
Figure C.3 HANCI political commitment levels, change in mean annual 
GNI growth vs mean annual change in stunting rates for 1990s 
vs 2000s 
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Finally, Figure C.4, using data for the decade 2003–2012, again suggests that there is a 
weak relation between levels of economic growth and deceleration in stunting rates. The 
reported R2 value suggests that this relationship is also not statistically significant and does 
not explain the observed data patterns well. 
Figure C.4 Annual change in stunting vs annual GNI growth rates, 2003–
2012 
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and undernutrition occur at all but the weakest levels of government effectiveness. Our data 
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Table C.5 HANCI political commitment and government effectiveness 
(World Governance Indicators 2013) 
 Government effectiveness (2012)a 
0–10 10–25 25–50 50–75 75–100 
High 
commitment 
 Madagascar 
Nepal 
Guatemala 
Peru 
Malawi 
Tanzania 
Brazil  
Moderate 
commitment 
 Bangladesh Gambia 
Burkina Faso 
Indonesia 
Senegal 
Vietnam 
Uganda 
Ghana 
Philippines 
Rwanda 
 
Low 
commitment 
 Mali 
Cambodia 
Pakistan 
Sierra Leone 
India 
Benin 
Ethiopia 
Niger 
Mozambique 
Kenya 
South Africa 
China 
 
Very low 
commitment 
Burundi 
Togo 
Afghanistan 
Yemen 
Congo,DR 
Myanmar 
Sudan 
Guinea Bissau 
Liberia 
Côte d’Ivoire 
Nigeria 
Mauritania 
Cameroon 
Angola 
Zambia 
Lesotho 
  
Source: aWorld Bank, Worldwide Governance Indicators. 
 
Figure C.5 A linear regression of HANCI rankings and government 
effectiveness levels 
 
Source: World Bank 2013e, World Governance Indicators. 
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Annex D Expert perceptions of commitment, 
by country and indicator 
Table D.1 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, Bangladesh 
Indicator44 2011: Hunger 
and Nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.37 2.75 3.10 2.84 3.12 
Government intention and action 2.34 2.47 2.74 2.41 2.72 
Locus of initiative 2.42 1.98  1.91 1.91 
Analytical rigour 2.50 3.13 3.18 2.83 3.05 
Learning and adaptation 3.05 2.97 3.09 2.40 2.71 
Public commitment 3.06 2.43 2.61 2.25 2.55 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 3.11 2.72 2.92 2.57 2.82 
Continuity of effort 3.32 2.97 3.28 2.75 3.14 
Credible incentives 3.90 3.99 4.02 3.58 3.71 
Political leadership – 2.79 2.90 2.74 2.74 
Overall score (mean of means) 2.91 2.80 2.96 2.63 2.85 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
 
Table D.2 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, India 
 Bihar Odisha Uttar Pradesh 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.47 2.80 3.91 3.92 4.60 4.61 
Government intention and action 2.77 2.80 2.62 2.62 3.46 3.46 
Locus of initiative 3.52 3.52 3.78 
Analytical rigour 4.00 3.97 3.25 3.25 3.73 3.73 
Learning and adaptation 3.86 3.80 3.05 3.18 2.96 3.02 
Public commitment 3.10 3.06 2.88 2.96 3.23 3.08 
Mobilisation of key stakeholders 3.77 3.74 3.16 3.28 3.39 3.20 
Continuity of effort 3.59 3.51 3.58 3.13 3.59 2.26 
Credible incentives 4.35 4.28 4.22 4.23 4.04 3.99 
Political leadership 3.33 3.36 3.13 3.17 3.43 3.43 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                               
44 Indicator definitions are presented in te Lintelo et al. (2013). 
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Table D.3 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, Nepal 
Indicator 2013 
Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.89 2.86 
Government intention and action 2.78 2.63 
Locus of initiative 2.10 2.10 
Analytical rigour 3.30 3.21 
Learning and adaptation 2.59 2.43 
Public commitment 2.82 2.71 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 2.84 2.70 
Continuity of effort 3.18 3.11 
Credible incentives 3.40 3.31 
Political leadership 3.42 3.42 
Overall score (mean of means) 2.93 2.85 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
 
Table D.4 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, Malawi 
 2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.13 2.57 2.59 2.63 
Government intention and action 2.13 2.55 2.28 2.47 
Locus of initiative 1.66 1.66 1.75 1.75 
Analytical rigour 2.15 2.69 2.60 2.72 
Learning and adaptation 2.31 2.51 2.17 2.35 
Public commitment 1.94 2.31 2.63 2.47 
Mobilisation of key stakeholders 2.31 2.46 2.44 2.52 
Continuity of effort 2.38 2.76 2.59 2.79 
Credible incentives 3.66 3.76 3.32 3.41 
Political leadership 2.74 2.74 2.66 2.66 
Mean of means 2.34 2.60 2.50 2.57 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
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Table D.5 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, Tanzania 
Indicator 2013 
Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.79 3.22 
Government intention & action 2.81 3.02 
Locus of initiative 2.07 2.07 
Analytical rigour 3.18 3.72 
Learning and adaptation 3.02 3.23 
Public commitment 3.14 3.28 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 3.16 3.23 
Continuity of effort 3.26 3.50 
Credible incentives 4.26 4.13 
Political leadership 3.08 3.08 
Overall score (mean of means) 3.08 3.25 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
 
Table D.6 Expert perceptions of public policies and programmes 
addressing hunger and undernutrition, Zambia 
Indicator 2011: 
Hunger and 
nutrition 
2012 2013 
Hunger Nutrition Hunger Nutrition 
Institutional coordination 2.19 2.84 3.12 2.60 2.88 
Government intention & action 2.01 2.66 2.91 2.69 3.14 
Locus of initiative 1.79 1.65  1.62 1.62 
Analytical rigour 3.10* 2.89 3.00 2.82 3.31 
Learning and adaptation 2.96 2.93 3.08 2.53 2.74 
Public commitment 2.49 2.44 2.65 2.29 2.80 
Mobilisation of stakeholders 3.00 2.85 2.92 2.66 2.95 
Continuity of effort 2.99 2.79 3.13 2.76 3.34 
Credible incentives 4.45 4.01 4.07 4.44 4.47 
Political leadership - 2.86 3.23 2.81 2.99 
Overall score (mean of means) 2.74 2.79 2.98 2.72 3.02 
Note: Mean score: 1 = very strong commitment; 5 = very weak commitment. 
*Recalculated from 2011 data to allow for comparability with 2012 data. 
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Table D.7 Expert perceptions on state government commitment towards addressing hunger and undernutrition, 
Bihar, Odisha, Uttar Pradesh (India) 2012 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Bihar – 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Odisha – 
Bihar 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
– Odisha 
Prob > F Bihar – 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Odisha – 
Bihar 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
– Odisha 
Prob > F 
To what extent are government policy preferences reflected in 
budget expenditures? 
0.127 0.176 0.997 0.087* 0.325 0.835 0.780 0.300 
How strong or weak would you, in general, characterise the 
government’s absolute (in money terms) budget expenditures on 
hunger and nutrition? 
0.382 0.023** 0.504 0.028** 0.467 0.281 0.987 0.232 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and 
undernutrition to electoral cycles? 
0.012** 0.003*** 0.000*** 0.000*** 0.063* 0.893 0.008*** 0.008*** 
How sensitive are government budget expenditures on hunger and 
undernutrition to emergencies/disasters? 
0.941 0.015** 0.061* 0.010** 0.596 0.743 0.991 0.492 
How well has the national government developed transparent 
financial mechanisms for earmarked funding? 
0.901 0.596 0.942 0.529 0.844 0.635 0.983 0.552 
What kind of a priority does the government give to hunger and 
nutrition? 
0.880 0.006*** 0.036** 0.004*** 0.282 0.003*** 0.236 0.005*** 
How well are the goals of improving hunger and nutrition outcomes 
expressed in government development strategies/policies? 
1.000 0.528 0.587 0.385 0.988 0.760 0.914 0.665 
What is the strength of (vertical) coordination efforts between 
national and subnational governments to improve hunger and 
nutrition outcomes? 
0.160 0.884 0.029** 0.029** 0.019** 0.999 0.021** 0.008*** 
How developed are government systems that generate knowledge 
and evidence to inform policy? 
0.005*** 0.056* 0.788 0.005*** 0.005*** 0.053* 0.782 0.005*** 
To what extent does the government enhance administrative 
capacity to address hunger and nutrition? 
1.000 0.515 0.543 0.358 0.975 0.889 0.649 0.566 
Notes: Pair-wise mean comparison by State (post hoc testing) was done using Sidak multiple-comparison test. Statistical significance of the overall F-test and post hoc tests: * at 10% level; ** at 5% 
level; *** at 1% level. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Table D.7 (cont’d.) 
 Hunger Nutrition 
Bihar – 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Odisha – 
Bihar 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
– Odisha 
Prob > F Bihar – 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
Odisha – 
Bihar 
Uttar 
Pradesh 
– Odisha 
Prob > F 
To what extent does the government enhance financial capacity to 
address hunger and nutrition? 
0.975 0.498 0.749 0.419 1.000 0.676 0.689 0.503 
How well are budget lines for hunger and nutrition developed? 0.935 1.000 0.934 0.829 0.962 0.907 0.672 0.595 
How accessible is government policy on hunger and nutrition to 
public scrutiny? 
0.050* 0.172 0.918 0.045** 0.159 0.653 0.730 0.160 
What is the strength of credible incentives for individual policymakers 
and implementers, and their agencies, to perform well? 
0.666 0.988 0.815 0.565 0.660 0.865 0.972 0.577 
To what extent do senior political leaders speak out against hunger 
and undernutrition? 
0.992 0.011** 0.005*** 0.002*** 0.874 1.000 0.889 0.744 
How well do senior politicians understand the status of hunger, 
undernutrition in the country? 
Hunger and Nutrition not separated 0.991 0.785 0.590 0.493 
How well do senior politicians understand causal factors of hunger, 
undernutrition in the country? 
Hunger and Nutrition not separated 0.868 1.000 0.852 0.718 
How well do senior politicians understand solutions to hunger, 
undernutrition? 
Hunger and Nutrition not separated 1.000 0.995 0.995 0.969 
How developed is presidential/prime ministerial leadership in the 
country on hunger and nutrition? 
0.914 0.998 0.839 0.740 0.998 0.999 0.989 0.962 
How well are (improved) hunger and nutrition outcomes set out as 
goals in political party manifestoes? 
0.970 0.575 0.312 0.262 0.973 0.612 0.350 0.294 
Donors support the government 0.328 0.827 0.798 0.304 0.319 0.668 0.916 0.291 
Media supports the government 0.075* 0.059* 1.000 0.034** 0.075* 0.153 0.974 0.057* 
Civil society supports the government 0.976 0.746 0.467 0.401 0.977 0.608 0.332 0.281 
The general public supports the government 0.988 0.265 0.401 0.197 0.952 0.413 0.706 0.355 
Opposition political parties support the government 0.843 0.053* 0.004*** 0.004*** 0.889 0.148 0.021** 0.020** 
Notes: Pair-wise mean comparison by State (post hoc testing) was done using Sidak multiple-comparison test. Statistical significance of the overall F-test and post hoc tests: * at 10% level; ** at 5% 
level; *** at 1% level. 
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Annex E Operationalisation of indicators 
Indicator Main source* URL† Operationalisation Year Variable 
name 
Government 
spending on 
agriculture 
IFPRI (SPEED database) 
and ReSAKSS calculations 
using IMF Government 
Statistics 
www.resakss.org/ 
www.ifpri.org/ 
Government expenditures on agriculture as share of total 
government expenditures (percentage) 
2005–11 agexpend 
Government 
spending on 
health 
WHO Nutrition Landscape 
Information System 
http://apps.who.int/nutrition/
landscape/report.aspx?rid=
161&template=nutrition 
Government expenditure on health as a share of total 
government expenditure (percentage) 
2010 healthexpend 
Nutrition 
budget 
SUN country summary 
reports (not in public 
domain); SUN country fiche; 
IDS Nutrition Governance; 
Save the Children Nutrition 
Barometer; WHO Landscape 
Analysis 
www.ids.ac.uk/nutritiongov
ernance 
0 = no budgets or where no confirming information could 
be found; 
0.5 = sectoral budgets for nutrition; 
1 = separate budget line for nutrition 
2011–12 nutribudget 
Security of 
access to land 
International Fund for 
Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) 
http://info.worldbank.org/go
vernance/wgi/pdf/IFD.xlsx 
Assesses the existence of an institutional, legal and 
market framework for secure land tenure and the 
procedure for land acquisition and accessibility to all. 
The Ratings Scale goes from 6 (high) through 1 (low), as 
follows: 
6 = Good for 3 years; 
5 = Good; 
4 = Moderately satisfactory; 
3 = Moderately unsatisfactory; 
2 = Unsatisfactory; 
1 = Unsatisfactory for 3 years. 
For coding details see p. 6 of: 
www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/80/e/EB-2003-80-R-3.pdf 
2012 landaccess 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. †The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2014 even though the data were extracted in 2013. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex E (cont’d.) 
Indicator Main source* URL† Operationalisation Year Variable 
name 
Access to agri. 
extension 
services 
International Fund for 
Agricultural Development 
(IFAD) 
http://info.worldbank.org/go
vernance/wgi/pdf/IFD.xlsx 
This indicator assesses to what extent the agricultural 
research and extension system is accessible to poor 
farmers, including women farmers, and is responsive to 
the needs and priorities of the poor farmers. Coding is 
done in the same manner as for the 'security of access to 
land' indicator. For coding details see p. 8 of: 
www.ifad.org/gbdocs/eb/80/e/EB-2003-80-R-3.pdf 
2011 rdaccess 
Civil 
registration of 
live births 
UNICEF: DHS/MICS www.childinfo.org/birth_regi
stration_tables.php 
Percentage of children under five years of age who were 
registered at the moment of the survey 
2005–10 birthreg 
Status of 
safety nets 
Transformation Index of the 
Bertelsmann Stiftung (BTI) 
www.bti-project.org/index/ 10 = Social safety nets are comprehensive; 
7 = Social safety nets are well developed, but do not 
cover all risks for all strata of the population; 
4 = Social safety nets are rudimentary and cover only few 
risks for a limited number of beneﬁciaries; 
1 = Social safety nets do not exist 
2010 welfare_statu
s 
Vitamin A 
coverage 
MICS4 Indicators, UNICEF 
field offices and WHO, 
Countdown to 2015 reports, 
author calculations based on 
country DHS data 
www.unicef.org/statistics/in
dex_countrystats.html 
The percentage of children aged 6–59 months who 
received 2 high doses of vitamin A supplements within 
the last year 
2007–10 vitamina 
Governments 
promote 
complementary 
feeding 
SUN Reports/world breast-
feeding trends initiative 
www.worldbreastfeedingtre
nds.org/report/51-country-
report.pdf 
Whether governments promote complementary feeding 
practices of children aged 6–9 months and continued 
breastfeeding of children at ages 12–15 and 20–23 
months. 0 = no; 1= yes 
2012 suppfood 
Access to 
drinking water 
WHO Nutrition Landscape 
Information System 
http://apps.who.int/nutrition/
landscape/report.aspx 
The percentage of population with access to an improved 
drinking water source 
2011 wateraccess 
Access to 
sanitation 
World Bank Database http://data.worldbank.org/in
dicator/SH.STA.ACSN 
The percentage of population with access to improved 
sanitation facilities 
2011 sanitaccess 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. †The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2014 even though the data were extracted in 2013. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex E (cont’d.) 
Indicator Main source* URL† Operationalisation Year Variable 
name 
Skilled birth 
attendance 
UNICEF: DHS/MICS www.childinfo.org/antenatal
_care_country.php 
Percentage of women aged 15–49 years attended at 
least once during pregnancy by skilled health personnel 
(doctor, nurse or midwife) 
2007–
2012 
preg 
Extent of 
nutrition 
features in 
national dev. 
policies 
Web-based searches See Annex F in HANCI 
report for a list of 
documents consulted for 
each country 
The total count of key search terms in a selected policy 
document divided by the number of pages in the 
document. Search terms: nutritio•.•; undernutrition/under-
nutrition; malnutrition/mal-nutrition nutrient; diet•.•; 
stunt•.•; wasting/wasted; short-for-age; short for age; 
height-for-age; height for age; weight-for-age; weight for 
age; weight for height; weight-for-height; underweight; 
under-weight; low birth weight; thinness; micro-nutrient; 
micronutrient; 1000 days; one thousand days; 
breastfeed•.•; behaviour change; behaviour change; Iron 
deficiency anaemi/anemi; zinc; deworm; de-worm; 
vitamin A; supplementary feed; complementary feed 
2013 npolicy 
National 
nutrition policy, 
plan or 
strategy 
EIU Global Food Security 
Index; Save the Children 
Nutrition barometer 
http://foodsecurityindex.eiu.
com/ 
www.savethechildren.org.u
k/sites/default/files/docs/Da
ta_for_Nutrition_Barometer
_0.pdf 
Whether a national nutrition policy, plan or strategy 
exists: 1 = yes; 0 = no 
2013 nplan 
Multi-sectoral 
and multi-
stakeholder 
coord. 
mechanism 
SUN fiches/Country docs  Whether a multi-sectoral and multi-stakeholder 
coordination mechanism exists: 0 = no; 1 = yes 
2011–
2012 
stakecoord 
Time-bound 
nutrition 
targets 
SUN 2.2, 2.3, / Save the 
Children nutrition barometer 
www.savethechildren.org.u
k/sites/default/files/docs/Da
ta_for_Nutrition_Barometer
_0.pdf 
Whether governments identify time-bound nutrition 
targets in public policy documents: 0= no; 1 = yes 
2011–
2013 
ntarget 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. †The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2014 even though the data were extracted in 2013. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex E (cont’d.) 
Indicator Main source* URL† Operationalisation Year Variable 
name 
National 
nutrition survey 
UNICEF www.childinfo.org/mics4_su
rveys.html 
Has there been a Demographic and Health Survey / 
Multiple Indicator Cluster Survey /comparable national 
nutrition survey in the past three years? 1 = Yes if the 
survey was dated 2010 or thereafter, or currently 
underway; 0 = No new survey undertaken after 2009 
2010–
2013 
dhs_mics 
Constitutional 
right to food 
FAO information paper www.fao.org/docrep/016/ap
554e/ap554e.pdf 
www.fao.org/docrep/MEETI
NG/007/J0574E.HTM 
Strong =3 
Constitutions explicitly recognise a Right to Food forall 
citizens, specific groups or incorporates the RTF under 
articles on living standards AND/OR Ratified international 
human rights law is automatically assigned equal status 
to constitutional law) 
Moderate =2 
Right to Food is implicit as part of a broader right in 
constitutional law. 
Weak =1 
RTF is included under Directive Principles OR Likely or 
ratified international human rights law is confirmed 
primacy over national law, but not equivalent to 
constitutional law 
2011 rtf 
Women’s 
access to 
agricultural 
land 
OECD's Gender, Institutions 
and Development Database 
(GID-DB) 
http://stats.oecd.org/Index.a
spx?datasetcode=GIDDB2
012 
Score based on women’s legal rights and de facto rights 
to own and/or access agricultural land. Value based on 
the following scale: 
0 = equal; 
0.5 = Women have equal legal rights but there are 
discriminatory practices against women’s access to and 
ownership of land in practice; 
1 = Women have no/few legal rights to access or own 
land or access is severely restricted by discriminatory 
practices. (note: in HANCI calculation, this scoring is 
reversed for consistency) 
2012 womenland 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. †The URLs were last confirmed 
live on 4 April 2014 even though the data were extracted in 2013. 
(Cont’d.) 
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Annex E (cont’d.) 
Indicator Main source* URL† Operationalisation Year Variable 
name 
Constitutional 
right to social 
security 
FAO information paper www.fao.org/docrep/MEETI
NG/007/J0574E.HTM 
The Constitution clearly references a right to social 
security (see Annex II of the source document). 0= no; 1= 
yes 
2006 rsocsec 
Women’s 
economic 
rights 
The Cingranelli-Richards 
(CIRI) Human Rights Data 
Project 
http://humanrightsdata.org/ The extent to which women have equal economic rights 
in law and in practice. 0: there were no economic rights 
for women in law and systematic discrimination based on 
sex may have been built into law; 
1 = women had some economic rights under law, but 
these rights were not effectively enforced; 
2 = women had some economic rights under law, and the 
government effectively enforced these rights in practice 
while still allowing a low level of discrimination against 
women in economic matters; 
3 = all or nearly all of women’s economic rights were 
guaranteed by law and the government fully and 
vigorously enforces these laws in practice 
2010 wecon 
Enshrine 
ICMBS in 
domestic law 
Unicef www.unicef.org/nutrition/file
s/State_of_the_Code_by_C
ountry_April2011.pdf 
The extent to which the International Code for Marketing 
of Breastmilk Substitutes is enshrined in law: 
9 = ICMBS is fully in law; 
8 = Many provisions of ICMBS are in law; 
7 = Few provisions are in law; 
6 = Voluntary adoption of all, or nearly all provisions of 
the ICMBS; 
5 = Some provisions voluntary; 
4 = Measure drafted awaiting final approval; 
3 = Being studied; 
2 = Action to end free breast milk substitutes; 
1 = No action 
2011 brstmlksub 
Note: *In addition to these main sources for some countries we sourced the data from specific country sources. These sources are highlighted in the online data base. †The URLs were last 
confirmed live on 4 April 2014 even though the data were extracted in 2013. 
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Annex F Policy documents analysed for 
nutrition key words 
Country Searched document Period 
Afghanistan Afghanistan National Development Strategy (ANDS) 2008–2013 
Angola MPLA Development Program 2012–2017 
Bangladesh 6th Five year Plan 2011–2015 
Benin Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy (GPRS) 2011–2015 
Brazil Plano Plurianual (PPA): Plano Mais Brasil 2012–2015 
Burkina Faso Strategy for Accelerated Growth and Sustainable Development (SCADD) 2011–2015 
Burundi PRSP II 2025 
Cambodia National Strategic Development Plan (NSDP) 2006–2010 
Cameroon Growth and Employment Strategy Paper (GESP) 2010–2020 
China 12th Five Year Plan (FYP) 2011–2015 
Côte d’Ivoire PRSP 2009–2015 
Congo, DR Poverty Reduction and Growth Strategy Paper (PRGSP) 2006–2008 
Ethiopia Growth and Transformation Plan (GTP) 2011–2015 
Gambia PRSP 2007–2011 
Ghana Ghana Shared Growth and Development Agenda (GSGDA) 2010–2013 
Guatemala Plan estratégico SEGEPLAN 2008–2012 
Guinea Bissau PRSP II 2011–2015 
India 11th Five Year Plan 2007–2012 
Indonesia National Medium-Term Development Plan (RPJMN) 2010–2014 
Kenya Kenya Vision 2030: First Medium Term Plan (MTP) 2008–2012 
Lesotho PRSP: National Strategic Development Plan 2013–2017 
Liberia Poverty Reduction Strategy (PRS) 2008–2011 
Madagascar Madagascar Action Plan (MAP) 2007–2012 
Malawi Malawi Growth and Development Strategy (MGDS) 2006–2011 
Mali PRSP II 2007–2011 
Mauritania PRSP III 2011–2015 
Mozambique Programa Quinquenal do Governo 2010–2014 
Myanmar Framework for Economic and Social Reforms (FESR) 2012–2015 
Nepal Three Year Intermin Plan 2007–2010 
Niger PRSP II: Accelerated Development and Poverty Reduction Strategy 
(ADPRS) 
2008–2012 
Nigeria PRSP: National Economic Empowerment and Development Strategy 
(NEEDS) 
2003–2007 
Pakistan Vision 2030 2007–2030 
Peru Plan Bicentenario: El Perú hacia el 2021 2011–2021 
Philippines Philippine Development Plan 2011–2016 
Rwanda PRSP 2008–2012 
Senegal PRSP II 2007–2015 
Sierra Leone PRSP II 2009–2012 
South Africa National Dev Plan: Vision for 2030 2012–2030 
Sudan The Five Year Plan 2007–2011 
Tanzania The Tanzania Development Vision 2025 2025 
Togo PRSP 2009–2011 
Uganda National Development Plan 2011–2015 
Vietnam Socio-Economic Development Plan 2006–2010 
Yemen Socio-Economic Development Plan for poverty reduction 2006–2010 
Zambia Vision 2030 2007–2030 
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